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Updating the Building Code to Include Indoor Farming 
Operations 
Clint Simpson* 
Abstract 
Urban agricultural production has grown to be a critical tool 
in the battles for food security and sustainability.  A common 
regulatory barrier to urban agricultural operations big and small has 
been ambiguity in land-use laws.  Local governments are 
increasingly friendly toward community gardens, small greenhouse 
farming operations, farmers markets, and the like.  Many have sought 
to lift regulatory restrictions and provide clarity in the law.   
However, while these efforts benefit a multitude of local 
food production efforts, they do little to address the regulatory 
ambiguities faced by commercial-scale, indoor farming operations, 
especially vertical farms.  Particularly concerning to indoor vertical 
farms are the ambiguities implicit in the International Building Code 
(“IBC”), which serves as the model building code for virtually every 
American municipality.  Currently, the IBC lacks any provisions 
contemplating buildings purposed for large-scale indoor crop 
production.  While some state governments have traditionally 
exempted agricultural buildings from this type of regulation, this is 
neither a safe nor feasible solution for indoor farming operations.  
This article seeks to provide alternative solutions. First, in the short 
term, local governments should provide clear statutory guidance 
concerning where indoor farming operations fit into the IBC scheme.  
Second, as a more sustainable solution, the International Code 
Council, should update the IBC to account for commercial-scale 
indoor farming operations by including such operations under a 
particular occupancy group.    
I.  Introduction 
 In recent years, there has been a drastic resurgence of urban 
agricultural practices.1  As people begin to prioritize self-sufficiency, 
 
* The author is a student of the University of Arkansas School of Law, Class of 
2020.  He would like to thank Professor Carl J. Circo for his guidance and comments 
throughout the process of writing the substantive portion of this note.  He would also 
like to thank his fellow editors on the Journal of Food Law & Policy, Collette Cox, 
Jaden Atkins, and Evangeline Bacon, for their help in editing and revising this note.  
Finally, the author would like to thank his wife, Keelie, and his family and friends 
for their unwavering support.  
1 See Michael Roberts & Margot Pollans, Setting the Table for Urban Agriculture, 
in URBAN AGRICULTURE: POLICY, LAW, STRATEGY, AND IMPLEMENTATION 3, 3–9 
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prefer locally sourced foods, and decrease their carbon footprints, 
urban agriculture stands as an attractive alternative to traditional 
models of food production.  Urban agricultural practices include 
raising livestock inside the city, small personal urban gardens, garden 
clubs, community-supported agriculture ventures, farmers markets, 
and larger commercial enterprises.2  Commercial vertical farming 
operations have grown alongside community-based farms and 
gardens,3 providing large-scale crop production with environmental 
advantages over traditional commercial crop production.4  While 
indoor vertical farms are growing, the largest challenge they face is 
in raising the capital necessary to get off the ground.5  Local 
governments can facilitate these fundraising efforts by making 
regulations more friendly to indoor vertical farming operations.  
Luckily, urban planning models that integrate local food 
production systems into the fabric of land use have grown in 
popularity, displacing the more restrictive traditional zoning 
systems.6  The broader trend of integrating agriculture into cities is 
known as “Urban Agrarianism.”7  Many city and county 
governments have updated zoning ordinances and other regulatory 
measures aimed at protecting small-scale urban agricultural 
practices.8  These measures focus more on expanding zoning 
permissions, offering tax incentives, and exempting certain 
structures from building codes.9  While helpful to community 
gardens and small, traditional farms, these policies shed very little 
light on how building codes will affect indoor vertical farms.  
Consequently, such policies leave large-scale, commercial urban 
farms out of the picture. 
This article highlights the need to fill the existing gaps in 
pro-urban agriculture policy schemes.  Specifically, it offers two 
courses of action—one intended to alleviate the problem in the short-
term, and the other intended as a more permanent fix.  First, local 
governments need to provide clarification as to which occupancy 
group governs indoor vertical farms.  Publishing opinion letters that 
 
(Am. Bar Assc. ed., 2015) (discussing the history and development of the current 
American urban agricultural trend).  
2 See id. at 4. 
3 See AGRILYST, STATE OF INDOOR FARMING 7 (2017).   
4 See generally Kheir Al-Kodmany, The Vertical Farm: A Review of Developments 
and Implications for the Vertical City, 8 BUILDINGS 24 (2018) (providing an 
overview of the benefits of vertical farming and the state of the industry). 
5 AGRILYST, supra note 3, at 36.  
6 Roberts & Pollans, supra note 1, at 12. 
7 Id.  
8 E.g., id. at 11–12. 
9 See infra Part V. 
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are directly on point is the easiest way to do this.  Second, the long-
term solution is to update building codes—specifically, the 
International Building Code (“IBC”)—alongside zoning ordinances, 
either by adding a new “occupancy group,” or adding statutory 
clarity to the existing occupancy groups.   
The background section of this article begins with a baseline 
description of indoor vertical farming and explains why state and 
local governments should seek to encourage the growth of 
commercial indoor vertical farming operations alongside small-scale 
urban agriculture.  The next section then outlines current zoning and 
building code barriers to urban agriculture, how local land-use 
regulations have evolved to address these barriers, and why these 
measures fail to address the current problems with building codes.  
The next section then discusses the current deficiencies in the 
International Building Code itself.  Finally, the discussion section of 
this article addresses why statutory clarification and modification of 
the International Building Code is the next logical step in 
encouraging indoor vertical farming.  
II.  Background 
A.  What is Indoor Vertical Farming? 
To understand indoor urban farming, one must first be 
familiar with urban agriculture generally.  A fitting and popular 
definition for urban agriculture is “the growing of plants and the 
raising of animals within and around cities.”10  As noted in the 
Introduction, this can include a variety of crop production formats—
from backyard and rooftop gardens to neighborhood gardens on 
combined lots.11   
From a very general standpoint, we can consider “indoor 
urban farming” to be the raising of plants in enclosed structures in an 
urban setting.  Indoor farming facilities may be constructed 
purposefully from the ground up or converted from existing 
buildings.  “Vertical farming” falls under the larger umbrella of 
indoor urban farming for the purposes of this article.12  In basic 
terms, vertical farming is the farming of crops distributed vertically 
rather than horizontally, as is done in traditional row-cropping.13  
 
10 Urban Agriculture, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE U.N., http://www.fao.org/urba 
n-agriculture/en/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2019). 
11 Roberts & Pollans, supra note 1, at 4. 
12 The “vertical farm” can be traced back as far as 600 A.D. to the Hanging Gardens 
of Babylon, but the modern concept of vertical farming refers primarily to indoor 
farming practices.  See Al-Kodmany, supra note 4, at 32.  
13 Id. 
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While outdoor vertical farming is a relevant practice, it is of less 
consequence for the purpose of this article.  Accordingly, as used in 
this article, “vertical farming” refers exclusively to vertical farming 
methods that require permanent building structures.14 
There are essentially three types of vertical farms: (1) small 
structures located on the rooftops of residential and commercial 
buildings; (2) farms constructed from tall buildings with several 
layers of growing beds (“modest-sized vertical farms”); and (3) what 
Kheir Al-Kodmany refers to as “visionary” multi-story buildings 
(“visionary vertical farms”).15  This article concerns the latter two.16 
One common method of building modest-sized vertical 
farms involves the conversion of abandoned factories or other 
industrial buildings, as this method can drastically cut start-up costs 
by eliminating the need to construct a new building.17  “The Plant” 
is one such farm.  The Plant is an indoor vertical aquaponic farming 
operation located in Chicago, Illinois, run by the non-profit 
organization, Plant Chicago.18  The Plant utilizes the “aquaponic” 
method—a combination of aquaculture and hydroponic food 
production—whereby a closed hydroponic system is created using a 
symbiotic relationship between the production of fish and crops.19  
The fish are grown for food production and their waste products are 
then used to provide the necessary nutrients for hydroponic crop 
production; the only required resource input is fish food.20  Like 
many other indoor vertical farms, The Plant utilizes an alternative 
energy source—in this case, an anaerobic digester—for some of its 
energy needs.21  Moving forward, The Plant will act as an excellent 
 
14 It is important to focus on permanent structures here because the vertical farming 
operations discussed require sturdy, permanent buildings.  Additionally, temporary 
agricultural buildings such a hoop houses are regulated much more loosely by the 
bulk of statutory land-use schemes.  E.g., infra Section V.D.  
15 See Al-Kodmany, supra note 4, at 2.   
16 Rooftop vertical farms are typically small in scale and of such a construction that 
they will reap the same regulatory benefits as traditional community gardens.  Nicole 
M. Reese, An Assessment of the Potential for Urban Rooftop Agriculture in West 
Oakland, California (May 16, 2014) (unpublished Master’s Projects and Capstones) 
(on file with the Gleeson Library, University of San Francisco). 
17 Lisa Tomlinson, Indoor Aquaponics in Abandoned Buildings: A Potential 
Solution to Food Deserts, 16 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 16, 18 (2017) 
(describing a case study of “The Plant,” an indoor farming operation built into the 
Peer Foods Factory building in Chicago, the owner of which purchased the building 
for the estimated value of the metal inside). 
18 Who We Are, PLANT CHICAGO, http://plantchicago.org/who-we-are (last visited 
Mar. 29, 2019). 
19 Tomlinson, supra note 17, at 16. 
20 Id.  
21 Id.  
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example of how vertical farming operations may run afoul of local 
regulations.22 
B. The Benefits of Indoor Vertical Farming 
 The last century saw a major shift in agricultural production, 
away from small-scale, family-owned farming operations and 
towards massive commercial farming operations.23  While this 
change in the industry allowed for significant gains in food 
production, modern row-crop farming methods have had a disastrous 
impact on the environment.24  Tilling practices designed to plow 
under the previous crop to prepare for the next crop increase soil 
erosion.25  No-tilling practices are not much better; while they limit 
soil erosion, they also require a much greater application of herbicide 
to kill the undesirable weeds that are normally prevented by tilling.26  
Indoor farming methods provide distinct advantages over traditional 
farming in these areas.27 
 One major benefit of indoor farming over traditional land-
based agriculture is the reduced use of resources such as water.  
Indoor farms can reduce water use by up to 90% when compared to 
traditional agricultural methods.28 Finally, indoor vertical farming 
completely eliminates the use of tractors for plowing, planting seeds, 
weeding, applying fertilizer, and harvesting, which collectively 
account for more than 20% of all gasoline and diesel fuel used in the 
United States.29 
 Another major benefit of indoor farming is increased yield 
resulting from several factors.  First, indoor farming allows for year-
round food production and is resistant to the effects of climate 
change.30  While traditional farming is dependent on favorable 
weather, indoor farming systems are climate-controlled with great 
 
22 See infra Section III.B. 
23 See Trautmann et. al, Modern Agriculture: Its Effects on the Environment, 
CORNELL COOP. EXT., http://psep.cce.cornell.edu/facts-slides-self/facts/mod-ag-
grw85.aspx (last visited Mar. 10, 2019) (discussing the effects of widespread use of 
fertilizers and herbicides in modern agriculture). 
24 Id.  
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Al-Kodmany, supra note 4, at 6 (“Designed to grow in a controlled, closed-loop 
environment, these farms would eliminate the need for harmful herbicides and 
pesticides, maximizing nutrition, and food value in the process.”). 
28 See Al-Kodmany, supra note 4, at 15, 19 (describing existing vertical farms in 
Memphis, Tennessee and Den Bosch, Holland).  
29 See Al-Kodmany, supra note 4, at 4 (discussing fossil fuel use under a traditional 
farming system). 
30 Id. at 26.  
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precision.31  Second, popular methods for indoor crop production are 
inherently more efficient; vertical hydroponic and aquaponic 
growing systems allow plants to take in nutrients at a much higher 
rate and produce faster growth.32  A recent study found that a thirty-
story vertical farm could produce 480 acres-worth of crop yield per 
acre of base area.33  This is not shocking when one considers that a 
single-story hydroponic greenhouse can produce 8.71 pounds per 
square foot of leafy greens compared to 0.69 pounds per square foot 
when using conventional methods.34 
 Finally, there are the secondary social and economic benefits 
derived from the production efficiencies described above.35  
Growing food indoors in urban areas supplies food during times 
when outdoor crop production is interrupted.36  Additionally, indoor 
vertical farming provides a method of crop production that can 
provide agricultural autonomy to areas with unfriendly climates.37  
Geographical regions that are hostile to traditional agriculture are 
often very friendly to alternative energy production, like wind, solar-
photovoltaics, and solar-thermovoltaics.38  This provides regions 
with an opportunity to establish sustainable crop production through 
the construction of alternative energy sources alongside indoor 
farming operations.39 
III.  Modern History of Land Use and Agriculture in 
the U.S. 
While the umbrella of land use controls stretches beyond 
zoning ordinances and building codes, these account for the bulk 
regulatory challenges faced by vertical farmers discussed in this 
article. This is because both zoning ordinances and building codes 
prohibit certain uses and structures depending on the situation.40  To 
understand where we are now and one reason why the IBC is in such 
 
31 Id. at 28. 
32 Id. at 7; see also Wilson Lennard & Simon Goddek, Aquaponics: The Basics, in 
AQUAPONICS FOOD PRODUCTION SYSTEMS: COMBINED AQUACULTURE AND 
HYDROPONIC PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGIES FOR THE FUTURE 113, 138–39 (Simon 
Goddek et al. eds., 2019). 
33 See Al-Kodmany, supra note 4, at 4. 
34 AGRILYST, supra note 3, at 14. 
35 See generally Chirantan Banerjee, Up, Up and Away! The Economics of Vertical 
Farming, 2 J. AGRIC. STUDIES 40, 51 (2014) (discussing the social and economic 
opportunities associated with vertical farming). 
36 See Al-Kodmany, supra note 4, at 28 (discussing the potential for indoor farming 
to provide a source of food during times of reduced yield and drought). 
37  Banerjee, supra note 35, at 51.  
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 See discussion infra Section III.A; see discussion infra Section III.B. 
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desperate need of update and clarification, one must first understand 
how land use controls came to exist in their present form.  Use-based 
zoning and building restrictions that are ambiguous in definition and 
scope—at least as it relates to agricultural purposes —create 
headaches best soothed with express statutory solutions.  This section 
outlines the basics of use-based zoning restrictions and modern 
building codes.  Specifically, it shows how ambiguities in the current 
law make it difficult or impossible to know how vertical farms will 
be treated from one urban area to the next.  
A.  Euclidian Zoning Ordinances 
Local government ordinances are the primary source of law 
for zoning regulations.41  Zoning laws are premised on state and local 
government police power.42  Local zoning regulation in the United 
States dates to the colonies, where land use controls were often a 
mayoral power.43  These controls frequently allowed for urban 
agriculture by their nature.44   
In the early twentieth century, new zoning practices started 
to take over. 45  The effect of this was that American cities relegated 
agricultural production out of urban areas.46  With the advent of 
railroads and refrigeration, perishable food did not have to originate 
as close by to be fresh for consumers.47  However, over the last 
decade, urban agriculture has seen an explosion in popularity, 
brought on by shifts in consumer priorities toward increased personal 
wellness and environmental sustainability.48   
Much of the zoning power of American city governments 
comes from iterations of the Standard Zoning Enabling Act, a model 
law created by the U.S. Department of Commerce in 1924.49  The 
power of local government to enact such measures was established 
 
41 Jeffrey P. LeJava & Michael J. Goonan, Zoning and Land Use Planning, 41 REAL 
EST. L. J. 216, 225 (2012).  
42 ROBERT R. WRIGHT & MORTON GITELMAN, LAND USE IN A NUTSHELL (West 
Publishing Co., 1978) (4th ed., 2000). 
43 JULIAN CONRAD JURGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND USE PLANNING 
AND DEVELOPMENT REGULATION LAW 44 (West Group eds., 2003). 
44 During this time, regulations were focused more on compelling development 
within cities through affirmative use obligations.  While agricultural land use 
regulations existed, they related to fencing property rather than restricting 
agricultural practices themselves.  See id.  
45 Id. 
46 Roberts & Pollans, supra note 1, at 206. 
47 Id. at 207. 
48 See id., at 201–02 (tracking a drastic increase in the mention of “urban agriculture” 
in the popular press and in law reviews and journals beginning in the mid-2000s). 
49 U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, A STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT § 1 
(revised ed. 1926); see also JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 43, at 68.  
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in the seminal case Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.50  In 
Euclid, the Supreme Court determined that a city government had the 
power to create and enforce zoning laws as part of its police power.51  
In other words, cities can establish zoning ordinances to provide for 
the health, safety, and welfare of citizens.52  Cities use this police 
power to safely manage their growth and development and keep 
undesirable activities and building structures out of certain areas.53   
The method of zoning that grew out of Euclid, “Euclidian 
Zoning,” still stands as the most common zoning method used 
today.54  The Euclidian Zoning model is predicated on the idea that 
some uses of land are appropriate for certain areas while others are 
not.55  Local governments regulate land use by partitioning land into 
districts based on the desired use.56 Common district categories 
include residential, commercial, mixed-use, industrial, and 
agricultural districts.57  Within each zone, particular uses may be 
deemed “approved,” “permitted,” or “as a right” if the governing 
body intended them to be allowed without interference.58   
Conditional use may be permitted on a particular lot for a purpose 
that is considered appropriate for the zone type in some, but not all, 
instances.59  Conversely, prohibited uses may not be allowed at all.60   
B.  Building Codes – The IBC 
While building codes share a common purpose with zoning 
ordinances in that they are intended to promote local health, safety, 
and welfare, they are distinct from zoning ordinances in that—rather 
than regulating the purpose of parcels of land—building codes 
regulate methods and materials and establish other minimum 
thresholds in the construction, maintenance, remodeling, and 
 
50 Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 389-90 (1926); see also 
JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 43, at 44–45. 
51 Vill. of Euclid, 272 U.S. at 387. 
52 JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 43, at 47. 
53 Id. at 68–69. 
54 Id. 
55 LeJava & Goonane supra note 41, at 226–27. 
56 Id. 
57 Heather Wooten & Amy Ackerman, Seeding the City: Land Use Policies to 
Promote Urban Agriculture 6, NAT’L POL’Y & LEGAL ANALYSIS NETWORK (2011). 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 20. 
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demolition of buildings.61  The IBC is frequently used as a model and 
has been adopted by most cities in the United States.62   
Like local zoning ordinances, the IBC groups different types 
of buildings, called“occupancy groups,” based on their intended 
use.63  Much of the IBC’s application is predicated on which 
occupancy group a given building falls under.64 For instance, the 
maximum number of stories and allowable height are determined by 
occupancy group.65  Occupancy groups include Assembly, Business, 
Educational, Factory, High-Hazard, Institutional, Mercantile, 
Residential, Storage, and Utility and Miscellaneous groups.66   
Without question, use-based regulatory schemes are an 
effective way to ensure public health, safety, and welfare.  There will 
always be certain spaces, structures, and activities that are 
incompatible—or even dangerous—with one another.  However, 
use-based restrictions can just as easily function as a barrier to urban 
agriculture.  This is particularly concerning where no forms of urban 
agriculture are provided for at all or where the limited provisions that 
do exist are vague in scope and definition.  In regard to vertical 
farming, knowing which occupancy group(s) a vertical farming 
structure may fit into is of substantial importance because it 
determines maximum height and number of stories, what zone a 
vertical farm can operate in, and whether the processing of crops is 
allowed on site.  
IV.  Current Barriers: What Stands in the Way? 
In the classic use-based restriction tradition, local regulatory 
barriers are designed with the purpose of either permitting or denying 
particular uses and structures in particular areas.  However, some 
land use barriers may arise inadvertently—as a consequence of 
statutory ambiguity, for instance.  For this reason, it helps to 
distinguish express or deliberate barriers to vertical farming from 
incidental barriers. 
 
61 JOHN MARTINEZ, Local Government Law § 16:27 (2018); see also Tomlinson, 
supra note 17, at 18. 
62 MARTINEZ, supra note 61, at § 16:27.  
63 INT’L BLDG. CODE §§ 303–312 (2018). 
64 See id. § 302.1. 
65 Id.  
66 Id. §§ 303–312. 
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Express restrictions can come in many forms, including lot 
size limitations,67 setback requirements,68 and restrictions on the sale 
of agricultural products.69  Inadvertent restrictions are more likely to 
come about through statutory omissions and ambiguities, often 
resulting from legislators failing to keep up with the times.  However, 
despite the fact that inadvertent barriers are unintentional by nature, 
they frequently have the effect of exposing certain uses of land to 
more express restrictions (i.e., failure to adequately define the scope 
of a particular occupancy group can expose some buildings to 
regulations that were not intended to apply to it).70 
A.  The Problem of Ambiguity 
The most readily-addressable barrier to vertical farming 
operations is the ambiguity inherent in existing zoning and building 
requirements.  Even cities seeking to expand urban agriculture 
generally may accidentally create ambiguities or fail to expressly 
include a given method of farming or raising livestock in such a way 
that prevents its propagation.  This concern is evidenced by the 
permeation of land use treatises discussing the definition of 
“agricultural use,” “agricultural building,” and similar terms.71  
 As discussed in the introduction to this article, urban 
agriculture embodies a vast spectrum of food production, including 
community gardens, backyard and rooftop gardens, commercial 
greenhouses, apiaries, backyard livestock, and more.72  With this 
variety of use and application available under the “urban agriculture” 
banner, local governments must take on the task of expressly 
providing for all those agricultural activities they intend to 
encourage.  The consequence of not carefully including and defining 
all potentially beneficial urban agricultural practices is that 
prospective farmers are exposed to legal and financial risk.73  
Additionally, because land use regulations include both zoning 
 
67 See New Rochelle, N.Y., City Code §§ 89-16, 89–17 (prohibiting the raising of 
livestock activities on lots less than two acres in size and mandating one acre per 
animal, even for the raising of chickens). 
68 Setback measures may even apply to accessory uses that are invaluable to vertical 
farming operations. See St. Paul, MN, Code of Ordinances, tit. VIII, ch. 300, § 343 
(restricting the height and area of solar power panels).  
69 LeJava & Goonan, supra note 41, at 227.  
70 See infra Section IV.C (discussing the consequences of vague definitions in the 
IBC). 
71 See 38 A.L.R. 5th 357 (discussing multiple state court decisions regarding the 
definitions of “agriculture,” “agricultural building,” “farm building,” and the like); 
see also Agricultural Exemptions, 4 AM. L. ZONING § 33:4 (5th ed.). 
72 LeJava & Goonan, supra note 41, at 217.  
73 Wooten & Ackerman, supra note 57, at 7. 
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ordinances and building codes, legislators must be careful to provide 
clarity in both regards.  
B.  Zoning Ambiguities 
The term “Urban Farm” provides an excellent example of 
ambiguity in legislation.  In Seattle, Washington, an “Urban Farm” 
is defined as a “use in which plants are grown for sale of the plants 
or their products, and in which the plants or their products are sold at 
the lot where they are grown, off-site, or both, and in which no other 
items are sold.”74  St. Paul, Minnesota defines the very same term as 
“a commercial growing operation that is generally larger in scale 
than a community garden.”75  By contrast, Minneapolis, Minnesota, 
defines the same term as “[a]n establishment where food or 
ornamental crops are grown or processed to be sold or donated that 
includes, but is not limited to, outdoor growing operations, indoor 
growing operations, vertical farms, aquaponics, aquaculture, 
hydroponics and rooftop farms.”76  It is easy to see here how 
statutory clarity dramatically improves one’s ability to understand 
how the law will apply to them.  
Another example of a zoning ordinance definition that tells 
a potential vertical farmer very little about their legal risk is found in 
Denver, Colorado.  The City of Denver provides for urban crop 
production as a non-primary, accessory use, defining “garden” as the 
“growing and cultivation of fruits, flowers, herbs, vegetables, and/or 
other plants” which may exist in addition to a residential structure.77  
On its face, this definition might encapsulate a respectable range of 
personal and commercial levels of crop production.  However, it is 
unlikely that a large indoor farming operation will be welcome in the 
zoning areas covered by this law, and prospective indoor farmers 
have only the scope of the term “accessory use” by which to judge 
their legal risk.  While the intent behind such language may be to 
open as many doors as possible, ambiguity stands in the doorway.   
C.  IBC Ambiguities 
Ambiguous and underdeveloped building codes act as 
another barrier to vertical farming development.  While the business 
group (“Group M”), factory group (“Group F”), and utility and 
 
74 Goldstein et al., Urban Agriculture: A Sixteen City Survey of Urban Agriculture 
Practices Across the Country 53, (Turner Envt’l. L. Clinic) (2011). 
75  St. Paul, MN., Urban Agriculture Plan Ch. 3.13 (2011), http://www.minneapolis 
mn.gov/www/groups/public/@cped/documents/webcontent/convert_265422.pdf; 
see also Goldstein et al., supra note 74, at 30. 
76 Minneapolis, MN, Code of Ordinances, tit. 20, ch. 520, § 12 (2019).  
77 DENVER, CO CITY CODE § 11.12.8.2 (2018); § 11.2.6 (2018). 
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miscellaneous group (“Group U”) all have potential relationships 
with indoor crop production, the IBC does not provide a definition 
that describes or encapsulates “vertical farming.”78  At best, Group 
U covers some kinds of agriculture-related structures under the term 
“agricultural building[s].”79 An “agricultural building” is defined as: 
A structure designed and constructed to house farm 
implements, hay, grain, poultry, livestock or other 
horticultural products.  This structure shall not be a 
place of human habitation or a place of employment 
where agricultural products are processed, treated or 
packaged, nor shall it be a place used by the public.80 
Of great importance is the fact that there is no language 
pertaining to the production, cultivation, or growing of crops in this 
definition.81  Nor does it expressly exclude such uses, prohibiting 
only habitation, processing, treating, packaging, employment, and 
public use for agricultural buildings.82  Consequently, any local 
government adopting these sections of the IBC without a 
supplemental definition of “agricultural building” fails to provide 
statutory clarity regarding buildings that actually operate as farms.   
Outside of the Group U provision’s description of 
agricultural buildings, the only other mention of food production in 
the IBC is under Group F, which includes buildings used for 
“assembling, disassembling, fabricating, finishing, manufacturing, 
packaging, repair or processing operations that are not classified as a 
Group H hazardous or Group S storage occupancy,” although the list 
is not exhaustive.83  The IBC lists “food processing establishments 
and commercial kitchens not associated with restaurants, cafeterias, 
and similar dining facilities more than 2,500 square feet in area” 
under the Moderate-Hazard Factory Industrial Group (“Group F-
1”).84  While filing vertical farms under Group F-1 would foreclose 
on much of our problem—and make sense given that conversion of 
factory buildings is such an attractive starting point for vertical 
 
78 See Tomlinson supra note 17, at 21 (discussing the City of Phoenix’s 
interpretation of the IBC).  
79 INT’L BLDG. CODE § 202 (2018). 
80 Id. 
81 Note that “crop production” and “horticulture” are not used interchangeably in 
most statutory schemes.  See id; see also INT’L BLDG. CODE § C101.1 (2018). 
82 While the IBC does not define “habitation” specifically, it defines a “habitable 
space” as “[a] space in a building for living, sleeping, eating or cooking,” and 
expressly excludes “[b]athrooms, toilet rooms, closets, halls, storage or utility 
spaces . . .”  INT’L BLDG. CODE § 202 (2018). 
83 Id. § 306.1. 
84 Id. § 306.2. 
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farms—it is hard to construe this language in such a way so as to 
capture indoor commercial crop production (absent an express 
provision). 
Other occupancy definitions of the IBC do not lend much 
more support.  For instance, the IBC also includes “incidental uses,” 
which it defines as “ancillary functions associated with a given 
occupancy that generally pose a greater level of risk to that 
occupancy.”85  However, these uses are restricted to those expressly 
listed in IBC Table 509, which includes things like furnaces and 
stationary battery storage, but nothing involving indoor farming or 
agriculture generally.86 
The IBC’s treatment of construction materials further 
complicates the building code scheme.  The IBC separates 
occupancy groups into sub-groups based on their elemental 
construction materials.87  IBC height and space requirements are 
determined based on the occupancy group, the construction type, and 
the existence of automatic sprinkler systems.88  While this is all very 
straightforward on its face, complications can quickly arise in a 
mixed-use scenario.  A single building may be subject to several 
conflicting height and occupancy restrictions based on the occupancy 
group and construction materials.89  
If the mixed-use conundrum were not enough, further 
complicating issues like the conversion of existing buildings into 
vertical farms is the fact that the IBC provides that, when a building 
changes occupancy groups, it must meet the requirements of 
additional codes, such as the International Energy Conservation 
Code (“IECC”), at least where adopted.90  Like the IBC, application 
of the IECC depends in large part on the occupancy group a structure 
fits into.  This exacerbates the effect of the statutory ambiguity.   
V.  Analysis 
A.  Current Solutions: What They Are, and Why They Fail 
Without the IBC 
 While restrictive, use-based urban planning models still 
account for the majority of local ordinances, urban agriculture-
 
85 Id. § 509.1. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. § 504.2. 
88 See id. § 504.3–504.4. 
89 See id.  
90 See INT’L ENERGY CONSERVATION CODE § 505C (requiring any buildings 
undergoing a change in occupancy group to comply with IECC provisions if the 
change in use results in increased use of electrical energy or fossil fuels).  
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friendly models are coming back into the foreground.91  This increase 
in public interest in urban agriculture has expanded into the legal 
profession as well, with the mention of “urban agriculture” in law 
journals increasing dramatically after 2008.92  Specifically, there is a 
shift in agricultural law away from the historical purpose of 
preserving rural agricultural and toward legalizing and promoting 
urban agricultural practices.93  This urban planning movement—
which is designed to implement urban agrarianism—is known as 
“agricultural urbanism.”94  Agricultural urbanism operates as an 
alternative to use-based urban planning in that it advocates for 
sustainable urban agriculture as a mandated use, providing that 
portions of land in a community are to be set aside for food 
production.95  This is analogous to the function of inclusionary 
zoning for urban housing.96 
Much of the current legal discourse pertains to the need for 
changes at the state and local level.97  At these levels, legal efforts 
geared toward the expansion of urban agriculture include approaches 
such as changes in municipal zoning codes,98 property tax 
incentives,99 and agricultural exemptions from land use laws.100  
These measures have been successful in breaking down regulatory 
barriers and fostering community-based urban agriculture systems.  
But, assuming the ultimate goal is to foster food security and 
environmental sustainability, such measures must also address 
commercial-scale vertical crop production.  These efforts fall short if 
building codes are left untouched.  Pay careful attention to the 
measures described below and where they fail to fill the gap left by 
the outdated IBC.  
 
91 Roberts & Pollans, supra note 1, at 9. 
92 Id. at 5, Table 2. 
93 See id. at 11 nn. 46–47. 
94 Id. at 11 nn. 46-47. 
95 Id. 
96 Inclusionary zoning sets aside land for specific types of housing.  See 
JURGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 43 at 6:7.  
97 See, e.g., Wooten & Ackerman, supra note 57, at 10–15 (outlining a plethora of 
legal frameworks promoting urban agriculture generally). 
98 Kathryn A. Peters, Current and Emerging Issues in the New Urban Agriculture: 
A Case Study, 7 J. FOOD L. & POL'Y 297, 313–28 (2011) (discussing zoning 
measures).  
99 See also UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-2-1703 (West 2014) (granting tax incentives to 
urban farming operations that fall within certain lot size specifications and that have 
been in operation for at least two years prior to application for the applicable tax 
incentive); see also Roberts & Pollans, supra note 1, at 11–12. 
100 LeJava & Goonan, supra note 41, at 227; see also Wooten & Ackerman supra 
note 57, at 14. 
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B.  Zoning Updates 
In the midst of use-restriction ambiguities, many cities are 
making moves in the right direction by updating their zoning 
provisions to expressly include desired forms of agriculture.  
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, for example, has amended its zoning 
provisions to permit urban agriculture as a primary or accessory use 
depending on the zone.101  It expressly provides for commercial crop 
production as well.102  Similar measures have been enacted in Jersey 
City, New Jersey,103 and Seattle, Washington.104  Kansas City, 
Missouri is another city on the rise.  Specifically providing for 
commercial crop production, Kansas City enacted a zoning 
exemption for “crop agriculture,” or crop production intended for 
sale off-site.105  However, this measure still expressly requires that 
all agricultural buildings comply with the applicable building 
code.106 
These zoning permission updates are friendly to urban 
agriculture generally and appear to pave the way for vertical farming 
operations.  However, each of these cities still requires that 
agricultural buildings comply with relevant building codes or 
contemplate buildings in a way that clearly fails to consider vertical 
farms.107  While express zoning permission alleviates concerns 
around whether a parcel of land is appropriate for vertical farming, it 
does nothing to address the difficulties of applying the building code 
to the vertical farm buildings.108  This illustrates why zoning 
revisions alone cannot bridge the gap to allowing vertical farming.  
C.  Tax Incentives 
 Another area where local governments are trying to foster 
growth is in property tax exemptions.  Tax incentives seek to foster 
 
101 PITTSBURGH, PA., CITY CODE § 911.04.A.2(a)-(c) (2018), § 912.07 (2015). 
102 Id. 
103 JERSEY CITY, N.J. CODE OF ORDINANCES § 345-60(V.1) (2011). 
104 SEATTLE, WASH., CITY CODE §§ 23.42.051-.052 (2010). 
105 CULTIVATE KC, Growing Good Food in Kansas City Neighborhoods: A Guide to 
Urban Agriculture Codes in KCMO 4, https://www.cultivatekc.org/wp-content/upl 
oads/2019/02/CultivateKC_Booklet_Codes_KCMO.pdf (last updated Apr., 2015). 
106 Id. 
107 See, e.g., JERSEY CITY, N.J. CODE OF ORDINANCES § 345-60(V.1); see also 
SEATTLE, WASH., CITY CODE § 23.42.051 (restricting “[s]tructures for urban farm 
use” to a height of twelve feet). 
108 Buildings utilized in operations such as The Plant in Chicago, Illinois, illustrate 
the difficulty here.  See Chi., Ill. Municipal Code § 17-9-0103.3 (2017) (failing to 
mention of buildings being used in vertical farm operations).  See generally BUBBLY 
DYNAMICS, LLC, The Plant, https://www.bubblydynamics.com/the-plant/ (last 
visited Oct. 9, 2018) (describing the concept, purpose, and physical characteristics 
of The Plant by the company that owns and operates it).  
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the growth of urban agricultural operations by providing financial 
incentives to offset start-up costs.  This could be very important to 
prospective vertical farmers worried about how they will pay for 
labor, materials, property taxes, and building permits.  States with 
tax incentives targeting urban agriculture include Utah, California, 
Maryland, New Jersey, Minnesota, and Missouri.109  However, as 
with many zoning updates, some will fall short of encouraging the 
growth of vertical farming operations.  Some tax incentives may not 
apply to prospective vertical farmers at all, as the land or structure in 
question falls outside the requirements for the incentives. 
Utah requires that the lot size be at least two but not more 
than five acres in area and that the lot was used for at least two 
successive years preceding the tax year.110  Because the purpose of 
vertical farming indoors is to limit land use, this is antithetical to 
vertical farming’s mission.  Likewise, a prospective farmer would 
have to farm the land for two years before applying for the tax 
exemption and building a vertical farm.  
 California’s Urban Agriculture Incentive Zones Act (“UAIZ 
Act”) allows acreage from one-tenth of an acre to a maximum of 
three acres, but only applies to “vacant, unimproved, or blighted 
lands [that can be] converted for small-scale agricultural use.”  Here 
again, a potential farmer looking to benefit from this law to develop 
a vertical farm is out of luck.  They are restricted to small-scale 
production, which eliminates any profitability.  This also further 
exacerbates the challenge of getting capital funding in the first place.  
 Missouri’s Urban Agriculture Zone Exemption is quite 
promising.  It is likewise limited to blighted areas, but the definition 
of “blighted” targets existing, run-down lots in urban areas.111  This 
law is specifically beneficial to indoor vertical farming operations 
that seek to convert abandoned factory buildings or similar structures 
into vertical farm sites.  However, like every tax exemption example 
given thus far, any buildings used or constructed on the property 
must comply with Missouri’s version of the IBC.112  
 
109 Roberts & Pollans, supra note 1, at 12; see Martha Harrell Chumbler, The Tax 
Implications of Urban Agriculture: Liabilities and Incentives, in URBAN 
AGRICULTURE: POLICY, STRATEGY, AND IMPLEMENTATION 173, 173-194 (Martha H. 
Chumbler et al. eds., 2015) (outlining various municipal and state approaches to 
offering tax incentives for urban agricultural land use).   
110 UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-2-1703 (West 2019).  Note that the lot size restriction will 
decrease to a minimum of one acre in 2020.  
111 See Roberts & Pollans, supra note 1, at 182. 
112 MO. REV. STAT. §§262.900.1–.2 (2014); see also Roberts & Pollans, supra note 
1, at 182. 
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D.  Agricultural Building Code Exemptions 
Agricultural building exemptions are generally applied at the 
state level to address concerns like the one this article focuses on.113  
While the IBC does not contain any agricultural exemptions itself, a 
state government may preempt certain locally adopted portions of the 
IBC to affect them.114  Some exemptions pertain to building codes 
and zoning ordinances alike.115  Unfortunately, agricultural 
exemptions to the building code often fail for three reasons.  First, 
they are subject to the same ambiguity problems discussed 
throughout the article thus far.  Second, much like the tax incentives 
discussed above, building code exemptions often impose conditions 
that new vertical farming operations will find impracticable if not 
outright impossible to meet. Third, there is a legitimate concern that 
exempting large structures from building regulations poses a risk to 
public welfare—both from a human health and economic 
perspective. 
First, many agricultural exemptions simply will not apply to 
vertical farm buildings, either expressly or because they suffer from 
the same ambiguity problems inherent in the IBC occupancy group 
definitions.116  Because many exemptions tend to reference the 
“agricultural building” as defined under Group U, the confusion 
surrounding what types of buildings are covered remains.117  This 
 
113 E.g., FLA. STAT. § 163.3162 (2018).  
114 FLA. STAT. § 163.3162 (“[A] county may not exercise any of its power to adopt 
any ordinance, resolution, regulation, rule, or policy to prohibit, restrict, regulate, or 
otherwise limit an activity of a bona fide farm operation on land classified as 
agricultural land.”); IOWA CODE § 335.2 (“[N]o ordinance adopted under this chapter 
applies to land, farm houses, farm barns, farm outbuildings, or other buildings or 
structures which are primarily adapted, by reason of nature and area, for use for 
agricultural purposes, while so used.”). 
115 MO. REV. STAT. § 65.677(2018) (township zoning “shall not be exercised so as 
to impose regulations or to require permits with respect to land, used or to be used 
for the raising of crops, orchards, or forestry or with respect to the erection, 
maintenance, repair, alteration or extension of farm buildings or farm structures.”)  
116 See e.g., CANYON CTY. BLDG. DEP’T, AGRICULTURAL BUILDING EXEMPTION 
(citing CANYON CTY., IDAHO BLDG. CODE ORDINANCE 04-11 §§ 06-01-07, 09(4)), 
https://www.canyonco.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Agricultural-Building-
Exemption-Rev.pdf.; see also 2006 MISS. AG LEXIS 321, *17 (Opinion No. 2006-
00436) (stating that structure must be used for storing farm products or implements 
or will be used to shelter livestock). 
117 E.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 674:32-c (“The tilling of soil and the growing and 
harvesting of crops and horticultural commodities, as a primary or accessory use, 
shall not be prohibited in any district. Nothing in this subdivision shall exempt new, 
re-established, or expanded agricultural operations from generally applicable 
building and site requirements . . .”).  Note that because many vertical farming 
operations convert old factory buildings or similar structures, this limitation fails to 
reach vertical farming as we have discussed it here.  
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was recently the subject of an Attorney General’s Opinion letter from 
Mississippi, which determined that exemptions must be decided on 
a case-by-case basis.118 
 Second, agricultural exemptions often come with conditions 
precedent that preclude new vertical farming operations.119  
Requirements include minimum acreage, preexisting ground-crop 
farming operations, strict zoning qualifications, and the like.120  As 
one Idaho county’s opinion letter stated, “[i]f you are not farming the 
ground on which your Agricultural Building (“Barn”) is to be placed; 
you probably do not qualify for an Agricultural Building 
Exemption.”121 
 Third, even when the agricultural building exemptions do 
apply, it is not clear that they should.  There is a genuine concern that 
larger buildings of greater economic importance should be subject to 
building code regulations.  A white paper from the Minnesota 
Governor’s Council on Fire Prevention and Control discussed this 
issue in November of 2010.122  With an apparent sense of urgency, 
this white paper discussed losses related to snow-load collapse, 
windstorms, and fire.123  It concluded that non-engineered and 
partially-engineered structures lack the structural accounting and 
oversight to provide adequate safety for workers and pose a risk to 
insurance companies.124  While this is a larger policy issue in and of 
itself, it calls into question whether agricultural exemptions can be a 
meaningful part of the solution where vertical farming is involved, 
especially when considering the types of structures involved in these 
operations.  
 
118 See 2006 MISS. AG LEXIS 321, *17 (Opinion No. 2006-00436); see also Hinds 
County Board of Supervisors v. Leggette, 833 So. 2d 586, 592 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002) 
(discussing factors and guidelines for making a factual determination as to what the 
definition of an “agricultural operation” is in regard to a zoning exemption). 
119 See CANYON CTY. BLDG. DEP’T, AGRICULTURAL BUILDING EXEMPTION (citing 
CANYON CTY., IDAHO BLDG. CODE ORDINANCE 04-11 §§ 06-01-07, 09(4)), 
https://www.canyonco.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Agricultural-Building-
Exemption-Rev.pdf.   
120 Id. (requiring that buildings be constructed on a single parcel of no less than five 
acres and in an agricultural district).  
121 Id. 
122 See MINN. GOVERNOR’S COUNCIL ON FIRE PREVENTION & CONTROL, BUILDING 
CODE EXEMPTIONS FOR AGRICULTURAL BUILDINGS 4–5 (Nov. 24, 2010) (discussing 
the risks associated with the exemption from the state building code for agricultural 
buildings) [hereinafter WHITE PAPER]; see also Kuehl v. Cass Cty., 555 N.W.2d 686, 
688–9 (Iowa 1996) (citing IOWA CODE § 335.2 (1995)) (ruling that hog barns 
sufficient to house 900 feeder hogs are exempt from building codes). 
123 WHITE PAPER, supra note 122, at 3.  
124 Id. at 5. 
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VI.  Analysis: Solutions 
A.  Statutory Interpretation:  Falling Just Short 
One local government has attempted to tackle the issue of 
vagueness in the IBC with administrative guidance.  Phoenix, 
Arizona, concerned with the IBC’s rigidity on urban agriculture, 
updated its interpretation of the IBC to account for modern 
agricultural practices by recognizing that commercial-scale indoor 
agriculture differs from the accessory buildings allowed under Group 
U.125  To remedy this, Phoenix expressly declared that, under its new 
interpretation, buildings used as growing areas fall under either 
Group F or Group U designations.126  However, any indoor farm 
wanting to undertake retail sales also falls under Group M.127 
Phoenix accomplished a great thing here by clarifying the 
application of its building code for many prospective indoor farmers.  
However, the Phoenix scheme is not perfect.  Because Group U, 
Group F-1, and Group M buildings each carry their own permitting 
requirements and limitations, any mixed-use building must jump 
through the same or similar hoops mentioned earlier.128  For a farm 
attempting to grow, wash, and sell produce at the same building site, 
it is a daunting task to keep up with three separate use group 
provisions and all that they entail.  Additionally, these provisions still 
lack language for common indoor farming practices like those used 
in aquaponics, as they contain no language pertaining to the 
production of livestock.129   
Consider the previously described Chicago-based farm, The 
Plant.130  The Plant utilizes a converted factory to grow hydroponic 
produce and raise fish in a closed system; it also incorporates an 
anaerobic digester as a source of some of its electrical energy.  This 
complex and varied usage is left unaddressed by the City of 
Phoenix’s efforts.131   In fact, the inclusion of fish in The Plant’s 
production scheme pushes the farm back into the same unknown 
territory previously inhabited by “agricultural buildings” under 
Group U, as the IBC states that livestock must be housed in 
 
125 See CITY OF PHOENIX, INDOOR AGRICULTURAL OCCUPANCY CLASSIFICATIONS 
(2013), https://www.phoenix.gov/pddsite/Documents/TRT/dsd_trt_pdf_00756.pdf; 
see also Tomlinson supra note 17, at 21 (discussing the clarification). 
126 Id. 
127 Id. 
128 Id.  
129 Id. 
130 See supra Section II.A. 
131 See CITY OF PHOENIX, supra note 125.  
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“agricultural buildings.”132  This potentially creates an inherent 
contradiction in the IBC’s treatment of such a building because, even 
under the Phoenix interpretation, The Plant is both expressly not an 
“agricultural building” where it is used for the production of crops 
and is an “agricultural building” where it is used for the production 
of livestock.  
Critiques aside, the City of Phoenix has provided local 
lawmakers with the building blocks of a solid short-term solution to 
ambiguity in the IBC. The concern with statutory clarification is not 
that it fails as a solution outright; indeed, explicit clarification as to 
which occupancy group a farm building falls under is a step in the 
right direction.  Rather, the concern with statutory clarification is that 
it can only go so far in the face of a nuanced, still-developing 
industry.  In other words, efforts like the City of Phoenix’s opinion 
letter operate as useful, but temporary, salve to the problem of 
ambiguity until a more permanent solution is available.  
B.  Updating the IBC 
The more sustainable solution is a change to the law.  The 
problems highlighted in this article may be solved with something as 
simple as the addition of new definitions, or carefully worded 
interpretations.  For building codes, this means a straightforward 
modification of the IBC occupancy groups.  Because virtually every 
building code in the United States is modeled after the IBC and states 
re-adopt the revised IBC every few years, changing the IBC directly 
would mean that local governments are essentially required to do 
nothing beyond continuing to adopt updated versions of the IBC.  
The IBC would simply be changed at the top and adopted by the 
states as usual.  This is far more efficient than waiting on each state, 
county, or municipal government to adopt its own interpretation of 
the existing occupancy groups to facilitate vertical farming.  
 The only remaining question is which occupancy group to 
use.  Given the trend in converting old factory buildings to vertical 
farms—as well as the need for flexibility in height and story limits—
the most fitting occupancy group currently is the Group F.  If the IBC 
were modified to incorporate “indoor crop farming” into Group F, 
particularly Group F-2, the following goals would be accomplished.  
First, the ambiguities that plague prospective vertical farmers now 
would be eliminated.  Second, it would avoid the massive complexity 
of mixed-use in regard to all the various permits and hoops that 
prospective farming operations would have to jump through.  Third, 
the contradictions in IBC use and height restrictions would be 
 
132 INT’L BLDG. CODE § 302.1. 
2019]                  UPDATING THE BUILDING CODE                  21 
 
 
avoided, as indoor farm building would no longer potentially fall 
under the Group U or Group M categories.   
VII.  Conclusion 
As described above, the popular regulatory measures of 
updating zoning plans, providing tax incentives, and passing 
statewide agricultural exemptions, are wholly inadequate for the 
purpose of fostering vertical farming operations in urban 
environments.  Updated zoning plans tend to benefit community 
agriculture, but fail to consider large vertical farming operations and 
leave such operations at the mercy of statutory ambiguities.  Tax 
incentives and statewide exemptions from the building code likewise 
fail to reach vertical farming buildings, either due to ambiguity or 
disadvantageous conditions.  Additionally, there are seemingly 
legitimate public policy reasons for not allowing building code 
exemptions for large, costly structures.  Statutory interpretation may 
alleviate certain problems in the short-term, but still leave some long-
term issues with mixed-usage, particularly for farms that want to sell 
produce on-site.  Updating the IBC will alleviate all of these 
problems and allow local governments to facilitate the growth of 
vertical farming in the future.  
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Abstract 
Trade in food and agricultural products accounts for a 
major part of global trade, and the trade continues to alert domestic 
consumers to the risks associated with modern food processing and 
production methods.  The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement 
(TPP), now rebranded as the Comprehensive and Progressive 
Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), represents a new 
model of mega-regional trade pacts posed to set higher standards 
for promoting and streamlining trade liberalization.  Because of 
concerns with national food safety regulations that could constitute 
forms of non-tariff barriers, the CPTPP, in contrast to the World 
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Trade Organization (WTO), stipulates further rules on parties’ 
sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS), achieving a type of role 
model of SPS-plus.   
This article explores the legal implications and 
progressiveness of the SPS-plus design, particularly focusing on the 
requirements of scientific evidence and risk analysis.  The 
SPS-plus that sets hurdles for national regulatory regimes largely 
reflects WTO jurisprudence, international health standards, and the 
national regulations of the United States.  I argue that the role 
model may provide momentum to modernize parties’ food safety 
regimes, but the cost of full compliance could be high.  Genuine 
collaboration, experience-sharing, and technological and financial 
support between developed countries and less developed countries 
may alleviate the difficulties of implementation and promote 
coherence. 
Key words: CPTPP, SPS-Plus, Food Safety, Science, Risk Analysis 
I.  Introduction 
Food trade accounts for a major part of global trade, and 
domestic consumers are increasingly wary of the safety of imported 
foods.  Although food trade can ensure food security for countries 
that cannot sustain themselves, it may also engender risks that 
originate from modern food processing and production methods.  
Therefore, national food authorities are expected to manage food 
risks cautiously.  Risk analysis consists of three components, 
namely risk assessment, risk management, and risk communication, 
which has become an important mechanism of risk control.    
The incorporation of risk analysis in food regulations has 
succeeded at global and local levels in ensuring food safety.  The 
Codex Alimentarius Commission (CAC), a World Health 
Organization (WHO) and Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) 
subsidiary, is the leading international food safety institution.  The 
CAC not only engages in risk analysis in setting international food 
standards, but also promotes the implementation of risk analysis 
within national regimes.1  The WHO and the FAO have jointly 
produced a guidance document to help national authorities establish 
food safety risk analysis regimes.2  Nonetheless, the document, 
 
1 CODEX ALIMENTARIUS COMM’N., WORKING PRINCIPLES FOR RISK ANALYSIS FOR 
FOOD SAFETY FOR APPLICATION BY GOVERNMENTS 2–9 (2007), http://www.fao.org/ 
3/a-a1550t.pdf. 
2 FOOD AND AGRIC. ORG. & WORLD HEALTH ORG., FOOD SAFETY RISK ANALYSIS: 
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although useful in this regard, is implemented on a voluntary basis.  
The European General Food Law represents a clear model of the 
full incorporation of risk analysis in governing food safety,3 and 
the Food Safety Basic Law of Japan also recognizes the 
indispensable role of risk analysis in ensuring consumers’ 
confidence in food safety.4     
Concerned with the impact of national regulations on 
imported foods, the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Agreement 
on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS 
Agreement) requires members to adopt risk-based decision-making 
and especially to link trade measures to risk assessment. 5  
However, the drafters of the SPS Agreement did not intend to 
oblige members to build a thorough risk analysis system into their 
regulations, despite certain provisions partially reflecting such 
ideas. 6 Since the WTO Doha Round was in dilemma, trading 
parties have turned their efforts to negotiating regional trade 
agreements (RTAs).  To further promote the international flow of 
agricultural products without unjustified intervention, certain 
SPS-plus disciplines have been pursued.7  In contrast to the SPS 
Agreement, most SPS-plus arrangements have emphasized 
cooperation and effective coordination between parties. 8  
Nonetheless, most of the agreements have shown little interest in 
pushing for the establishment of an advanced system for risk-based 
regimes beyond that of the WTO’s original mechanism.9  
 
 
A GUIDE FOR NATIONAL SAFETY AUTHORITIES xi–xii (2006), http://www.fao.org/do 
crep/012/a0822e/a0822e00.htm [hereinafter FAO & WHO GUIDE]. 
3 Risk Analysis constitutes one of the general principles of European food law of 
which definition has clearly been provided. See 2002 O.J. (L 31) 1–8 (defining 
Risk Analysis as one of the general principles of European food law) [hereinafter 
European General Food Law]. 
4 FOOD SAFETY COMM’N. OF JAPAN, JAPAN FOOD SAFETY BASIC LAW (2010), 
http://www.fsc.go.jp/english/brochure/brochure2010/fsc10_p3.pdf. 
5 See Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, arts. 
5.1–5.4, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 493 [hereinafter SPS Agreement]. 
6 Id. arts. 5.5–5.6. 
7 See Part II of this Article and corresponding footnotes. 
8 See e.g., The Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between the 
European Union and Canada, entered into force provisionally on September 21, 
2017, art. 5.4, https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ceta/ceta-chapter-by-chapt 
er/ [hereinafter CETA]; see also, The Economic Partnership Agreement between 
the European Union and Japan, signed on July 17, 2018, entered into force on 
February 1, 2019, art. 6, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/eu-japan-econom 
ic-partnership-agreement/ [hereinafter Economic Partnership Agreement]. 
9 See id. 
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The finalization of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement 
(TPP) involved many stages of negotiations and partners.  It began 
with plurilateral talks of the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic 
Partnership between Brunei, Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore.10  
Subsequently, more Asia-Pacific countries expressed interest in 
joining the trade block.  In particular, the United States’ (U.S.) 
determination to lead and set the agenda for the mega-regional trade 
arrangement made the TPP the most ambitious and unprecedented 
RTA in both economic strength and standards. 11   The TPP 
concluded in 2015 represented a new model of mega-free-trade 
pacts and was posed to set higher standards for promoting and 
streamlining trade liberalization, 12  and to espouse significant 
values beyond trade and commerce concerns.13  
Since the Trump administration withdrew the U.S. from the 
TPP in early 2017, the remaining 11 parties have endeavored to 
keep the agreement alive.  During the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Ministerial Meeting held in Da Nang, Vietnam, on November 11, 
2017, the TPP-11 countries in the Pacific region—New Zealand, 
Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, 
Mexico, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam—reached a consensus that 
the TPP would be temporarily replaced by the Comprehensive and 
Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP).14  
 
10  See Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership (P4), NEW ZEALAND 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS & TRADE, https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/free-trade-agreeme 
nts/free-trade-agreements-in-force/p4/ (last visited Oct. 26, 2019) (discussing the 
timeline of the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership which was signed in 
2005 and entered into force in 2006); see also, The Trans-Pacific Strategic 
Economic Partnership (P4), https://www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/FTAs-agreements-in-f 
orce/P4/Full-text-of-P4-agreement.pdf. 
11 See RAHEL AICHELE & GABRIEL FELBERMAYR, THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP 
DEAL (TPP): WHAT ARE THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR IN- AND OUTSIDERS? 4 
(2015), http://ged-project.de/2015/10/09/who-wins-and-who-loses-with-tpp/. 
12  But cf., Free Trade Agreements, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE 
REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements, (last 
visited Oct. 26, 2019) (indexing the voluminous list of individual trade agreements 
between the U.S. and other nations).  
13  See Press Release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Notification of 
Completion of Domestic Procedures for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) 
Agreement (Jan. 20, 2017), http://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_001443.h 
tml (“It also seeks to deepen and broaden economic ties among countries and 
regions that share fundamental values such as freedom, democracy, basic human 
rights, and the rule of law, and is hence strategically significant in terms of 
pursuing further regional stability.”).  
14 See Press Release from Minister Taro Kono, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Japan, Agreement at the Ministerial Level on the TPP Negotiations Among 11 
Countries (Nov. 11, 2017), http://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_001788.ht 
ml. 
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The CPTPP was signed in Chile on March 8, 2018.15  The free 
trade pact would become effective 60 days after at least six (or 50%) 
of the signatories notified the Depositary (New Zealand) of the 
completion of ratification procedures.16  As of October 30, 2018, 
six countries (Canada, Australia, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, and 
Singapore) have ratified the agreement. Therefore, the CPTPP 
entered into force on December 30, 2018.17  
Several original commitments of the TPP, including 
intellectual property and investment Chapters, have been suspended, 
but the SPS Chapter remains unchanged.  Due to concerns that 
national food safety regulations could constitute a form of non-tariff 
barriers (NTBs), the CPTPP, in contrast to the WTO, adds further 
requirements to parties’ SPS measures, referred to as SPS-plus.18  
In particular, the CPTPP SPS Chapter explicitly requires risk 
analysis and provides definitions for its components.19  In contrast 
to recent SPS-plus developments in other RTAs and free trade 
agreements (FTAs), the CPTPP’s SPS approach appears unique and 
ambitious.  The effort to push the incorporation of the risk regime 
into parties’ regulatory regimes is a progressive agenda that 
presents both opportunities and challenges for national compliance.   
This article explores the legal implications of the 
progressive design of the SPS-plus model and assesses its impact, 
particularly focusing on the requirements of scientific evidence and 
a risk analysis regime.  The difficulty for national regulatory 
regimes to fulfill such high SPS standards seems apparent, but the 
mandate may provide an opportunity to modernize national food 
safety governance that has thus far been subject to political and 
non-science-based considerations.  Part II introduces the 
development of SPS-plus in RTAs.  Part III of this article analyzes 
the CPTPP’s approach to applying a risk analysis mechanism, 
 
15 See Dave Sherwood & Felipe Iturrieta, Asia-Pacific Nations Sign Sweeping 
Trade Deal Without U.S., THOMPSON REUTERS (Mar. 8, 2018, 12:12 AM) 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-trade-tpp/asia-pacific-nations-sign-sweeping-tra
de-deal-without-u-s-idUSKCN1GK0JM.  
16 See id. 
17 See Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, 
N.Z. FOREIGN AFFAIRS & TRADE, https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/free-trade-agre 
ements/free-trade-agreements-in-force/cptpp/cptpp-overview/ (last visited Oct. 26, 
2019) (discussing the origins of the CPTPP and ratification process). 
18 See Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, 
signed on March 8, 2018, entered into force on December 30, 2018, ch. 7, 
https://www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/Trans-Pacific-Partnership/Text/7.-Sanitary-and-Ph
ytosanitary-Measures-Chapter.pdf [hereinafter CPTPP]. 
19 Id. arts. 7.1, 7.9. 
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describes the discrepancy between the WTO contexts and those of 
the SPS-plus, and explores the implications of the obligations 
imposed on the parties.  Part IV discusses the challenges facing 
the parties in implementing the added requirements.  Part V 
concludes that the significance and challenges of applying the 
SPS-plus standards for improving national food risk regulatory 
regimes are considerable.  All parties to the new model of RTA 
should work in good faith to make the arrangement beneficial to all 
stakeholders. 
II.  Developments of SPS-Plus in RTAs 
The impasses of the WTO Doha agenda pushed trading 
parties to pursue further trade liberalization by negotiating RTAs 
and FTAs.20  The aims of the free trade zones include, inter alia, 
tariff reduction, trade facilitation, NTB elimination, regulatory 
cooperation, and anti-corruption and environmental protection 
provisions. 21   These objectives exceed the original WTO 
commitments, namely WTO-plus.22     
When trade partners have pursued WTO-plus at regional 
and bilateral levels, the premise of SPS-plus has also been included 
in the negotiations.23  During the past decade, many RTAs/FTAs 
have been concerned with increasing NTBs and non-tariff measures 
(NTMs). 24  Several reasons have made the move increasingly 
urgent.  Public health concerns, particularly for the risks brought 
by imported agricultural products, have increasingly attracted the 
attention of national consumers, prompting nations to increase the 
level of protection concerning health and environmental safety and 
tighten their regulations.25  Regulation of imported foods has been 
enhanced by requiring more inspections and sophisticated 
certifications.  These alleged NTBs or NTMs, many of which have 
not been entirely science-based or rule-based, have alarmed 
countries, particularly exporting countries.26 Such countries have 
 
20  MITSUO MATSUSHITA ET AL., THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: LAW, 
PRACTICE, AND POLICY 24–25 (3rd ed. 2016). 
21  International Free Trade Zone, ECONOMY WATCH (May 25, 2010), 
https://www.economywatch.com/international-trade/free-trade-zone.html. 
22 See Ken Ash and Iza Lejarraga, Can We Have Regionalism and Multilateralism? 
in TACKLING AGRICULTURE IN THE POST-BALI CONTEXT 75–78 (Ricardo 
Melédez-Ortiz et al., eds., 2014). 
23 Id. at 77. 
24  United Nations Conference on Trade and Dev., NON-TARIFF MEASURES: 
ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT AND POLICY OPTIONS FOR DEVELOPMENT 4 (2018), 
https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/ditctab2018d3_en.pdf.  
25 Id. at 85, 115. 
26 United Nations Conference on Trade and Dev., NON-TARIFF MEASURES IN 
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argued that SPS-plus should be constructed to prevent the abuse of 
such measures or the implementation of disguised protectionist 
policies.27 
In negotiations of SPS-plus arrangements, parties have 
pursued some common goals, such as the further elaboration of 
thorough scientific principles and risk analysis to support and 
justify food regulations, elimination of unnecessary 
non-science-based measures, and expansion of the width and depth 
of information sharing, including transparency requirements.28  In 
particular, to facilitate food trade, cooperation and consultation 
mechanisms have been enhanced. 29  The relevant texts of the 
CPTPP, the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement 
between the European Union (EU) and Canada (CETA), and the 
EU-Japan Economic Partner Agreement (EPA) reflect similar 
approaches with minor distinctions. 30   In general, these 
developments derived from a gradual consensus-building among 
WTO members.  Scholars have observed that “many SPS-plus 
measures found in RTAs are already enshrined in the voluntary 
guidelines of the WTO SPS Committee on how to implement the 
WTO SPS Agreement.”31  The mutuality and interdependence of 
the agreements can help achieve the convergence of regional 
SPS-plus approaches and multilateral developments.  The progress 
in RTAs thus, as observed, may be expected to promote the 
multilateralization of such RTA-plus measures.32  
 
 
 
 
 
ASEAN 2, 125 (Lili Yan Ing et al. eds., April 2016), https://unctad.org/en/Publicati 
onsLibrary/ERIA-UNCTAD_Non-Tariff_Measures_in_ASEAN_en.pdf. 
27 Naoto Jinji, An Economic Theory of the SPS Agreement, THE RESEARCH INST. 
OF ECON., TRADE AND INDUS. 1, 3, https://www.rieti.go.jp/jp/publications/dp/09e03 
3.pdf. 
28RENÉE JOHNSON, CONG. RES. SERV., R43450, SANITARY AND PHYTOSANITARY 
(SPS) AND RELATED NON-TARIFF BARRIERS TO AGRICULTURAL TRADE 11-12 (2014);  
see also, CETA, supra note 8, chs. 4–5; Economic Partnership Agreement, supra 
note 8, chs. 6–7. 
29 Markus Wagner, The Future of SPS Governance: SPS-Plus or SPS-Minus? 51 J. 
WORLD TRADE 445, 461 (2017). 
30 CPTPP, supra note 18, chs. 7–8; CETA, supra note 8, chs. 4–5; Economic 
Partnership Agreement, supra note 8, chs. 6–7. 
31 Ash & Lejarraga, supra note 22, at 77. 
32 See id. at 76, 81. 
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III.  Scientific Principles and Risk Analysis in 
CPTPP/SPS-Plus 
A.  Overall Approach of the SPS Chapter of CPTPP 
 
The U.S. was influential in shaping SPS-plus regarding 
scientific principles and risk analysis during original TPP 
negotiations.  The proposal of the Office of the United States 
Trade Representatives (USTR) transcended the existing rules under 
the WTO and prior U.S. bilateral/regional trade deals.  For 
example, the USTR intended to clarify the elements of risk 
assessment that were considered to be inadequately elaborated33 in 
the text of Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement.  The USTR’s 
proposal was premised on the concern shared by many exporters 
that some WTO members adopted import restrictions based on 
flawed or even nonexistent risk assessments, and, consequently, an 
“adequate” risk assessment must be further defined. 34  
Considering its tensions with several countries in the Asia-Pacific 
region (Japan, Korea, Taiwan, etc.) regarding certain food safety 
controversies since 2011, the U.S. anticipated crafting the TPP/SPS 
Chapter as a mega-regional template for future application.35  The 
negotiators consolidated the various SPS proposals into a single 
text at the ninth round in Chicago, including key elements such as a 
timeline for risk assessment, enhanced process transparency, and a 
more specific definition of “sound science.”36 
 
Subsequently, U.S. agri-food groups started to jointly and 
publicly make their appeals at the twelth TPP negotiation round in 
Dallas.37  Several recommendations aimed at revamping existing 
SPS rules were proposed, including an elaborate set of risk 
assessment and risk management requirements, enhanced 
transparency (notification and explanation of new measures and a 
reasonable length of time for public comments on draft measures), 
and an emphasis on international standards and harmonization.38  
These recommendations played a vital role in the subsequent 
 
33 USTR May Offer Revised SPS Proposal in TPP, Aims to Go Beyond WTO, 
INSIDE U.S. TRADE (July 22, 2011), https://wtonewsstand.com/content/ustr-may-off 
er-revised-sps-proposal-tpp-aims-go-beyond-wto. 
34 Id. 
35 Id.  
36 U.S. Tables Revised SPS Chapter, TPP Round Produces Consolidated Text, 
INSIDE U.S. TRADE (Sep. 16, 2011), ProQuest Central, Document ID: 911969547. 
37 Agriculture, Food Industry Seek WTO-Plus Rules for TPP Chapter, INSIDE U.S. 
TRADE (May 18, 2012), ProQuest Central, Document ID:1014125823. 
38 Id. 
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rounds of negotiations. 
 
The risk analysis mechanism has been adopted by several 
international institutions that govern food safety, such as the CAC39 
and the 2001 Biosafety Protocol. 40   Some national and 
supranational regulatory regimes have also applied and practiced 
this model, including the EU41 and Japan.42  
 
The WTO SPS Agreement requires compliance with 
science-based and risk-based principles for adopting national SPS 
measures.43  However, the agreement only explicitly mentions the 
idea of risk assessment and does not specify the terms of risk 
management and risk communication. 44   The Panel in EC–
Hormones explained the essence of Article 5 of the SPS Agreement 
by covering elements of both risk assessment and risk 
management.45  The broad approach to align the coverage with the 
general understanding, however, was rejected by the Appellate 
Body simply because such a wording of risk management did not 
explicitly appear in the context.46  
 
Regulatory cooperation has constituted one of the major 
goals of current RTA/FTA negotiations.47  Such a mandate is also 
 
39 See Food and Agriculture Organization [FAO] & World Health Organization 
[WHO], Codex Alimentarius Comm’n: Report of the Twenty-Sixth Session, app. IV, 
Ref. No. ALINORM 03/41 (June 30 – July 7, 2003), http://www.fao.org/docrep/00 
6/Y4800E/y4800e0o.htm#bm24 (containing the working principles that guide the 
work of the Commission and its subsidiary bodies regarding risk analysis). 
40  See Cartagena Protocol on Biodiversity to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity, arts. 15–16, annex III, adopted Jan. 29, 2000, 2226 U.N.T.S. 208, 
(entered into force Sept. 11, 2003).  
41 The European General Food Law, supra note 3, art. 6. 
42 According to Japan Food Safety Basic Act, “a new concept of ’risk analysis’ 
was introduced to promote food safety in a more comprehensive manner. See 
http://www.fsc.go.jp/english/brochure/brochure2010/fsc10_p3.pdf (last visited Oct. 
10, 2018). 
43 SPS Agreement, supra note 5. 
44 See id. (discussing only risk assessment, without mention of risk management 
or risk communication). 
45 Panel Report, European Communities – Measures Concerning Meat and Meat 
Products (Hormones), WTO Doc. WT/DS48/R/CAN, ¶¶ 8.94–8.95, 8.98 (Aug. 18, 
1997) [hereinafter Panel Report, EC – Hormones]. 
46 Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Concerning Meat 
and Meat Products (Hormones), WTO Doc. WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, ¶ 
181 (Jan. 16, 1998) [hereinafter Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones]. 
47 See Alexia Brunet Marks, The Right to Regulate (Cooperatively), 38 U. PA. J. 
INT’L L. 1, 64-65 (2016) (illustrating a number of RTA/FTA practices in enhancing 
regulatory cooperation, particularly on SPS matters); see generally Eugenia 
Costanza Laurenza & Fabienne Goyeneche, Regulatory Cooperation in Free Trade 
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commonly required in many SPS Chapters of trade agreements.  
For example, CETA reflects the trend.48  The EPA also highlights 
the significance of cooperation for easing possible health-related 
regulatory disagreements. 49   Both agreements, despite being 
negotiated by parties of developed countries, failed to elaborate a 
risk regime beyond the original WTO/SPS design in the end. The 
EPA—irrespective of its ambition to consolidate risk analysis, as 
evidenced in an early EU assessment report50—has turned out to be 
a simple repetition of the WTO legacy.51  
    
By contrast, the CPTPP SPS Chapter has unequivocally 
specified the requirement for risk analysis.52  It is the first attempt 
at incorporating a relatively sound risk-based and science-based 
mechanism into a regional trade regime.53  The unprecedented 
approach is a clear indication of the original vision of the U.S. in 
seeking the codification of high standards into SPS-plus.  The 
effort also represents a progressive development in the WTO/SPS 
arrangement.   
 
The U.S. has withdrawn itself from the TPP, but the 
approach originally proposed by the U.S. continues to impact on its 
current RTA negotiations.  The North America Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) between the U.S., Mexico, and Canada has 
been renegotiated since the Trump administration came into 
office.54  This RTA has been replaced by the newly-concluded 
United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA). 55   Some 
 
Agreements: Perspectives from the Automotive and Information and 
Communication Technology Sectors, 12 GLOBAL TRADE AND CUSTOMS J. 433 (2017) 
(discussing the forms of regulatory cooperation and their use in modern free trade 
agreements, particularly in the automotive industry and information and 
communication technology sectors). 
48 CETA, supra note 8, arts. 21.1– 21.2. 
49 See Economic Partnership Agreement, supra note 8, art. 6.1.  
50 See LSE ENTER., TRADE SUSTAINABILITY IMPACT ASSESSMENT OF THE FREE 
TRADE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND JAPAN 59–60 (2015). 
51 See Economic Partnership Agreement, supra note 8, arts. 6.4, 6.6 (reiterating 
the mandate of the WTO SPS Agreement on risk assessment). 
52 CPTPP, supra note 18, art. 7.9. 
53 Because the U.S and other countries have a strong comparative advantage in 
agricultural production, they consider import restrictions should meet more 
reasonable and sound scientific tests to avoid NTBs. See notes 33–37 and 
accompanying text.   
54  The USMCA was concluded on Sep. 30, 2018. See Alan Rappeport, A 
Last-Minute Deal With Canada Salvages a Trade Agreement, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 
2018, at A1 https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/30/us/politics/us-canada-nafta-deal- 
deadline.html (last visited October 31, 2018). 
55 Id.  
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changes in the new trade deal originated from the TPP per se.56  In 
terms of the SPS rules, the USMCA maintains a large portion of the 
TPP ingredients.57  The provision concerning “science and risk 
analysis” generally mirrors that of the TPP/SPS with minor 
modifications.58 
 
B.  Implications and Progress of Risk Analysis in the 
CPTPP/SPS Chapter 
 
i.  General Idea of Risk Analysis in the CPTPP 
 
The CPTPP’s definition of risk analysis 59  reflects the 
common usage appearing at international, regional, and national 
levels.60  In particular, it increases the requirements for the format 
of risk analysis and public involvement in the process by requiring 
that the operation of the system be documented and opportunities 
for public comment be provided to interested persons or parties.61  
To clarify the application, the SPS Chapter specifies that such 
requirements apply only to a risk analysis for a sanitary or 
phytosanitary measure that constitutes a sanitary or phytosanitary 
regulation for the purposes of Annex B of the SPS Agreement 
(transparency).62  
 
In the pursuit of harmonization, the WTO/SPS Agreement 
expects members to apply international standards, guidelines, and 
recommendations and extends certain incentives, 63  but such 
international standards are not binding on WTO members per se.64  
 
56 See Justin Worland, Trump’s NAFTA Replacement Largely Maintains Status 
Quo on Free Trade, TIME (Oct. 1, 2018), https://time.com/5411444/nafta-trump-de 
al-usmca/. 
57 Id. 
58 In contrast to the CPTPP, the new agreement replaces risk analysis with risk 
assessment and risk management, although the title of the provision remains 
unchanged.  The move may indicate the USMCA’s intent to reduce the mandate 
of risk communication.  Agreement between the United States of America, the 
United Mexican States, and Canada art. 9.6, U.S.-Mex.-Can., Nov. 30, 2018; see 
also CPTPP, supra note 18, art. 7.1.   
59 Id. art. 7.1. 
60 FAO & WHO GUIDE, supra note 2, at 7; see also European General Food Law, 
supra note 3, art. 3, paras. 11-13. 
61 CPTPP, supra note 18, art. 7.9. 
62 Id. footnote 4 to art. 7.9, ¶ 4(b). 
63 Article 3.2 of the SPS Agreement provides that national SPS measures that 
conform to international standards enjoy the presumption of consistency with the 
SPS Agreement. SPS Agreement, supra note 5, at 2.  
64 Observing the Appellate Body’s jurisprudence has led to the conclusion that 
“[t]he Appellate Body’s interpretation . . . has turned the course of subsequent SPS 
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The WTO case law has not fully recognized a principle of 
deference to certain international standards and their setting.  In 
Hormones II, the Appellate Body departed from international 
standard-setting in two main aspects.  First, the Appellate Body 
opined that experts involved in standard-setting may lack 
independence and not be suitable to provide objective opinions, 
especially if they were not in agreement with members who sought 
a higher level of protection than that of an international regime.65  
Second, it also rejected the idea that an existing international 
standard can justify the sufficiency of scientific evidence that may 
disqualify a provisional measure.66 
 
By contrast, the TPP negotiators managed to bring the SPS 
Chapter closer to international standard-setting and demonstrated 
an intent to further the mandate of harmonization by, inter alia, 
including the encouragement of “the development and adoption of 
international standards, guidelines and recommendations” and the 
promotion of “their implementation by the Parties” as one of the 
objectives of the SPS Chapter.67  The text was aimed at making 
enforceable the relevant international arrangements on risk analysis 
that are usually voluntary.  As the WTO/SPS Committee and other 
international standard-setting regimes, including the WHO and 
FAO, have provided useful references for building a risk analysis 
regime, the CPTPP parties are required to take into account their 
works in designing their regulations.68  In effect, the CPTPP SPS 
Chapter bluntly reinforces the relevance of international soft law 
with the establishment of a national risk analysis regime. 
 
 
 
jurisprudence away from the assessment of national SPS measures against 
international benchmark standards.” See JACQUELINE PEEL, SCIENCE AND RISK 
REGULATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 178–81(2010). 
65 Appellate Body Report, United States – Continued Suspension of Obligations in 
the EC – Hormones Dispute, ¶ 481, WTO Doc. WT/DS320/AB/R (adopted Oct. 16, 
2008) [hereinafter Appellate Body Report, U.S. – Continued Suspension]; see also 
KUEI-JUNG NI, Does Science Speak Clearly and Fairly in Trade and Food Safety 
Disputes? The Search for an Optimal Response of WTO Adjudication to 
Problematic International Standard-Making, 68 FOOD & DRUG L. J. 97, 111–13 
(2013) (observing the tendency of the Appellate Body of not entirely endorsing 
international standard-setting). 
66 The Appellate Body also denied that an existing international standard can 
entail and prove sufficiency of scientific evidence in order to disqualify a 
provisional measure. Appellate Body Report, U.S. – Continued Suspension, supra 
note 65, ¶¶ 695,733. 
67 CPTPP, supra note 18, art. 7.2, ¶ (f). 
68 Id. art. 7.9, ¶ 6(a). 
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ii.  Scientific Principles and Risk Assessment 
 
The SPS Chapter does not provide a new definition of risk 
assessment as the WTO/SPS Agreement has defined the term 
clearly.69  To justify the results of a risk assessment and gain 
public confidence, many national practices have adhered to certain 
core values and principles when completing the assessment.  For 
example, the European General Food Law specifies that “[r]isk 
assessment shall be based on the available scientific evidence and 
undertaken in an independent, objective and transparent manner.”70  
The Japan Food Safety Basic Law71 details similar requirements.72  
 
The WTO/SPS Agreement has yet to add further mandates 
such as those of the EU and Japan.  In addition to requiring a 
science-based approach to risk assessment, it may be desirable for 
the SPS Chapter to incorporate objectives compatible with higher 
values such as democracy and fairness.  The CPTPP context has 
not explicitly recognized the principles of independence and 
transparency.  However, as mentioned, the CPTPP parties shall 
take into account international standards, guidelines, and 
recommendations in the execution of risk analysis.73  Thus, the 
WHO and FAO’s guidance that recognizes the characteristics of 
objectivity and transparency in risk assessment74 may help shape 
the progress of national risk analysis regimes, although it is of a 
less obligatory nature.  
 
Article 2.2 of the WTO/SPS Agreement specifies the 
science-based principle as one of its controlling mandates. 75  
According to Article 5.1 of the Agreement, WTO members shall 
base their trade measures on an assessment of risks.76  In the 
assessment of risks, they are required to take into account 
“available” scientific evidence. 77   In EC—Hormones, the 
Appellate Body stated that these two provisions should be read 
together. 78   The difference between the WTO/SPS and the 
 
69 SPS Agreement, supra note 5, Annex A, ¶ 4.  
70 The European General Food Law, supra note 3, art. 6, ¶ (2) (emphasis added). 
71 Japan Food Safety Basic Act, Act No. 48, arts. 13(emphasis added) of May 23, 
2003, http://www.fsc.go.jp/english/basic_act/fs_basic_act.pdf. 
72 Id. arts. 13, 32. 
73 CPTPP, supra note 18, art.7.9, ¶ 6 (a) (emphasis added). 
74 FAO & WHO GUIDE, supra note 2, at 48, 49. 
75 SPS Agreement, supra note 5, art. 2.2. 
76 Id. art. 5.1. 
77 Id. art. 5.2. 
78 Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, supra note 46, ¶¶ 177, 180. 
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CPTPP/SPS context lies in the benchmark that they set for the 
eligibility of scientific evidence.  The main addition of the 
SPS-plus in this regard is a focus on making the scientific approach 
more stringent.  A careful reading of the SPS Chapter suggests that 
it adds criteria of what constitutes “sound science” as opposed to 
“junk science.”  
 
First, regarding the quality of scientific evidence, the SPS 
Agreement does not classify the type of science that can satisfy the 
requirement to support a given measure. 79   However, WTO 
jurisprudence appears to value the significance of scientific 
robustness. 80   In US/Canada—Continued Suspension, the 
Appellate Body stated that the standard of review exercised by a 
Panel on a party’s risk assessment should involve examining 
“whether that risk assessment is supported by coherent reasoning 
and respectable scientific evidence and is, in this sense, objectively 
justifiable.”81  Thus, such science should be examined by a test of 
whether it “comes from a respected and qualified source” and 
meets “the necessary scientific and methodological rigor.”82  The 
SPS Chapter adds an element by emphasizing the “objectiveness” 
of the science to justify an SPS measure in question.83  The further 
elaboration and incorporation of the WTO’s judicial rulings on 
qualified science by the CPTPP tighten the admissibility of science 
for legitimate use in risk assessment.  Indeed, the reinforced 
threshold of requiring legitimate science squarely fulfills the 
original objective of the TPP negotiations to pursue high standards.   
 
Second, with respect to the form of the scientific evidence 
in question, neither the WTO/SPS context nor its case law requires 
any certain format.  The CPTPP Chapter states that such scientific 
evidence must be documented. 84   This requirement raises the 
threshold of compliance.  Nevertheless, given the lack of a clear 
definition of documentation, it remains unclear how stringent the 
element should be.  An argument that scientific evidence must be 
published in journals could be too restrictive, given many studies 
and surveys have yet to be published.85  
 
79 SPS Agreement, supra note 5, art. 5.2. 
80 See PEEL, supra note 64, at 190–230 (discussing the WTO’s treatment of 
scientific principles). 
81 Appellate Body Report, US – Continued Suspension, supra note 65, ¶ 590. 
82 Id. ¶ 591. 
83 CPTPP, supra note 18, art. 7.9, ¶ 2. 
84 Id. art. 7.9, ¶ 4(b). 
85  FAO & WHO GUIDE, supra note 2, Box 3.9, at 50 (noting that certain 
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Third, regarding the scope of scientific evidence, the 
WTO/SPS Agreement simply provides that members are required to 
apply scientific evidence that is available to them.86  Given that 
countries possess various levels of scientific and technological 
development, the alleged “availability” of the evidence in question 
may differ.  The negotiators of the CPTPP SPS Chapter would 
likely not be satisfied with the WTO mandate because this approach 
may, to some extent, exempt members from using the best science 
that exists worldwide but may not be available in the country under 
complaint.  The SPS Chapter limits the scope of the science in 
question.  It first states that the availability of science to parties 
shall be “reasonably” available.87  The additional requirement of 
reasonableness may impose burdens on parties to perform more 
searches and surveys for further evidence if to do so would be 
reasonable.  Moreover, parties are required to take into account 
data that is “relevant.” 88   Thus, the limitation could further 
constrain nations’ discretion in data collection.   
 
On the other hand, the CPTPP’s approach is also a 
manifestation of the incorporation of the WTO case law.  In EC— 
Hormones, the Appellate Body ruled that the methodology for 
performing scientific risk assessment is not limited to the usual 
model of quantitative usage, as a qualitative approach would also 
be acceptable.89  Thus, the SPS Chapter aligns with the approach 
by explicitly covering these two methods.90  
  
As expected, the justification for formulating a relatively 
rigid mandate for the quality of science is not without objections or 
open questions.  The introduction of the idea of “documented and 
objective science” could narrow down the flexibility of parties to 
select and apply applicable science.  Concerns have been 
expressed regarding whether the flexibility of using “minority 
 
information and data produced by industry may not be published, which 
nevertheless can be relied on for risk assessment). 
86 SPS Agreement, supra note 5, arts. 5.2, 5.7.  
87 CPTPP, supra note 18, art. 7.9, ¶ 5. 
88 Id. 
89 The broad understanding was also confirmed by the subsequent rulings.  See 
Appellate Body Report, Australia – Measures Affecting the Importation of Salmon, 
WTO Doc. WT/DS18/AB/R, ¶ 124 (Oct. 20, 1998) [hereinafter Appellate Body 
Report, Australia – Salmon]; Appellate Body Report, U.S. – Continued Suspension, 
supra note 65, ¶ 530; Appellate Body Report, Australia – Measures Affecting the 
Importation of Apples from New Zealand, WTO Doc. WT/DS367/AB/R, ¶ 208 
(Nov. 29, 2010) [hereinafter Appellate Body Report, Australia – Apples].  
90 CPTPP, supra note 18, art. 7.9, ¶ 5. 
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science” as recognized by WTO jurisprudence could be undermined 
by the rigid approach. 91   According to the Appellate Body’s 
rulings, WTO members are permitted to use minority views of the 
scientific community as the basis for decision-making as long as 
such views originated from qualified and respected sources.92  The 
question thus becomes whether a minority opinion that, despite 
being reputable, was not formally published or is just the result of 
“a small number of peer-reviewed studies”93 could be permissive 
under the high standard.  This may depend on the interpretations 
of “documentation” for science. 
 
iii.  Risk Management 
 
As mentioned, risk management is not explicitly 
recognized in the WTO/SPS Agreement. 94   Nevertheless, the 
Agreement reflects certain elements of risk management in the 
allocation of the rights and obligations of WTO members.95  For 
example, Article 5.4 of the SPS Agreement recognizes the right of 
countries to decide their appropriate level of protection (ALOP),96 
which constitutes a preliminary process of risk management. 97  
The Agreement further includes the mandates of necessity and 
non-discrimination in applying SPS measures. 98   Of course, 
reflecting a precautionary principle or approach, the Agreement 
recognizes members’ discretion to adopt provisional SPS measures 
where scientific evidence is insufficient.99  
 
 
 
91 Wagner, supra note 29, at 454. 
92 Appellate Body Report, U.S. – Suspension, supra note 65, ¶ 591; Appellate 
Body Report, Australia – Apples, supra note 89, ¶ 214; Appellate Body Report, EC 
– Hormones, supra note 46, ¶ 194. 
93 Wagner, supra note 29, at 454–55. 
94 Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, supra note 46, ¶ 181. 
95 E.g. MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 20, at 475–76. 
96 See Australia – Salmon, supra note 89, ¶ 199.  The Appellate Body also 
considered that the SPS Agreement also implied an “obligation” of WTO members 
to disclose their ALOP precisely.  Id. ¶ 206.  The WHO and FAO Guide 
specifies that the determination of an ALOP is critical when the selection of a risk 
management option is undertaken.  See FAO & WHO GUIDE, supra note 2, at 29–
31. 
97 MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 20, at 486 (citing Appellate Body’s ruling on 
Australian Salmon). 
98 SPS Agreement, supra note 5, arts. 5.5, 5.6. 
99 See Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, supra note 46, ¶ 124 (recognizing 
that Article 5.7 reflects the idea of precaution without confirming whether it is a 
principle or an approach).  
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The CPTPP/SPS Chapter continues to extend certain 
regulatory autonomy to parties relating to risk management. It 
affirms the right of parties to establish their ALOP100 and preserves 
the right to implement SPS measures on a provisional basis.101  
Concerning the obligations of parties conducting risk management, 
apart from reiterating the non-discrimination principle, the SPS 
adds, most notably, a procedural mandate requiring that risk 
management be conducted in a documented manner.   
 
The SPS Chapter defines risk management as “the 
weighing of policy alternatives in light of the results of risk 
assessment and, if required, selecting and implementing appropriate 
control options, including regulatory measures.”102  This definition 
is quite similar to the general understanding of risk management 
found in the European General Food Law 103  and WHO/FAO 
documents alike.104  
 
The SPS Chapter contributes to the legalization of risk 
management by incorporating international institutions’ efforts 
relating to risk management.  For example, the WHO and FAO 
produced a guidance document for helping national food safety 
authorities to establish their risk analysis regime. 105   This 
document provides a generic four-step framework for risk 
management: (i) preliminary risk management activities; (ii) 
identification and selection of risk management options; (iii) 
implementation; and (iv) monitoring and review.106  The CPTPP 
parties are required to “take into account” such arrangements.107  
The framework remains non-binding on parties, 108  but its 
incorporation to some extent may compel the revamping of national 
regulatory structures.  Building a regime and framework not only 
requires rule-making and legislative efforts but also demands 
substantial expertise, management skills, financial resources, and 
capacity-building.  The attempt to push the modernization of risk 
 
100 CPTPP, supra note 18, art. 7.9, ¶ 3(a). 
101 Id. art. 7.9, ¶ 3(c). 
102 Id. art. 7.9, ¶ 2. 
103 European General Food Law, supra note 3, art. 3, ¶ 12. 
104 FAO & WHO GUIDE, supra note 2, at 7. 
105 See id. 
106 Id. at 11, 15–35. 
107 CPTPP, supra note 18, art. 7.9, ¶ 6(a) (emphasis added). 
108 See FAO & WHO GUIDE, supra note 2, at xii (The Guide “provides essential 
background information, guidance and practical examples of ways to apply food 
safety risk analysis.”) Since the Guide is not of treaty format, it is not binding on 
nations per se.   
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management systems is indicative of the CPTPP’s ambition to set a 
new model for RTAs.   
 
The SPS Chapter also requires parties to “consider” and 
“select” risk management options that are not more trade restrictive 
than necessary to achieve their ALOP and SPS objectives.109  The 
CPTPP text seems quite similar to that of WTO/SPS 110  and 
reaffirms the principles of necessity and proportionality. 111  
Nonetheless, the arrangement literally reflects the WHO and FAO’s 
procedure for deciding among risk management options, which 
involves a dynamic process of identification, evaluation, and 
selection of risk management options.112  As mentioned, the SPS 
Chapter, like the WTO SPS Agreement, reaffirms the right of 
parties to determine their ALOP; however, both texts fail to clearly 
describe how ALOP can fairly function.  By requiring the CPTPP 
parties to consider international guidelines, the WHO and FAO’s 
arrangements may help optimize competent national regimes.   
 
When considering and selecting policy options, national 
authorities are normally expected to determine which level of 
protection is ideal and suitable for addressing specific food safety 
issues and risks.  The work of the WHO and FAO has helped to 
clarify the status of ALOP by underscoring that “[t]he concept of 
ALOP . . . is essential in establishing the linkage between risk 
management actions and the level of consumer health protection 
achieved.” 113   It also provides that “[a] range of tools or 
approaches are available to the risk manager in bridging between 
practical control measures and [the] level of consumer health 
protection.”114  With the availability of a clearer road map on 
which regulatory regimes can be based, the predictability and 
transparency of the process can be enhanced. 
 
Overall, the influence of the international guidelines over 
the establishment of national regimes cannot be overemphasized.  
The original voluntary nature of these guidelines has to some extent 
 
109 CPTPP, supra note 18, art. 7.9, ¶ 6(b),(c) (emphasis added). 
110 SPS Agreement, supra note 5, art. 5.6. 
111 Id. 
112 FAO & WHO GUIDE, supra note 2, at 24–33 (“Harmonized and transparent 
application of a RMF to identify and select risk management options in different 
countries should significantly advance the goal of preventing unjustified and unfair 
restrictions in the international trading of food.”)  
113 Id. at 30. 
114 Id. 
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been hardened by the CPTPP.  However, it remains to be seen 
whether the requirements will limit the parties’ regulatory space in 
constructing their own best regimes per respective risk perceptions.  
Thus, the one-size-fits-all approach may continue to be of concern 
for its legitimacy. 
 
iv.  Risk Communication  
 
The SPS Chapter defines risk communication as “the 
exchange of information and opinions concerning risk and 
risk-related factors between risk assessors, risk managers, 
consumers and other interested parties,” which is also in line with 
the widely recognized concept.115  In contrast to its provisions on 
risk assessment and risk management, the Chapter does not provide 
any specific requirements or obligations for parties to observe in 
doing risk communication. 116  Nevertheless, as mentioned, the 
SPS Chapter mandates that relevant international documents play a 
major role in guiding national risk analysis.117  According to the 
WHO and FAO guidelines, the subject of risk communication 
involves multiple stakeholders, including risk assessors, risk 
managers, and external participants.118  Food authorities expect to 
form a unit with specialists responsible for communication, which 
could be integrated into “all phases of risk analysis” by their 
regulations.119  Indeed, many developed countries, including the 
CPTPP parties, have already implemented this task by setting up a 
specialized team for communication.120  
 
The WTO/SPS Agreement did not explicitly stipulate risk 
communication nor any requirements for the process.  However, 
Article 7 of the Agreement concerning transparency is a major 
mechanism by which the communication mandate can be 
fulfilled.121  WTO members are required to notify other members 
of their SPS measures and to keep them updated concerning 
 
115 CPTPP, supra note 18, art, 7.1, ¶ 2; see also FAO & WHO GUIDE, supra note 2, 
at 66; see also European General Food Law, supra note 3, art. 3, ¶ 13. 
116 See CPTPP, supra note 18. 
117 Id. art. 7.9, ¶¶ 2, 6(a). 
118 FAO & WHO GUIDE, supra note 2, at 66. 
119 Id. (emphasis added).  
120 For example, the Japan Food Safety Commission is composed of seven 
commissioners, including one who has expertise in risk communication.  See, e.g., 
FOOD SAFETY COMMISSION OF JAPAN, fsc.go.jp/english/aboutus/members_com.html 
(last visited Oct. 25, 2019).  
121 SPS Agreement, supra note 5, art. 7. 
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newly-implemented regulations. 122   Annex B, regarding 
transparency in the WTO/SPS Agreement, provides a more detailed 
process for communicating information.123  
 
Achieving greater transparency in the decision-making 
process has become a commonly-pursued agenda in current 
RTA/FTA negotiations.  Both the CETA124 and EPA125 aimed to 
improve the quality of transparency for SPS measures.  In terms of 
trade in agricultural products, the deficiency of transparency that 
constitutes a type of NTB has more direct and stronger effects than 
a tariff does.126  Thus, the efforts of the RTA were acclaimed 
because they were credited with “introducing new obligations that 
strengthen the ex-ante and ex-post transparency requirements 
related to the design and application of standards and establishing 
improved web-based information systems and consultation 
processes that include interested foreign parties.”127  
  
In line with the developments, the CPTPP SPS Chapter 
elaborates and enhances the level and contingency of 
transparency.128  An apparent discrepancy between the WTO SPS 
arrangement and that of the CPTPP is that the former largely entails 
one-way communication from national authorities to other 
members, whereas the latter strengthens mutual understanding and 
information exchange among governments and relevant 
stakeholders.   
 
The CPTPP Chapter also endeavors to improve the notice 
and comment procedure, which may strengthen the input of 
outward advice.  The attempt reflects the administrative practice129 
of the U.S. and was one of the main negotiation pieces put forward 
by the country. 130   The Chapter provides more stringent 
requirements on the time for comments and how the parties 
proposing SPS measures shall interact with their counter-parties.  
 
122 See id. 
123 See id. Annex B. 
124 CETA, supra note 8, ch. 5, arts. 5.11–5.12. 
125 Economic Partnership Agreement, supra note 8, ch. 6, arts. 6.11, 6.12, 6.15; ch. 
17. 
126 See Ash & Lejarraga, supra note 22, at 80–81. 
127 Id. at 80. 
128 CPTPP, supra note 18, art. 7.13. 
129 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 553 (2016); see also Wagner, supra 
note 29, at 464–65 (discussing the merits and problems of incorporating such a 
practice). 
130 See JOHNSON, supra note 28. 
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The WTO/SPS Agreement only requires a “reasonable” time for 
members to make comments.131  By contrast, the SPS Chapter 
specifies a fixed time of at least 60 days.132  
 
The methods of discussion and communication among 
parties under the CPTPP arrangements are relatively more proactive 
than reactive.133  The required exchanges are more comprehensive 
and meaningful.  WTO members must “discuss these comments 
upon request, and take the comments and the results of the 
discussions into account.”134  The SPS Chapter strengthens the 
interaction by adding that “on request of another Party, the Party 
shall respond to the written comments of the other Party in an 
appropriate manner.” 135   Because the SPS Agreement only 
requires members to exchange opinions on “comments,” the 
content of the discussion has also been elaborated in the Chapter to 
include “any scientific or trade concerns” raised by other parties 
and “the availability of alternative, less trade-restrictive approaches 
for achieving the objectives of the measure.”136    
 
If parties’ SPS measures are not in conformance with 
international standards, the SPS Chapter furthers the scope and 
content of the notification.  These countries are obliged to provide 
more thorough information, which has not been specified under the 
WTO agreement, such as documented and objective scientific 
evidence.137 
 
The SPS Agreement only suggests that WTO “members” 
can benefit from the merit of transparency.138  The CPTPP in 
particular aims to ensure that the general public is entitled to access 
the information in question, including the proposed measure, the 
legal basis for the measure, and the written comments received by 
the party.139  Therefore, if implemented appropriately, the design 
may help promote the realization of democratic decision-making by 
 
131 SPS Agreement, supra note 5, Annex B, ¶ 5(d). 
132 CPTPP, supra note 18, art. 7.13, ¶ 4. 
133 Ragnar E. Lofstedt, Risk versus Hazard—How to Regulate in the 21st Century, 
2 EUR. J. RISK REG. 149, 166-67 (2011) (describing how proactive risk 
communication can achieve better public trust compared to reactive 
communication). 
134 SPS Agreement, supra note 5, Annex B, ¶ 5(d). 
135 CPTPP, supra note 18, art. 7.13, ¶ 4 (emphasis added). 
136 Id. art. 7.13, ¶¶ 4, 7. 
137 Id. art. 7.13, ¶ 6. 
138 SPS Agreement, supra note 5, Annex B, ¶¶ 5, 6.  
139 CPTPP, supra note 18, art. 7.13, ¶ 5. 
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bound parties. 
 
The CPTPP’s approach is not entirely novel, but rather, 
reflects international and certain national practices.  Nevertheless, 
its progressiveness distinctive from the WTO SPS Agreement is 
quite obvious and meaningful.  The policy that places parties’ 
trading partners, interested persons, and the general public in 
beneficial positions may result in a more open, reasonable, 
non-arbitrary, and democratic decision-making process. 
 
IV.  Problems and Challenges with Implementing the 
SPS-Plus Requirements 
 
The SPS Chapter exhibits a strong intent to incorporate a 
risk analysis regime into national SPS regulations.  Requiring the 
provision of solid scientific evidence to justify their measures could 
impose considerable burdens on less developed countries.  Some 
of them may face difficulties in accessing the necessary science and 
technology.  They may not be able to comprehend recent relevant 
data.  It seems too onerous to expect them to have the same level 
of science and technology rigor as those CPTPP-developed parties.  
Given these scientific gaps, the implementation problem cannot be 
ignored.   
 
Many CPTPP parties that are strong in agricultural exports, 
such as New Zealand, Canada, and Australia, would benefit from 
importing countries making a real commitment to and enforcing 
science-based SPS measures.  These developed countries have 
already established relatively sound risk analysis regimes140 and 
may have no trouble implementing the mandate.141  Japan, which 
 
140 For example, Health Canada’s Food Directorate has a mandated responsibility 
to perform health risk assessments in response to requests from the Canadian Food 
Inspection Agency as laid out in the Memoranda of Understanding and Agreements 
between Health Canada and the Canadian Food Inspection Agency. See, e.g., 
About Health Canada, GOV’T OF CANADA, https://www.canada.ca/en/health-canad 
a/corporate/about-health-canada/branches-agencies/health-products-food-branch/fo
od-directorate.html.  
141 The New Zealand government stated that “nothing in the SPS Chapter would 
require New Zealand to change our approach to protecting human health, 
maintaining food safety, and protecting New Zealand’s animal and plant health 
status from pests and diseases. As a result, there are no disadvantages to New 
Zealand entering CPTPP from an SPS perspective.” See, e.g., N.Z. FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS & TRADE, COMPREHENSIVE AND PROGRESSIVE AGREEMENT FOR 
TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP NATIONAL INTEREST ANALYSIS 33 (2018), 
https://www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/CPTPP/CPTPP-Final-National-Interest-Analysis-
8-March.pdf. 
44         JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY       [Vol.15 
has tended to fill the leadership vacuum caused by the departure of 
the U.S., has confidence in ensuring compliance with the risk 
analysis standards.142      
 
Achieving the sound operation of a risk analysis regime 
always involves a costly and time-consuming process of capacity 
building.  Many less developed countries in this region may face 
hurdles in overcoming the challenges.  Moreover, some competent 
national food safety regimes have yet to mature.143  If little or no 
sound science can be produced to justify trade restrictions, these 
importing countries have little choice but to adhere to international 
standards 144  that may not always accommodate their specific 
public health concerns.  The high standard of the CPTPP may also 
dissuade countries from seeking accession to the agreement if the 
cost of compromising their policy freedom proves unaffordable.145  
 
All parties should work together to mitigate the problem of 
“technoimperialism,” that seeks to impose the high standards of 
developed countries upon less developed countries without 
meaningful input from the latter.146  Assisting these countries in 
adapting to the stricter regulatory requirements is also indispensable.  
International regulatory cooperation can play a critical role in 
promoting coherence and harmonization of regulations and 
practices among parties.147  Regarding risk assessment, regulatory 
cooperation can cover “dialogue, information sharing, and scientific 
fact-finding” and be fulfilled “by examining the science behind 
various regulatory approaches and determining which approach 
aligns with prevailing scientific knowledge.”148  Given that risk 
management is a relatively subjective process involving 
 
142 Interview with Japanese officials responsible for food safety on September 6, 
2016 (on file with the author).  
143 According to the USDA’s study, Vietnam’s “regulatory and food safety regime 
is still in its infancy and testing agencies are limited, leading to inconsistent 
enforcement which adds to uncertainty for foreign producers.” See U.S. DEP’T OF 
AGRIC., VIETNAM’S AGRI-FOOD SECTOR AND THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP 14 
(2014), https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/publications/43899/49392_eib130.pdf? 
v=0.  
144 See CPTPP, supra note 18, art. 7.9, ¶ 2. 
145 Despite having signed the CPTPP, it remains unclear whether Malaysia may 
eventually ratify the agreement, and this is because the high standards may 
constrain its regulatory autonomy.  See Martin Khor, Should Malaysia Ratify the 
CPTPP Deal?, THE STRAITS TIMES, (Aug. 13, 2018), https://www.straitstimes.com/ 
asia/se-asia/should-malaysia-ratify-the-cptpp-deal-the-star-columnist?.  
146 Marks, supra note 47, at 62–63 (illustrating that TPP may have fostered 
technoimperialism). 
147 Id. at 14–15.  
148 Id. at 45–46. 
2019]  SCIENCE & RISK ANALYSIS IN CPTPP/SPS-PLUS  45 
 
 
policy-making, regulatory cooperation may not necessarily be 
feasible.149  
 
The CPTPP does provide mechanisms to facilitate 
regulatory cooperation.  The SPS Chapter requires the 
establishment of a Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures.150  Apart from enhancing the implementation of the 
Chapter, this Committee is tasked with promoting cooperation 
between parties through which information exchange can occur.  
However, the task of engaging in technical assistance and 
cooperation projects remains optional.151  Additionally, the CPTPP 
creates a new chapter on regulatory coherence in which regulatory 
cooperation and capacity building are given as mandates.152  A 
Committee on Regulatory Coherence will be established 153  to 
supervise regulatory cooperation 154  that “may” include 
“information exchanges, dialogues or meetings with other Parties 
and interested persons, training programmes and relevant assistance, 
and other activities between regulatory agencies.”155  It remains to 
be seen whether the soft commitment to technical and other 
substantial support can effectively relieve the less developed 
countries’ burden.      
         
Overall, the CPTPP’s ambition to optimize national SPS 
regulations cannot be fulfilled without genuine collaboration, 
experience-sharing, and technological and financial assistance.156  
The full realization of the SPS-plus goals will, to some extent, 
depend on the goodwill and actions of the CPTPP parties that 
possess sufficient capacities. 
 
V.  Concluding Remarks  
The requirement for building a sound risk analysis regime 
is indicative of the CPTPP’s pursuit of high standards in food safety 
 
149 Id. at 45–47. 
150 CPTPP, supra note 18, art. 7.5, ¶ 1. 
151 Id. art. 7.5, ¶ 3(e). 
152 CPTPP, supra note 18, art. 25.2, ¶¶ 1, 2(e); see also Marks, supra note 47, at 
58 (stating that the CPTPP is the first trade agreement to include regulatory 
coherence). 
153 CPTPP, supra note 18, art. 25.6, ¶ 1. 
154 Id. art. 25.6, ¶¶ 2, 4; art. 25.9, ¶¶ 1, 4. 
155 Id. art. 25.7, ¶ 1 (emphasis added). 
156 See, e.g., Phoenix X. F. Cai, Regulatory Coherence and Standardization 
Mechanisms in the Trans-Pacific Partnership, 5 BR. J. AM. LEG. STUDIES 505, 
537-38 (2016) (observing that the efforts of capacity building can ensure the 
success of regulatory coherence and cooperation).   
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regulations.  The substance of the risk analysis is a blend of WTO 
jurisprudence, international standards, and national practices, 
especially those of the U.S.  Observing how this RTA’s proposed 
mechanism may interact with the relevant law-making of the WTO 
and thus enable the multilateralization of RTA-plus is appealing.157  
The influence of CPTPP’s model of risk analysis could be strong 
upon the parties’ will to cooperate and act in good faith.   
This lofty regulatory requirement may not be difficult to 
meet for some parties, such as Japan, Australia, and Canada.  
However, given the complexity of the system and the necessity for 
major capacity building and interdisciplinary professions, it would 
be undesirable for less developed countries to be required to attain 
the same level as countries that have substantial experience and 
practice in this regard.   
The requirement of scientific risk assessment does raise the 
level for admissible scientific evidence.  It would place the science 
used by the parties under scrutiny.  Nonetheless, the credibility of 
scientific findings would not be subject to dispute settlement under 
the CPTPP, which can thus reduce the pressure on the parties, 
leaving them some leeway vis-à-vis regulatory space and autonomy.   
Many Asian countries face the challenge of balancing the 
promotion of food trade with the protection of citizens from the 
risks engendered by imported food.  For example, Korea and 
Taiwan have prohibited the import of potentially radioactive foods 
from Fukushima, Japan, for many years.  Although the food risks 
have gradually decreased, those countries are still hesitant to lift the 
ban, and this is not necessarily only because of health concerns but 
also for social or political reasons.  However, if the risk analysis 
system can fairly be incorporated into domestic regimes, it may 
allow countries to construct a better mechanism that streamlines 
decision-making based on scientific evidence and public 
participation rather than yields to political interests. 
The CPTPP risk analysis approach may provide momentum 
to rationalize and democratize national food safety regulatory 
regimes.  However, it may also restrict importing countries’ 
autonomy for food regulations, forcing them to stick to mainstream 
science-based standards normally evidenced in international 
agreements and practice.  This article has argued that the extension 
 
157 See Ash & Lejarraga, supra note 22, at 76–77, 81 (arguing that the trend of 
RTA-plus, especially in the agricultural sector, is expected to be multilteralized, 
but conceding that it may be subject to political will). 
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of good faith technical and capacity-building support from 
developed parties and full commitments to regulatory cooperation 
may alleviate difficulties in compliance. 
The Marketing of Self-Care and Alternative Therapies in 
the U.S. in 2019: How Industry Stakeholders Appeal to 
Consumers’ Perceptions of Novel Food Products and 
Additives 
Melanie Marie Glover* 
Abstract  
This article examines the current marketing techniques of 
food products and additives in the growing self-care industry in print 
and digital formats. It assesses how well consumers understand such 
advertising tactics, and what the industry and federal government 
agencies are doing (or not doing) to help consumers be mindful and 
savvy about their purchase choices. The discussion further 
showcases hot-topic food products and additives including CBD, 
Kratom, and plant-based meat as examples of both regulatory risk 
and opportunity. Lastly, the article advocates a collaborative effort 
among federal government agencies (FDA, FTC, USDA, etc.), 
industry stakeholders, and the public to help accurately define not 
only the risks of food products and additives in the self-care space, 
but also the necessary regulations to keep consumers informed and 
empowered both in stores and online. 
 I.  Introduction 
How consumers understand the messaging around a 
consumer good is not a novel issue.1  For decades, not only the 
United States (U.S.) federal and state governments, but also private 
industry stakeholders have toiled to protect the consumer from 
misleading product messaging.2  However, given the rise in certain 
“natural,” self-care products containing food and other ingestible 
 
* Melanie Glover is in-house legal counsel at a large multinational self-care 
consumer goods company in Michigan.  Her work focuses on contracts, intellectual 
property, advertising, and promotions in the food, beverage, and drug space.  B.A., 
Michigan State University; University Degree, Universidad Complutense de 
Madrid; J.D., Western Michigan University Thomas M. Cooley Law School; LL.M. 
(expected May 2020), Global Food Law, Michigan State University College of Law. 
1 See, e.g., Kordel v. United States, 335 U.S. 345, 349 (1948) (deciding issues 
surrounding advertising and labeling of consumer goods).  See generally Ivan L. 
Preston, Reasonable Consumer or Ignorant Consumer? How the FTC Decides, 8 J. 
CONSUMER AFF. 131 (1974) (discussing various consumer protection standards). 
2 See, e.g., Kordel, 335 U.S. 345 (consumer protection case); see also Jonathan 
Stempel, Five More U.S. States sue OxyContin Maker Purdue Pharma Over Opioid 
Epidemic, REUTERS (May 16, 2019), https://www.reuters.com (search article title 
and select first result); see also Lenny Bernstein, Five More States Take Legal Action 
Against Purdue Pharma for Opioid Crisis, WASH. POST, (May 16, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com (search article title and select first result). 
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ingredients, that messaging is growing more complex, less 
understood, and more easily misconstrued. 
Advertising and marketing strategies have hinged for years 
on the emotional and social value of food and food-related products, 
and their tactics have worked.  Devour Tours, a Spanish start-up 
company, promotes itself with its values of connecting people to 
local culture (Spain, France, Portugal, and Italy) through the 
experiences of seeing, tasting, smelling, touching, and devouring 
foods and beverages.3  The Culinaria book series and The Food 
Lover’s Handbook are other modern examples of food sold through 
authentic cultural lessons and culinary experiences.4  Even 
Starbucks’ business model rests on connecting the consumer to his 
or her cup of joe along with comforting encounters with plush sofas 
and chairs.5  Similarly, by helping the consumer understand the 
emotional connection between a product and a desirable experience, 
marketers of self-care products are testing the waters by adapting 
their strategies to remain relevant and competitive,6 and they are just 
getting warmed up. 
II.  What is the “Self-Care” Industry, and Why is it 
Exploding? 
The self-care industry is booming.7  In a time of ever-
increasing healthcare costs,8 consumers prefer more options and 
 
3 Devour Tours, The Story Behind Devour Tours, YOUTUBE (Mar. 1, 2017), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ycoy68dwYls. 
4 See generally MARION TRUTTER, CULINARIA SPAIN: A CELEBRATION OF FOOD AND 
TRADITION (2015) (a unique cookbook that offers cultural lessons with glimpses into 
various Spanish cooks’ recipes and meal preparations through their personal and 
family stories in Spain); JODI ETTENBERG, THE FOOD TRAVELER’S HANDBOOK (Full 
Flight Press, 2012) (a former lawyer and current food guru’s journey into Asian 
cuisine through travel, tourism, and curiosity). 
5 Mitch Free, Apple, Starbucks Sell Experiences, Not Products, THE STREET (May 
20, 2010), https://www.thestreet.com/story/12806098/1/apple-starbucks-sell-experi 
ences-not-products.html. 
6 IRi, Taking Charge: Consumers Grabbing Hold of their Health and Wellness 
Drives $450-Billion Opportunity, 9 (Nov. 2018), https://www.iriworldwide.com/IR 
I/Media/Library/Publications/IRI_Self_Care_POV.pdf; Michele Parmelee, 
Deloitte’s Global Millennial Survey: Exploring a “Generation Disrupted,” FORBES 
(May 20, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/deloitte/2019/05/20/deloitte-globals-
millennial-survey-is-full-of-surprises-not-necessarily-the-good-kind/#64d15874bc 
6a.   
7 See e.g., IRi, supra note 6, at 9; Erik Sherman, U.S. Health Care Costs Skyrocketed 
to $3.65 Trillion in 2018, FORTUNE, (Feb. 21, 2019), https://fortune.com/2019/02/2 
1/us-health-care-costs-2/; Neil Lister Interview: Self Care Champion, PAGB (June 
17, 2019), https://www.pagb.co.uk/about-pagb/self-care-champion-p3-lister/. 
8 Christopher Cheney, Analysis: Doctor’s Prescriptions for America’s Broken 
Healthcare System, HEALTHLEADERS, (July 18, 2019), https://www.healthleadersm 
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alternatives to manage their own health.9  “Self-care” means those 
“decisions people make or activities they participate in to ensure 
health and wellness for themselves and their families.”10  Self-care 
refers to the accumulated habits, benefits, and solutions that 
consumers implement themselves over time; in this way, self-care is 
preventive medicine, and it can cost less than prescription drugs for 
treatment.11  Over-the-counter remedies are chief examples of such 
self-care products that consumers can control for themselves.  
“Alternative therapy,” the use of homeopathic products and other at-
home remedies that tout themselves as being gentler for the human 
body, is another such example.12   
Consumers nowadays also have access to more information 
than ever, and they are using it to explore self-care and alternative 
therapies to better control their well-being.  Examples of trendy self-
care consumer goods include: products marketed as “natural,” 
“chemical free,” lifestyle products, probiotics, vaping technologies, 
cannabidiol (“CBD”), food additives, dietary supplements, vitamins, 
nasal sprays, personal hygiene products, sleep remedies, body 
scrubs, skin care and other topical remedies, suntan products, oral 
care products, etc.13  The plethora of self-care, over-the-counter 
 
edia.com/clinical-care/doctors-prescriptions-americas-broken-healthcare-system; 
see also Steven Porter, Analysis: Azar and Verma: Competition, Value-Based 
Models Needed to Fix Our Cost Problem, HEALTHLEADERS, (July 23, 2019), 
https://www.healthleadersmedia.com/strategy/azar-and-verma-competition-value-
based-models-needed-fix-our-cost-problem. 
9 IRi, supra note 6, at 2. 
10 Id. at 1. 
11 Id. at 3.   
12 Id. at 2.  
13 See IRi, supra note 6, at 6–7.  A few examples of self-care consumer goods 
marketed in these ways include products found at the following websites: FOREST 
CENTER HERBS, https://forestcenterherbs.com (last visited Nov. 8, 2019); THRIVE 
MARKET, https://www.thrivemarket.com (last visited Nov. 8, 2019); SWANSON 
VITAMINS, https://www.swansonvitamins.com (last visited Nov. 8, 2019). Other 
“natural” self-care product examples include Land O’Lakes All-Natural Eggs, JIF 
Natural Creamy Peanut Butter, Seventh Generation Natural Laundry Detergent, 
Frito Lay Natural Cheetos White Cheddar Cheese Puffs, Neutrogena Naturals 
skincare products, Aveeno Active Naturals skincare products, Orville 
Redenbacher’s Naturals–Simply Salted Popcorn, and Hillshire Farm Naturals No 
Antibiotics Ever Slow Roasted Turkey Breast.  See LAND O’LAKES, 
https://www.landolakes.com/products/eggs/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2019); THE J.M. 
SMUCKER COMPANY, https://www.jif.com/products/peanut-butter/natural-creamy-
peanut-butter (last visited Nov. 10, 2019); SEVENTH GENERATION, 
https://www.seventhgeneration.com/laundry-detergent-free-clear (last visited Nov. 
10, 2019); FRITO LAY, https://www.fritolay.com/products/simply-cheetos-puffs-
white-cheddar-cheese-flavored-snacks (last visited Nov. 10, 2019); NEUTROGENA, 
https://www.neutrogena.com/naturals.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2019); AVEENO, 
https://www.aveeno.com (last visited Nov. 10, 2019); ORVILLE REDENBACHER, 
https://www.orville.com/naturals-simply-salted (last visited Nov. 10, 2019); 
2019] MARKETING OF SELF-CARE & ALTERNATIVE THERAPIES  51 
 
      
options available is giving consumers a lot of reasons not to visit the 
doctor for a prescription.14   
 
Digital health resources, online medical advice and e-visits, 
and personalized electronic marketing strategies are also emerging 
offerings in the self-care space due to consumer demand for 
convenience and the rise in online retailers marketing specialty, 
“more natural” consumables that are easily accessible for 
consumers.15  Burt’s Bees, the Honest Company, and other wellness 
companies are convincing consumers that their more “natural” 
products will help consumers feel better in their daily lives.16  The 
social media marketing of food and food-related products is also a 
hot topic among lawyers and legal professionals attempting to 
understand the current advertising landscape for such products.17  
The rising self-care industry has developed slogans such as “Gen 
Well,”18 “better for me” products and therapies,19 and “free from 
[insert a chemical or ingredient].”  Self-care and alternative therapies 
are available anytime to consumers digitally or over-the-counter in 
retail stores.  Moving forward, the industry may develop even further 
 
HILLSHIRE FARM, https://www.hillshirefarm.com/products/deli-meat/naturals-slow-
roasted-turkey-breast (last visited Nov. 10, 2019). 
14 IRi, supra note 6, at 1 (stating that 47% of millennials and 41% of Gen Xers avoid 
visiting the doctor). 
15 See, e.g., Digital Health Research Resources, UNIV. OF CAL. SAN FRANCISCO RES. 
CONSULTATION, CLINICAL & TRANSITIONAL SCIENCE INSTITUTE, https://consult.ucsf 
.edu/guidance/digital-health (last visited Nov. 3, 2019); IRi, supra note 6, at 1; see 
also Serra J. Schlanger & Rachael E. Hunt, Telemedicine, Understanding the FDA’s 
Role in Recent Regulatory and Enforcement Actions, COMPLIANCE TODAY (July 
2019), https://compliancecosmos.org/telemedicine-understanding-fdas-role-recent-
regulatory-and-enforcement-actions?authkey=410f81ecc4545f0d3d381cf44ac4529 
e69301e2ed123864ba2e129e2c38feec. 
16 See BURT’S BEES, https://www.burtsbees.com/content/ingredients-1/ (last visited 
Nov. 5, 2019) (stating on each individual ingredient page that the ingredient is 
“[g]ood for you, naturally”); Ahiza Garcia, The Skincare Industry Is Booming, 
Fueled by Informed Consumers and Social Media, CNN (May 10, 2019, 11:30 AM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2019/05/10/business/skincare-industry-trends-beauty-social-
media/index.html; see also A ‘Natural’ Rise in Sustainability Around the World, 
NIELSEN (Jan. 10, 2019), https://www.nielsen.com/us/en/insights/article/2019/a-
natural-rise-in-sustainability-around-the-world/. 
17 For example, the Food and Drug Law Institute hosted a conference in September, 
2019 about label claims and substantiation, plant-based food products, and social 
media marketing. FOOD AND DRUG LAW INST., https://www.fdli.org/2019/09/food-
advertising-labeling-and-litigation-conference/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2019). 
18 See Katie Nermoe, Millenials: The ‘Wellness Generation’ (Sept. 12, 2018), 
https://news.sanfordhealth.org (when you access the site, search “Wellness 
Generation” in the search bar at the top right where it says, “What can we help you 
find?”; the first option will be the article by Katie Nermoe); GENWELL PROJECT, 
https://genwellproject.org/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2019). 
19 IRi, supra note 6, at 2. 
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ways to access these products.  Still further, there has been an 
increase in recent years in the use of smart phone applications and 
personal counting devices, which range from watches to fitness 
bracelets, constantly measuring and storing data about an 
individual’s state of health.20   
 
Despite the interrelated yet competing interests and novelty 
of this social, business, and medical phenomenon, self-care and 
alternative therapies may genuinely help provide wellness solutions 
for consumers’ health issues.21  Consumers are seriously interested 
in greater self-management of their health conditions using products 
that empower them to proactively prevent or help treat health 
conditions.22 
 
 Even given their growing enthusiasm for the self-care 
industry, however, consumers should be skeptical because many 
questions remain unanswered.  These questions include but are not 
limited to: what does the product regulatory/consumer goods 
industry understand to be a “self-care” remedy or product; what is 
the “reasonable consumer” standard for understanding the marketing 
around a product;23 are food products, dietary supplements, and other 
alternative therapies marketed differently nowadays than their 
counterparts were a decade or more ago; and what impact does this 
have on consumers’ purchases?  Additional industry-specific 
questions include: do industry stakeholders/food producers/dietary 
supplement manufacturers need to market differently new food, food 
additives, dietary supplements, and alternative therapies consumed 
 
20 Id; Christopher Lane, Digital Health and the Rise of Mental Health Apps, 
PSYCHOLOGY TODAY (Aug. 11, 2018), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/s 
ide-effects/201808/digital-health-and-the-rise-mental-health-apps. 
21 See, e.g., Douglas Mann, et al., Integrating Complementary & Alternative 
Therapies with Conventional Care, in THE CONVERGENCE OF COMPLEMENTARY, 
ALTERNATIVE, & CONVENTIONAL HEALTH CARE: EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES FOR 
HEALTH PROFESSIONALS, 8–10 (Sheila N. Thomas ed., 2004), https://www.med.unc 
.edu/phyrehab/pim/files/2018/03/Integrating.pdf. 
22 See, e.g., The Reis Group, Survey Finds Patients Want More Guidance from 
Physicians on Self-Care, EUREKALERT! (July 23, 2019), https://www.eurekalert.org 
/pub_releases/2019-07/trg-sfp072219.php; GRAND VIEW RESEARCH, U.S. NATURAL 
PERSONAL CARE MARKET SIZE, SHARE & TRENDS ANALYSIS REPORT BY PRODUCT 
(SKIN CARE, HAIR CARE, ORAL CARE), BY DEMOGRAPHY (BABY, MIDDLE-AGED 
ADULTS, YOUNG ADULTS), AND SEGMENT FORECASTS, 2019-2025 (Feb. 2019), 
https://www.grandviewresearch.com/industry-analysis/us-natural-personal-care-m 
arket. 
23 FED. TRADE COMM’N, ADVERTISING FAQ’S: A GUIDE FOR SMALL BUSINESS, 
https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/advertising-faqs-guide-
small-business (last visited Nov. 7, 2019) (stating that the “reasonable consumer” is 
the “typical person looking at the ad” and that the ad will be viewed “in context–
words, phrases, and pictures–to determine what it conveys to consumers”). 
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by humans (given the novel and nuanced nature of these products, 
the rising self-care and wellness industry, and the online selling of 
consumable food products and dietary supplements);24 does online 
selling and consumers’ increased access to food products, dietary 
supplements, and other alternative therapies present increased risks 
to consumers such that the marketing of these products needs to use 
more careful, precise, and transparent messaging and positioning; 
and do consumers understand the health risks and benefits of food 
products, food additives, dietary supplements, and alternative 
therapies sold online as well as they understand the same store-
bought or traditional retailer-sold products?25  Finally, what is the 
role of technology in relation to these self-care products (e.g. digital 
health, artificial intelligence, and online selling of self-care products) 
(e.g. public accessibility to food products and product descriptions 
and reviews as advertisements), and is the product for sale a food or 
a drug, and if both, how should it be regulated?26  These questions 
 
24 See generally Vivekanand Sharma et al., Identifying Complementary and 
Alternative Medicine Usage Information from Internet Resources: A Systematic 
Review, 5 METHODS INF. MED. 322–332, (2016), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc 
/articles/PMC4975632 (providing a broad overview of research relating to such 
concerns). 
25 See Why Are Complementary and Alternative Therapies Harder to Evaluate? The 
Treatments Are Assumed to Be Safe, AMERICAN CANCER SOCIETY, 
https://www.cancer.org/treatment/treatments-and-side-effects/complementary-and-
alternative-medicine/complementary-and-alternative-methods-and-cancer/why-ca 
m-is-hard-to-evaluate.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2019) (describing the problems that 
arise when alternative therapies such as herbal remedies advertise a product 
untruthfully, which poses the question of how companies offering legitimate 
alternative therapy options will verify and market their products to consumers); see 
also Integrative Medicine: Find Out What Works, MAYO CLINIC, 
https://www.mayoclinic.org/tests-procedures/complementary-alternative-
medicine/in-depth/alternative-medicine/art-20046087 (last visited Nov. 9, 2019) 
(giving guidance to consumers considering the use of alternative therapies and 
medicines and warning of potential pitfalls); NAT’L CTR. FOR COMPLEMENTARY AND 
INTEGRATIVE HEALTH, DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., FINDING AND 
EVALUATING ONLINE RESOURCES, https://nccih.nih.gov/health/webresources#hed2 
(last visited Nov. 8, 2019) (addressing the concern that consumers searching for 
alternative therapies online may not be able to discern the good from the bad and 
offering particular advice for navigating the Internet for alternative therapies).   
26 Food and Drug Admin., Scientific Data and Information About Products 
Containing Cannabis or Cannabis-Derived Compounds; Public Hearing; Request 
for Comments, REGULATIONS.GOV (Apr. 3, 2019), https://www.regulations.gov/doc 
ument?D=FDA-2019-N-1482-0001 (explaining that where manufacturers have 
added CBD to food products, such products violate the FD&C Act because FDA has 
approved CBD as an active ingredient in a drug; this reality highlights the main FDA 
concern about how to regulate food products that contain active ingredients in 
approved drugs); FDA Warns Company Marketing Unapproved Cannabidiol 
Products with Unsubstantiated Claims to Treat Cancer, Alzheimer’s Disease, 
Opioid Withdrawal, Pain and Pet Anxiety, FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN. (July 23, 2019), 
https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/fda-warns-company-mark 
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help shape the scope of the trending and lingering debate about 
government regulation over certain food-drug hybrid products, and 
the evaluation is just beginning.   
 
III.  Is There a Standard Level of Understanding that 
May Apply to All Consumers? 
 The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) is the leading 
authority on the reasonable consumer standard.27  According to the 
FTC, a reasonable consumer is a typical one.28  In cases of 
advertising uncertainty, the FTC focuses its analysis on whether the 
advertisement would have misled or deceived a reasonable, 
unsophisticated consumer.29  For example, in the context of the 
FTC’s recent enforcement action against Amazon for misleading in-
app purchases directed at children, the FTC reminded advertisers that 
“under the FTC Act, it’s wise to view your transactions from the 
perspective of a reasonable consumer, not a customer already 
familiar with your products and billing practices.”30 
 
 One consumer-friendly marketing technique that self-care 
companies are using involves creating product packaging that 
resembles a food or beverage product to demonstrate more natural, 
less-processed benefits to human health.31  A second marketing 
technique is personalization and customization to comply with 
consumers’ preferences by using consumer insights research.32  Still 
another technique “embrace[s] wellness-focused lifestyles” or 
experiences (e.g. rock-climbing and dancing, eating whole foods, 
etc.).33  Finally, there is the convenience and efficiency of online 
nutritional counseling and medical and health-related advice.34 These 
 
eting-unapproved-cannabidiol-products-unsubstantiated-claims-treat-cancer; FDA 
Warns 15 Companies for Illegally Selling Various Products Containing Cannabidiol 
as Agency Details Safety Concerns, FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN. (Nov. 25, 2019), 
https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/fda-warns-15-companies-
illegally-selling-various-products-containing-cannabidiol-agency-details 
(announcing that FDA sent warning letters to 15 companies challenging their sales 
of CBD-infused dietary supplements and human and animal foods). 
27 Preston, supra note 1.  
28 Down…But Not Out:  Advert. and Labeling of Feather Down, FED. TRADE 
COMM’N (Mar. 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/do 
wnbut-not-out-advertising-labeling-feather-down-0. 
29 Id. 
30 Lesley Fair, 7 Quotes of Note from the Amazon Decision, FED. TRADE COMM’N 
(May 3, 2016, 12:23 PM), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/business-blog/20 
16/05/7-quotes-note-amazon-decision. 
31 IRi, supra note 6, at 8–9. 
32 Id. at 10–11. 
33 Id. at 5, 7. 
34 Id. at 11. 
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techniques are among the more positive, less misleading ones.  The 
deception, however, lies in the claims–both explicit and implicit–of 
health-related consumer goods products.   
 
IV. What is the Regulatory Framework for Food-        
Related Health Claims? 
The Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) regulates three 
types of health claims.35  The first is nutrient content claims, which 
characterize the level of nutrients in a food (e.g. “high,” “low,” or 
“free of” fats, sodium, and other nutrients).36  The second type of 
claims the FDA regulates are “structure-function” claims, which tell 
a consumer how beneficial a product could be for their health (e.g. 
“calcium builds strong bones”).37  The third type of claims are  
qualified health claims.38  Qualified health claims include statements 
about how certain food products may reduce the risk of disease or 
other health-related conditions (e.g. products claiming they can 
lower the consumer’s chance of heart disease or cholesterol levels).39  
The issue with food products and additives today is that their 
accompanying claims may fall into two or more of these areas.  This 
reality challenges the FDA’s current framework of regulating drug 
messaging or drugs positioned as foods because: what if the product 
is or could be both? 
V.  What are Today’s Popular Food Products and 
Additives, and How are they Advertised? 
The current commercial landscape for food-related products 
includes novel products such as plant-based food and food additives 
(e.g. meat, milk, mayonnaise, CBD, and other plant-infused 
products) that appeal to environment and human health-conscious 
consumers whose interests include weight and pain reduction and 
management.40  Marketers for food manufacturers are selling these 
products as a healthy, self-care, or euphoric experience by creating a 
 
35 Label Claims for Conventional Foods and Dietary Supplements FOOD AND DRUG 
ADMIN. (June 19, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/food/food-labeling-nutrition/label-cla 
ims-conventional-foods-and-dietary-supplements. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Heather Kelly, Can the New Vegan Impossible Burger Fool Meat Lovers, CNN 
BUS. (Jan. 8, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/01/08/tech/impossible-burger-new-
recipe/index.html (quoting David Lipman, Impossible Foods’ Chief Science 
Officer); Jordan Valinsky, Tim Horton Will Start Selling Beyond Meat Sandwiches 
Across Canada, CNN BUS. (June 12, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/06/12/busi 
ness/beyond-meat-tim-hortons/index.html. 
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message that encourages an emotional or social response from using 
or interacting with the product.41  There is also a market trend toward 
inserting plant-based food additives into food or dietary supplements 
and using them as an attractive, eye-catching ingredient in other 
consumable products.42  This discussion focuses on these product 
categories, but the marketplace is ripe with several other types of 
food products and dietary supplements with similar claims issues of 
which consumers should beware.   
 
Plant-based products currently in the public and regulatory 
eye include CBD, Kratom, and plant-based meat.43  This paper 
discusses how manufacturers and retailers market these plant-
derived foods and food additives, how consumers understand such 
advertisements, and the potential health risks involved.  This 
discussion ends with a glimpse into the regulatory framework (or 
lack thereof) for advertising these products.  Finally, the paper sets 
forth potential solutions that industry stakeholders, the U.S. federal 
government, and consumers can advocate for and implement in the 
near future and in the long-term.   
A.  CBD 
Regulatory concern is most prominent in the CBD arena 
because CBD is popping up everywhere.44  Convenience stores, 
pharmacies, and even strip malls increasingly boast CBD 
 
41 Sonia Thompson, 2 Lessons In Inclusive Marketing From KFC and Burger King’s 
Popular Launches of Plant Based ‘Meat’, FORBES (Aug 31, 2019, 01:45 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/soniathompson/2019/08/31/2-lessons-in-inclusive-m 
arketing-from-kfc-and-burger-kings-popular-launches-of-plant-based-meat/#57755 
b152822. 
42 July through August 2019, a drive down Highway I-131 near the downtown Grand 
Rapids, Michigan area revealed a large display sponsored by Harvest Health Foods, 
a local grocery store chain, with “CBD” displayed in big, bold letters across the 
billboard, broadcasting the benefits of CBD.  CBD Oil, HARVEST HEALTH FOODS, 
https://harvesthealthfoods.com/tags/cbd-oil (last visited Nov. 26, 2019). 
43 See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FDA REGULATION OF CANNABIS AND CANNABIS-
DERIVED PRODUCTS, INCLUDING CANNABIDIOL (CBD) (Oct. 16. 2019), 
https://www.fda.gov/news-events/public-health-focus/fda-regulation-cannabis-and 
-cannabis-derived-products-including-cannabidiol-cbd [hereinafter U.S. FOOD & 
DRUG ADMIN., FDA REGULATION OF CANNABIS]; see also U.S. FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN., FDA AND KRATOM (Sept. 11, 2019), https://www.fda.gov/news-
events/public-health-focus/fda-and-kratom; see also U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
STATEMENT OF POLICY – FOODS DERIVED FROM NEW PLANT VARIETIES (Apr. 29, 
2019), https://www.fda.gov/regulatory-information/search-fda-guidance-document 
s/statement-policy-foods-derived-new-plant-varieties. 
44 See Parija Kavilanz, Suddenly CBD is Everywhere. Here’s What’s Next, CNN 
BUS. (Mar. 26, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/03/26/success/cbd-entrepreneurs 
/index.html. 
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inventory.45  To start, the Cannabis sativa plant comes from the 
Cannabaceae plant family, and it contains active chemical 
compounds such as delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol (“THC”) and 
CBD.46  The Federal Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”) has 
controlled parts of the plant since 1970 under the drug class 
“Marihuana.”47  “Marihuana” is listed in Schedule I of the CSA 
because of the psychoactive effects of THC, and the federal 
definition of “Marihuana” is “all parts of the plant Cannabis sativa 
L.”48  The Farm Bill of 2018 legalized the sale of hemp-derived 
products while directing the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
(“USDA”) to develop regulations clarifying hemp use on a federal 
level.49  The gap, however, arose when Congress stayed silent on the 
FDA’s role in regulating products derived from cannabis or hemp 
under the Food Drug and Cosmetics Act (“FD&C Act”).  Some 
industry stakeholders have advocated for Congress to consider 
carving out an exception under the “Marihuana” definition to exclude 
cannabidiol from its definition like hemp.50 
 
The wide availability of CBD—evidenced by its various 
advertising forms—leads consumers to believe that it is lawful to 
purchase and consume.  The following photos depict real-life 
advertisements of CBD for sale in the West Michigan area. 
 
 
45 See Sean Williams, CBD: Coming to Chevron, Shell, ARCO, BP, Sunoco, or 76 
Station Near You, FOOL (June 14, 2019), https://www.fool.com/investing/2019/06/1 
4/cbd-coming-to-a-chevron-shell-arco-bp-sunoco-or-76.aspx; see also Sean 
Williams, This CBD Stock is Quietly Becoming a Retail Giant, FOOL (July 13, 2019), 
https://www.fool.com/investing/2019/07/13/this-cbd-stock-is-quietly-becoming-a-
retail-giant.aspx. 
46 See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FDA REGULATION OF CANNABIS, supra note 43. 
47 21 U.S.C. § 802(16)(A) (2019). 
48 Id. 
49 7 U.S.C § 5940 (2019). 
50 21 U.S.C. § 802(16)(B)(i) (2019); Sarah Sorscher, Deputy Dir. of Regulatory 
Affairs, Ctr. for Sci. in the Pub. Interest, Presentation at the FDLI Annual 
Conference: Marijuana, CBD, and Hemp: Understanding the Current Regulatory 
Landscape and How it Might Change (May 3, 2019). 
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Figure 1. CBD Advertisement in a Big Rapids, Michigan Strip 
Mall, June 30, 2019.51 
 
Figure 2. CBD ReThink Display in Allegan, Michigan, 
Allegan Community Pharmacy, May 15, 2019. 
 
51 The advertisement disappeared on Sunday, July 7, 2019.  Similarly, an online 
retailer, Thrive Market, pulled CBD products in June 2019 after its merchant 
processor expressed concern over the products’ legal status.  In addition, Curaleaf 
Inc., a cannabis company, removed health claims about CBD products from its 
website after receiving a warning letter from the FDA in July 2019.   
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The FDA is focused on the cumulative exposure to CBD 
across a broad range of products.  This is because edibles may have 
a longer delay in onset than inhaled products, difficult to control 
dosage, and higher risk of poisoning.52  The pricing, direct, and 
implied claims on a product may also cause confusion for a 
consumer.53  For example, does putting a premium price on a CBD 
product suggest or imply a claim that it is valuable for some 
specific—albeit unspoken—purpose?  What claims might a 
company be making by not saying anything? 
 The images below represent a fictional advertisement 
(although inspired by a real website and company)54 of CBD claims 
to further illustrate regulatory concerns about its widespread sale.  
This exercise demonstrates the expansive range of legal issues 
related to explicit and implicit claims involved in the marketing of 
an emerging self-care health product like CBD-infused nasal spray.   
 
 
Figure 3. Fictional CBD Product. 
 
52 Daniel G. Barrus et al., Tasty THC: Promises and Challenges of Cannabis 
Edibles, METHODS REP RTI PRESS (2016), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/artic 
les/PMC5260817. 
53 Riëtte van Laack, FDA Encourages Food Industry to Use “Best if Used by” Date 
for Self-Stable Foods, FDA LAW BLOG (June 4, 2019), http://www.fdalawblog.net/ 
(search “FDA Encourages Food Industry”). 
54 The inspiration for the product can be found at the following website, however, 
all claims and copy on the images included in this research paper were created for 
educational and discussion purposes: https://hhoutlet.com/products/hemp-cbd-nasal 
-spray-new. Graphics by Theresa Fernández, http://www.theresafernandez.com/. 
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Figure 4. Advertisement of Fictional CBD Product. 
 
 The advertisement in Figure 4 showcases a multitude of the 
FDA’s concerns about the presence, labeling, and marketing of CBD 
as an ingredient in food products, dietary supplements, and 
cosmetics.  The sale of these products over the Internet adds to the 
FDA’s concern for consumers who have little to no opportunity to 
interact with a knowledgeable salesperson or health professional; 
there is oftentimes no pharmacist available to answer questions 
digitally (yet).  Unfortunately, the rise in digital health mixed with 
novel products means more room for misdiagnoses and human error 
in the mismanagement of treatments, prescriptions, and medicine 
consumption.  The electronic marketing mediums also carry their 
own risks inherent to advertising products on the Internet or through 
applications;55 the risk for misinterpretation and lack of information 
due to the speed at which consumers browse the Internet and scroll 
and click through their smart phones increase the likelihood of a 
misinformed or underinformed consumer.56    
 This product demonstrates the numerous issues that the FDA 
and FTC can and should regulate.  First, the claim, “Healthy Hemp-
 
55 Miranda Brookins, Disadvantages of Online Advertising Options, CHRON (Feb. 5, 
2019), https://smallbusiness.chron.com/disadvantages-online-advertising-options-1 
0212.html. 
56 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., VAPEJOOSE INC. WARNING LETTER, MARCS-CMS 
585917 (June 18, 2019), https://www.fda.gov/inspections-compliance-enforcemen 
t-and-criminal-investigations/warning-letters/vapejoose-inc-585917-06182019 
[hereinafter US. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., VAPEJOOSE LETTER] (explaining that it is the 
responsibility of the manufacturer or distributor of the food, drug, or cosmetic “to 
ensure that [its] tobacco products and all related labeling and/or advertising on [its] 
website[s], on any other websites (including e-commerce, social networking, or 
search engine websites), in any other media in which [it] advertise[s], and in any 
retail establishments comply with each applicable provision of the FD&C Act and 
FDA’s implementing regulations”). 
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CBD Lavender-Scented Nasal Spray,” is misleading because hemp 
and CBD are now regulated differently after the passage of the Farm 
Bill of 2018.57  Likewise, the meaning of “healthy” has not yet been 
(re)determined on a federal level despite receiving FDA enforcement 
attention;58 therefore, there exists risk of consumer confusion in 
using this term.  Second, the claims that the CBD can “manage pain, 
treat seizures, and prevent the early onset of dementia” are 
unapproved drug claims because they convey that the product’s 
intended use is to treat or prevent dementia and seizures and 
otherwise affect the structure and function of the human body, and 
therefore the sentence is misleading.59  Third, the suggested dose 
 
57 Scientific Data and Information About Products Containing Cannabis or 
Cannabis-Derived Compounds; Public Hearing; Request for Comments, 84 Fed. 
Reg. 12, 969 (Apr. 3, 2019) (to be codified at 21 CFR pt. 15) (explaining that the 
Farm Bill of 2018 removed hemp from the United States Controlled Substances Act, 
which means that cannabis plants and their derivatives with no more than 0.3 percent 
delta-9 tetrahydrocannabinol concentration (“THC”) are no longer controlled 
substances under United States Federal Law);  U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N, FTC 
POL’Y STAREMENT ON DECEPTION, (Oct. 14, 1983), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files 
/documents/public_statements/410531/831014deceptionstmt.pdf; U.S. FOOD & 
DRUG ADMIN., USE OF THE TERM HEALTHY ON FOOD LABELING (Oct. 22, 2018), 
https://www.fda.gov/food/food-labeling-nutrition/use-term-healthy-food-labeling; 
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., WARNING LETTER TO CURALEAF INC., MARCS-CMS 
579289 (July 22, 2019), https://www.fda.gov/inspections-compliance-enforcement 
-and-criminal-investigations/warning-letters/curaleaf-inc-579289-07222019 
(explaining the FDA’s concerns that Curaleaf Inc’s “CBD Lotion,” “CBD Pain-
Relief Patch,” “CBD Tincture,” and “CBD Disposable Vape Pen” products are 
unapproved new drugs sold and misbranded in violation of the FD&C Act because 
the company included unapproved claims in the advertising related to these products 
on its website, and such claims were intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, 
mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease and/or intended to affect the structure 
or any function of the body); Anna Edney & Craig Giammona, FDA Targets U.S. 
Marijuana Leader in CBD Marketing Crackdown, BLOOMBERG (July 23, 2019), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-07-23/fda-targets-u-s-marijuana-l 
eader-in-crackdown-on-cbd-marketing. 
58 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., WARNING LETTER TO KIND, LLC (Mar. 17, 2015), 
https://www.fda.gov/inspections-compliance-enforcement-and-criminal-investigati 
ons/warning-letters/kind-llc-03172015; Angelica LaVito, FDA to Consider What 
‘Healthy’ Means and Other Claims Food Companies Can Make, CNBC (Mar. 29, 
2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/29/fda-to-consider-updating-health-claims-
food-manufacturers-can-make.html; Deena Shanker & Anna Edney, FDA to Update 
Its Definition of ‘Healthy’ This Summer, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 29, 2019), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-03-29/fda-will-give-definition-of-
healthy-this-summer-gottlieb-says. 
59 21 § U.S.C. 321(g)(1) (2012) (stating the definition of “drugs” as intended for use 
in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease and/or because 
they are intended to affect the structure or any function of the body); see also Kordel, 
335 U.S. 345 (discussing the scope of the Act’s “labeling” definition); see also U.S. 
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., WARNING LETTER TO NUTRAPURE LLC (2019), 
https://www.fda.gov/inspections-compliance-enforcement-and-criminal-investigati 
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states “take as needed.”  This statement raises the FDA’s well-known 
concern about the efficacy of CBD: how much spray is needed for 
the product to “work?”60  Fourth, the optics of the marijuana leaves 
on the nasal spray bottle packaging with lavender accent colors may 
make implied claims; in other words, consumers may interpret these 
graphics to mean that the nasal spray product contains a 
pharmacologically active ingredient or THC, or that it produces some 
other psychotropic effect.61  Fifth, the claim that “nasal delivery 
means quick absorption; gummies and capsules can take up to an 
hour!” lacks supporting research as of the time of writing this paper.  
The FDA’s concerns are with dosage levels due to the various forms 
that CBD can be ingested.  What if a person consumes both gummies 
and a nasal spray within a limited amount of time?  How will the 
FDA regulate such dosages?  Currently, there is no warning about 
the effect on the human body of taking CBD in multiple forms, and 
the FDA has invited industry stakeholders to conduct and share this 
research for increased understanding about CBD’s effects when 
combined in various ingestible products.62  Sixth, the language “read 
about our blog post on the therapeutic effects of Healthy Hemp-CBD 
Lavender-Scented Nasal Spray HERE” is problematic because the 
blog post may contain additional unapproved drug claims or other 
misleading language that encourage a consumer to purchase the CBD 
product.  The question becomes whether the content on the blog 
contains additional advertising or labeling about the product due to 
the proximity of the link to the product (on the product packaging).63  
 
ons/warning-letters/nutra-pure-llc-567714-03282019 (demonstrating the FDA’s 
enforcement action against a dietary supplements company where the FDA 
criticized the company’s claims that CBD could help treat Alzheimer’s disease and 
anxiety-related disorders). As of the writing of this paper, FDA has only approved 
one cannabis-derived and three cannabis-related drug products.  See U.S. FOOD & 
DRUG ADMIN., FDA REGULATION OF CANNABIS, supra note 43. 
60 Sorscher, supra note 50. 
61 Leslie Lake, New Research on CBD Highlights Immense Consumer Confusion 
and Erroneous Assumptions, GROCERY MFRS. ASS’N  (Oct. 28, 2019), 
https://www.gmaonline.org/news-events/newsroom/new-research-on-cbd-
highlights-immense-consumer-confusion-and-erroneous/ (Thirty-nine percent of 
Americans “incorrectly believe CBD is just another name for marijuana and more 
than half mistakenly think it can get you ‘high.’”). 
62 The FDA established a docket for public comment for a notice published on April 
3, 2019 to receive comments from industry stakeholders about CBD production, 
distribution, and sale. Scientific Data and Information About Products Containing 
Cannabis or Cannabis-Derived Compounds; Public Hearing; Request for 
Comments, 84 Fed. Reg. 12, 969 (Apr. 3, 2019) (to be codified at 21 CFR pt. 15). 
63 The  cases, Kordel v. U.S. and U.S. v. 24 Bottles Sterling Vinegar & Honey, 
demonstrate the distinction between when material is considered advertising (under 
FTC jurisdiction) and when material is considered a label or labelling (under  FDA 
jurisdiction).  Kordel, 335 U.S. at 347–51; U.S. v. 24 Bottles Sterling Vinegar & 
Honey, F.2d 157, 158–59 (1964). 
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Sellers of such products must be aware that related advertising 
material such as a blog post or an online article may be interpreted to 
be part of the product labeling and, therefore, subject to FDA 
regulations just like traditional product labels.64  Finally, the “try 
other Healthy Hemp products” section featuring other CBD-infused 
products creates concerns that (1) these products may have 
unapproved drug claim issues, and that (2) the lack of warnings about 
the effects on the human body when taking two or more 
simultaneously may harm consumers.  To address this, in the spring 
of 2019, the FDA invited industry stakeholders to submit their 
research findings on the effect of various CBD-infused products to 
help the FDA begin to understand how these CBD-infused products 
may affect humans if ingested together depending on the dosage. 
 The issue of food fraud, as it relates to the Cannabis plant 
and children, is also a risk to consumers that concerns the FDA.65  A 
recent case involving THC-infused gummies (“Stoney Kids,” a 
candy in packaging eerily resembling that of the popular candy, 
“Sour Patch Kids”) reveals growing anxiety over the marketing of 
edibles to children by mimicking common snacks and candies.66  
Mondeléz Canada has not only sued the manufacturer of the THC-
infused gummies for trademark infringement and dilution; the Sour 
Patch Kids manufacturer also alleges that Stoney Kids violates 
California’s Medicinal and Adult-Use Cannabis Regulation and 
Safety Act because Stoney Kids directly targets children with its 
striking resemblance to Sour Patch Kids.67  The timing of the Stoney 
Kids suit is particularly concerning considering the national and 
state-level debates occurring over CBD, THC, and related plant-
derived food additives.   
B.  Kratom 
Yet another ingestible self-care product is Kratom.68  While 
not as much of a household name as CBD arguably is, Kratom is 
 
64 See Kordel, 335 U.S. at 351; 24 Bottles of Sterling Vinegar & Honey, 338 F.2d at 
159. 
65 Corinne Gretler, Baby Food Has Too Much Sugar and Is Marketed Wrongly, 
WHO Says, BLOOMBERG (July 15, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles 
/2019-07-15/baby-food-has-too-much-sugar-and-is-marketed-wrongly-who-says. 
66 Elaine Watson, ‘Virtual knockoff’: Mondelez Canada Warns of Growing Trend 
Towards Marketing Edibles by Ripping Off Popular Snacks and Candies, FOOD 
NAVIGATOR USA (July 26, 2019), https://www.foodnavigator-usa.com/Article/2019 
/07/26/Virtual-knockoff-Mondelez-warns-of-growing-trend-towards-marketing-edi 
bles-by-ripping-off-popular-snacks-and-candies. 
67 Id. 
68 Schedules of Controlled Substances: Temporary Placement of Mitragynine and 7-
Hydroxmitragynine Into Schedule 1, 81 Fed. Reg. 59,929, 59,930 (proposed Aug. 
31, 2016) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1308). 
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similar to CBD in that it is underregulated, is for sale online and over-
the-counter,69 has alleged psychotropic and therapeutic effects, 
comes from a plant, and can be added to food.  Kratom’s scientific 
name is Mitragyna Speciosa, derived from a tropical tree indigenous 
to Southeast Asia.70  While Kratom and CBD have different 
regulatory histories (as of the writing of this paper, the U.S. Drug 
Enforcement Agency has announced its intent to schedule Kratom as 
a controlled substance),71 their similarities are significant.  This 
means that market and consumer interest in Kratom are just as 
concerning as CBD for many of the same reasons.  However, Kratom 
may deserve more immediate attention from regulators based on 
allegations that it can produce euphoric or psychotropic effects 
comparable to those that opioids produce in humans.72  While 
consumer-facing efficacy claims about Kratom range from mild to 
effective for managing pain, the regulatory dust is far from settling 
on Kratom.  In an interview with Michigan Public Radio on July 17, 
2019, University of Michigan Addiction Treatment Services 
psychiatrist, Edward Jouney, warned consumers to “scrutinize the 
source” from which Kratom is coming because “this is something 
that has the potential to be very powerful” for vulnerable populations 
who tend toward addictive behavior.73  The FDA has also publicly 
denounced Kratom, warning consumers that its health impact is not 
yet well understood.74  Like CBD, dosages for Kratom are not yet 
well-researched, leaving consumers precariously exposed to likely 
unjustified claims.   
C.  Plant-Based Meat, Mayonnaise, and Milk 
CBD and Kratom are not the only products on the market 
that concern the FDA and FTC.  Plant-based food options—and their 
advertising claims—are growing in popularity among health-
conscious consumers who are interested in plant-based products due 
 
69 See, e.g., KRAKEN KRATOM,  https://krakenkratom.com/. 
70 Schedules of Controlled Substances, 81 Fed. Reg. at 59,930. 
71 Id., at 59,933; DRUG ENF’T ADMIN., DEA Announces Intent to Schedule Kratom, 
Press Release (August 30, 2016). 
72 See Jennifer Clopton, Regulations Are on Hold as Kratom Debate Rages, WEBMD 
(Feb. 11, 2019), https://www.webmd.com/mental-health/addiction/news/20190211/ 
regulations-are-on-hold-as-kratom-debate-rages. 
73 You can buy it in gas stations, but experts warn that the drug Kratom is 
unregulated and under-researched. MICH. RADIO NPR (July 17, 2019), 
https://michigan.drupal.publicbroadcasting.net/post/stateside-funding-roads-local-
taxes-risks-kratom-mi-astronaut-apollo-11s-legacy. 
74 Nick Wing, Feds Prepare for a New War on Kratom, an Herbal Drug Many Swear 
By, HUFFPOST (Nov. 14, 2017), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/fda-kratom-regulat 
ion_n_5a0b465be4b00a6eece4c9e0; FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., Statement from FDA 
Commissioner Scott Gottlieb, M.D. on FDA advisory about deadly risks associated 
with kratom, Press Release (Nov. 14, 2017). 
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to their uneasiness with an overreliance on animal food products as 
a main source of protein.  Consumers are also interested in more 
environmentally sustainable practices that use fewer resources, and 
plant-based product manufacturers proudly acknowledge this.75  
Impossible Foods, Inc. (“Impossible Foods”) is one example of a 
company focused on “eliminat[ing] the need for animals in the food 
system.”76  To get there, the company has dedicated itself to 
“com[ing] up with a plant-based meat that people will actually 
choose.”77   
Food labels are also changing, and plant-based meat is a 
prime example of this.78  Changing food labels speak to consumers’ 
changing attitudes toward food and its ingredients, which are 
consistent with their interests in the self-care industry.  Consumers 
are choosier about their ingredients as they search for “dairy free,” 
“gluten free,” “egg free,” “cruelty free,” “fat free,” “hormone free,” 
and similar labels.79  Consumers want to know what is and is not in 
their food, but not at the expense of quality and an authentic user 
experience.  The growing number of “healthy” restaurant options and 
food brands demonstrate that consumers continue to care about what 
their food looks, smells, and tastes like.80  Consumers do not want to 
 
75 Impact Report 2019, IMPOSSIBLE FOODS (2019), https://impossiblefoods.com/miss 
ion/2019impact/. 
76 Kelly, supra note 40 (quoting David Lipman, Impossible Foods’ Chief Science 
Officer). 
77 Id. 
78 See Julia Horowitz, Meatless Farm Breaks into Booming US Market with Whole 
Foods Deal, CNN BUS. (June 24, 2019), https://edition.cnn.com/2019/06/24/busines 
s/meatless-farm-whole-foods/index.html (explaining via a video, titled “Fake Meat 
is the Future. Here’s Why,” that the packaging for plant-based meat is more akin to 
that of their real meat counterparts than packaging geared toward vegan or 
vegetarian consumers, as well as some concerns around grocery store placement of 
plant-based meats); see also Jordan Valinsky & Danielle Wiener-Bronner, America 
is Running Out of Impossible Burgers, CNN BUS. (Apr. 30, 2019, 2:47 PM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2019/04/30/business/impossible-meat-shortage/index.html; 
see also Neil Vigdor, Mission Impossible? Maker of Plant-Based Burger Struggles 
to Meet Chains’ Demand, N. Y. TIMES (June 15, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2 
019/06/15/business/impossible-foods-burger-demand.html. 
79 See Brandon McFadden, ‘Gluten-Free Water’ Shows Absurdity of Trend in 
Labeling What’s Absent, OBSERVER (Aug. 31, 2018, 11:29 AM), https://observer.co 
m/2017/08/gluten-free-water-shows-absurdity-of-trend-in-labeling-whats-absent-f 
ood-safety-regulations-consumers/.  A recent example is Palazzolo’s Artisan Dairy 
Slushie product, which bears a label containing the words, “No Fake Anything,” 
“No Trans Fat,” “No Gluten,” “No Added Hormones,” “No Corn Syrup,” and “No 
Dairy or Fake Flavorings.”  See Artisan Fruit Slushies, PALAZZOLO’S ARTISAN 
DAIRY (2019), https://www.palazzolosdairy.com/products/artisan-fruit-slushies/.   
80 See Gary Stern, CoreLife Eatery: A Vegetarian Restaurant Chain That Has 
Doubled Its Revenue in One Year, FORBES (Mar. 25, 2019, 12:32 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/garystern/2019/03/25/corelife-eatery-a-vegetarian-
restaurant-chain-whose-revenue-doubled-in-one-year/#2acc04b07bbf. CoreLife 
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ingest red meat, but they still want the experience of eating it.  A 
recent example is the color additive petition that Impossible Foods 
filed and the FDA granted, allowing Impossible Foods to apply soy 
leghemoglobin—“plant blood”—to plant-based beef.81  Despite this, 
the FDA and the public are still very much concerned with the 
potential impact to human health that plant-based products may 
have.82   
Despite market interest, the FDA, USDA, and various food 
industry stakeholders have expressed their concerns regarding the 
marketing claims surrounding alternative protein food options.83  
The various parties’ interests have culminated in a complex and 
sensitive regulatory and commercial framework that supports cell-
based meat production: the FDA regulates cell collection and growth 
 
Eatery, Panera Bread, Qdoba, and other food chains are examples of restaurants 
advertising “healthier” and “cleaner” food options.  See 100% of our food is 100% 
clean., PANERA BREAD (2019), https://www.panerabread.com/en-us/articles/100-
percent-of-our-food-is-100-percent-clean.html; Why Qdoba, QDOBA MEXICAN EATS 
(2019), https://www.qdobafranchise.com/why-qdoba.  See generally Leanna 
Garfield, 10 Up-and-Coming Healthy Fast Food Chains that Should Scare 
McDonald’s, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 19, 2018, 7:38 AM), https://www.businessinsider.c 
om/new-healthy-fast-food-chains-better-than-mcdonalds-2017-2 (listing ten up-
and-coming food chains advertising as healthy, cleaner food options). 
81 Listing of Color Additives Exempt From Certification; Soy Leghemoglobin, 84 
Fed. Reg. 37,573, 37,573-74 (Aug. 1, 2019) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 73) 
(explaining that Impossible Foods, Inc. filed and the FDA approved a color additive 
petition seeking permission for the FDA to consider soy leghemoglobin safe as a 
color additive, which would allow Impossible Foods to sell raw imitation beef in 
grocery stores); H. Claire Brown, After Plant Blood Gets FDA Approval, the 
Impossible Burger is Set to Hit Supermarket Shelves, THE NEW FOOD ECON. (July 
31, 2019), https://newfoodeconomy.org/plant-blood-heme-fda-approval-impossible 
-burger/.  
82 Chase Purdy, Plant-Based Meats Sound Healthy, but They’re Still Processed 
Foods, QUARTZ (July 1, 2019), https://qz.com/1655309/beyond-meat-needs-to-com 
municate-how-it-makes-its-plant-based-burger; see Press Release, Scott Gottlieb, 
Food and Drug Admin. Comm’r, Statement from FDA Commissioner Scott 
Gottlieb, M.D., on modernizing standards of identity and the use of dairy names for 
plant-based substitutes (Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-
announcements/statement-fda-commissioner-scott-gottlieb-md-modernizing-stand 
ards-identity-and-use-dairy-names. 
83 Beyond Meat Breaks Down After Consumer Group Warns of Chemicals in Fake 
Meat, CNBC (June 21, 2019, 5:37 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/video/2019/06/21/b 
eyond-meat-down-after-consumer-group-warns-of-chemicals-in-fake-meat.html?_ 
source=sharebar%7Ctwitter&par=sharebar (explaining via video one consumer 
groups concerns about the health claims from plant-based meat producers); see 
Lydia Mulvany & Deena Shanker, Why the ‘Bloody’ Impossible Burger Faces 
Another FDA Hurdle, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 26, 2018, 3:00 AM), https://www.bloomb 
erg.com/news/articles/2018-12-26/why-the-bloody-impossible-burger-faces-anothe 
r-fda-hurdle (discussing the concerns of interested parties about alternative meat 
producers’ lack of transparency when applying for FDA approval of “heme,” an 
additive in Impossible Foods’ plant-based meat). 
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during laboratory processing; the USDA manages the production and 
labeling of cell-based meat products developed from livestock and 
poultry cells; and food companies market the cell-based meat 
products for sale thereafter.84  One recent news article notes that, 
“[w]hile plant-based meat companies are ultimately making 
processed foods, their marketing is more in line with natural, organic 
offerings.”85  Indeed, more processing may not equate to being 
better-for-you, and in fact, some of these “meatless” products have 
come under attack in recent years due to alleged risks associated with 
the processing of their products.86  For example, a consumer 
advocacy group, “Moms Across America,” recently attacked 
Impossible Foods for allegedly high levels of the herbicide 
glyphosate in the burgers.87   
The question present in these marketing efforts is whether 
advertising the very food that the product is replacing is misleading 
to consumers.88  A highly-processed food product by its nature is not 
grown in the earth, so does it really deserve the title “natural” or 
“healthy”?  In this way, are consumers really getting the bargain for 
their buck with plant-based foods?  In the “Just Mayo” case, the FDA 
voiced its concerns about misbranding involving Hampton Creek’s 
advertising mayonnaise with an image of an egg on the label when 
the product was egg-free.89  The issue was why an egg-free product 
 
84 See Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA News Release: USDA and 
FDA Announce a Formal Agreement to Regulate Cell-Cultured Food Products from 
Cell Lines of Livestock and Poultry (Mar. 7, 2019), https://www.fda.gov/news-
events/press-announcements/usda-and-fda-announce-formal-agreement-regulate-
cell-cultured-food-products-cell-lines-livestock-and. 
85 Purdy, supra note 82. 
86 Joseph Mercola, Impossible Burger Attacks Moms for Publishing Pesticide 
Results, MERCOLA (June 4, 2019), https://articles.mercola.com/sites/articles/archive 
/2019/06/04/impossible-burger-glyphosate-residues.aspx; Tuttie Dedvukaj, Plant-
based Burgers May Not Be As Healthy As You Think, FOX BUS. (Aug. 2, 2019), 
https://www.foxbusiness.com/personal-finance/plant-based-burgers-may-not-be-as 
-healthy-as-you-think. 
87 Mercola, supra note 86; see generally Impossible Foods, Inc., The Unofficial 
Correction of “Moms Across America” (May 18, 2019), https://assets.ctfassets.net/ 
hhv516v5f7sj/77NQsg1qDb6d9Hi4PBQA6y/93b2af7c3f12ce2e4050e03a6e0345e
7/Unofficial_Correction_Moms_Across_America_05202019.pdf (responding to 
the claims of Moms Across America).  
88 Amelia Lucas, Plant-Based Eggs Land Their First Major Fast Food Deal, CNBC 
(2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/07/25/plant-based-eggs-land-their-first-major-
fast-food-deal.html (explaining that plant-based eggs are now showing up at fast-
food establishments); Impossible Foods, Inc., What Are the Ingredients? (2019), 
https://faq.impossiblefoods.com/hc/en-us/articles/360018937494-What-are-the-ing 
redients. 
89 Letter from Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition, U.S. Food & Drug 
Admin., to Joshua Tetrick, Founder and Chief, Hampton Creek Foods, Inc. (Aug. 
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has an egg on the picture of the label and whether this was confusing 
to consumers.90  Just Mayo subsequently relabeled its packaging by 
clarifying that the product was egg-free, and that the product 
packaging no longer displays an egg.91  Similarly, Muscle Milk 
revised its labeling to address allegations that arose in private 
litigation that its product was misbranded because it did not fit the 
standard of milk as consumers understood it, as it contained milk 
protein instead of cow’s milk.92  These cases demonstrate that 
consumers should think critically about the advertisements that they 
perceive related to certain self-care, plant-based products until the 
FDA determines the meaning of certain terms or decides whether to 
allow replacement products to advertise the very product that they 
are substituting. 
VI.  How Can Manufacturers, Consumers, and the U.S. 
Federal and State Governments Help? 
A.  Manufacturers 
The lack of research, a growing self-care industry, 
consumers’ interest in self-treatment, and the rise of alternative 
therapies, including food and other ingestible ingredients, strongly 
suggest that the FDA has wide latitude to regulate in these spaces and 
should provide guidance to industry stakeholders and education and 
warnings to consumers.  The FDA should also regulate in these food-
drug hybrid spaces in the interest of consumers’ present and future 
health.  So, what can industry stakeholders do to help ensure that 
neither legislative nor executive action creates precedent against 
their interests in this space?   
Companies promoting novel products do not always follow 
the golden rule of advertising,93 especially in the e-commerce 
 
12, 2015), https://www.fda.gov/inspections-compliance-enforcement-and-criminal-
investigations/warning-letters/hampton-creek-foods-08122015. 
90 “Just Mayo” Just Isn’t Warns FDA, FED’N OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS, (Sept. 14, 
2015, 1:10 PM), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/mayo.pdf. 
91Just Mayo, Non-GMO, 12 oz, WALMART (2019), https://www.walmart.com 
(search “Just Mayo” and click on 12-oz offering). 
92 See generally Andrew Adam Newman, Got Milk? For Sports Drink Maker, Nestlé 
Says No, N.Y. TIMES (July 26, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/27/busines 
s/media/27adco.html, (giving a brief overview of  the petition filed by Nestle in 
regards to the labeling of Muscle Milk); see also Muscle Milk Pro Series 40 Protein 
Shake, Go Bananas, 14 Oz, WALMART, https://www.walmart.com (search “Muscle 
Milk Pro Series 40 Protein Shake”) (showing the Muscle Milk label as now saying 
“CONTAINS NO MILK”).   
93 Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012) (stating in Section 5 that 
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce are prohibited and 
stating in Section 12 that false advertising that is likely to induce the purchase of 
foods, drugs, devices, services, or cosmetics is also prohibited).  
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space.94  Sometimes marketers appear to forget that all advertising 
claims must be truthful, accurate, and not misleading or deceptive.95  
They continue to push the envelope with even the most basic of 
claims and marketing tactics.  Companies can help combat 
misleading marketing by not making un- or under-substantiated 
claims about their products; they can continue to manufacture their 
products according to current good manufacturing practices 
(“GMPs”); and they can err on the side of caution when making 
claims related to human health to avoid misleading consumers about 
products that various stakeholders (the self-help industry, the 
government, and consumers) across the country are still getting to 
know.   
The food and beverage, drug, and cosmetics industries have 
a great opportunity to research the health impacts on the human body 
of the various alternative therapies and products hitting the market 
today, to present scientific-based research studies to the FDA and 
industry stakeholders to substantiate their claims and advertisements, 
and to advocate for the safest, most effective alternative therapies 
and products that emerge from their research.96  Well-researched 
health benefits are far more likely to lead to well-founded product 
claims and advertisements than a blank slate of regulatory fear and 
inaction.97  Hybrid food-drug products thus present enormous 
opportunity for industry stakeholders to play a role in not only 
changing law and policy, but also influencing consumers’ 
perspectives.  
Novel consumer goods products present more risk of 
misleading consumers because they fall into areas of regulatory 
uncertainty.  The FDA’s comfort zones are and have been food, 
drugs, and cosmetics, but, as hybrid products have emerged, the FDA 
grows weary of–and at times paralyzed over–how crossover products 
may interact with each other on the human body and in what 
amounts.98  If consumers do not know what a food or other 
consumable product is, how can they make an informed choice 
whether to purchase and ingest it?  If the U.S. federal and state 
governments allow food and other consumable products to be 
marketed with names that are potentially misleading about what the 
product is, how can consumers know what is good for them?  
 
94 US. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., VAPEJOOSE LETTER, supra note 56. 
95 Id. 
96 Comment Notice, 74 Fed. Reg. 3059 (Jan. 16, 2009). 
97 See id. 
98 Presentation at the FDLI Annual Conference: Marijuana, CBD, and Hemp: 
Understanding the Current Regulatory Landscape and How it Might Change (May 
3, 2019). 
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Plentiful options at grocery and convenience stores already daunt 
consumers.  How much more daunting is grocery shopping when 
advertisements for CBD and other un- or under-regulated plant-
based products line the aisles and counters with less-than-truthful 
claims enticing consumers to “try” a new product?  What should 
consumers do amid the exploding self-care industry, rising 
healthcare costs, and unregulated claims pertaining to ingestible self-
care products?  These questions, of course, may not yet have an 
answer, but they are worth asking as technology drives consumers 
toward more food and related self-care options.   
B.  Consumers  
Consumers must remain vigilant in their analysis.  They 
should not stop reading labels, researching product manufacturers, 
and thinking critically about the print and digital advertising (1) on 
product packaging and labels and (2) on websites and in social 
media, respectively.  The CBD, Kratom, and plant-based product 
debates present the lingering question of how much risk it will take 
to change the law.  Will it take a child eating several CBD-infused 
gummies, or something more or less?  Underregulated products like 
CBD and Kratom pose the risk of food fraud to consumers where the 
integrity of the product has not yet been proved.  Ms. Fritz warns: 
Anyone using CBD should make serious inquiries 
into the quality and purity of the product . . . 
[S]tudies have shown that many of the CBD oils out 
there consist mostly of olive oil or another 
alternative oil besides true CBD. Therefore, 
consumers should question the quality of the 
products they elect to purchase and use.99 
Consumers should be wary of the new ease of click-to-
purchase transactions.  They should continue to do their homework 
by consulting multiple reputable sources about such novel self-care 
products including food and food additives.   
 
 
99 Interview with Koral Fritz, Attorney, Innovative Law Group (July 15, 2019).  Ms. 
Fritz is a licensed attorney practicing in West Michigan.  Her current practice 
focuses on providing guidance to business clients on contracts, real estate, 
environmental, and litigation matters.  Along with a law degree, she also earned her 
Master’s degree in Food and Agriculture Law and Policy from the Vermont Law 
School.  Her experience ranges from working for national nonprofits on food policy 
to counseling clients retailing CBD and others interested in growing and marketing 
cannabis.  
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C.  Government 
 While the FD&C Act widely covers the regulation of food, 
drugs, and cosmetics, the FDA has struggled for years with how to 
regulate hybrid products that straddle two or more of these 
categories.  The best, most illustrative example of an opportunity for 
industry stakeholders to influence U.S. food and drug law currently 
rests with the debate over hemp and hemp-derived products since the 
Farm Bill of 2018.100  This area is ripe for stakeholder discussion and 
thought leadership because of manufacturers’ ability to create 
products that contain various parts of the plant at varying levels.   
 Examples are plentiful of manufacturers using CBD as an 
ingredient in their food products, dietary supplements, and drugs.101  
Examples include CBD-infused gummies, dietary supplements 
containing CBD, topical creams and oils containing CBD, CBD-
infused nasal sprays, CBD brownies and cookies, etc.102  The same 
is true with Kratom.  Due to its powder-like form, Kratom can easily 
be added to other products.103  There is no better time to impact U.S. 
food and drug law than now with the rise of these spaces adjacent to 
typical food products and dietary supplements.  The FDA is begging 
the industry to take charge with science-based evidence to 
demonstrate substantiated risks and benefits before the FDA will take 
a position on CBD, Kratom, and other plant-based ingredients in 
food products, dietary supplements, and consumer goods that dip into 
both worlds.104  As in the case of CBD, influencing U.S. food and 
drug law is not that difficult.  The FDA comment process is all 
inclusive and inviting.  
However, government indecision has contributed to 
marketplace and consumer confusion over CBD.105  Medical doctor 
Peter Grinspoon explains that “the government’s position on CBD is 
 
100 See Amy Abernethy & Lowell Schiller, FDA Is Committed to Sound, Science-
Based Policy on CBD, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (July 7, 2019), https://www.fda.gov/ 
news-events/fda-voices-perspectives-fda-leadership-and-experts/fda-committed-so 
und-science-based-policy-cbd. 
101 There are currently over 9,000 “Health & Household” items listed for sale on 
Amazon containing CBD.  See AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/ (type “CBD” in 
search bar; then narrow search results to “Health & Household” under 
“Department”) (last visited Nov. 10, 2019). 
102 Id. 
103 Lileana Pearson, Dietary Substitute Kratom Stays in Legal Gray Area, WWOT 
NBC 6 OMAHA (July 17, 2019, 5:27 PM), https://www.wowt.com/content/news/Di 
etary-substitute-Kratom-stays-in-legal-gray-area-512854091.html.  
104 See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FDA REGULATION OF CANNABIS, supra note 43. 
105 See Establishment of a New Drug Code for Marihuana Extract, 81 Fed. Reg. 
90194, 90194–96 (Dec. 14, 2016) (responding to public comments of confusion on 
the legality of CBD when not combined with cannabinols). 
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confusing, and depends in part on whether the CBD comes from 
hemp or marijuana.”106  The wide disparity in how law firms and 
other legal and compliance professionals and stakeholders position 
information about the Farm Bills of 2014 and 2018 and their effect 
on hemp and CBD further demonstrates the likelihood for consumer 
confusion.  Attorney Koral Fritz explains: 
The recent popularity of CBD has forced the FDA 
to play catch up.  As often happens, the market is 
ahead of the law . . . [T]he new supply and demand 
for these products has led to the FDA holding 
hearings with industry stakeholders to develop a 
regulatory framework for CBD . . . [M]onths ago[,] 
the FDA reiterated the clear position that CBD is not 
approved for use in food, however, the agency 
basically told the market that it will not be focusing 
on enforcement except for when a CBD product 
bares a health claim that goes too far.  The FDA 
seems the most concerned currently with any CBD 
product making a qualified health claim.  The FDA 
has taken enforcement action against companies that 
make unfounded, egregious claims about their 
products' ability to limit, treat, or cure cancer or 
diseases.107 
The FDA has made decisions on hemp seed, hemp oil, and 
hemp protein.108  However, the path forward for the cannabis and 
hemp industries depends on the USDA’s and the FDA’s ongoing 
efforts to issue guidance and rules for implementation of the 2018 
Farm Bill.   
Despite the need for FDA guidance with input from the 
industry on CBD, Kratom, and other emerging plant-based products, 
the FDA could also launch an education campaign to warn 
consumers about the dangers of ingesting these products that still 
lack research and regulation.109  While the FDA continues to 
 
106 Peter Grinspoon, Cannabidiol (CBD) – What We Know And What We Don’t, 
HARVARD HEALTH BLOG (Aug. 24, 2018, 6:30 AM), https://www.health.harvard.ed 
u/blog/cannabidiol-cbd-what-we-know-and-what-we-dont-2018082414476. 
107 Interview with Koral Fritz, supra note 99. 
108 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FDA RESPONDS TO THREE GRAS NOTICES FOR HEMP 
SEED-DERIVED INGREDIENTS FOR USE IN HUMAN FOOD (Dec. 20, 2018), 
https://www.fda.gov/food/cfsan-constituent-updates/fda-responds-three-gras-notic 
es-hemp-seed-derived-ingredients-use-human-food. 
109 To the FDA’s credit, the FDA has issued several public statements about CBD, 
warning consumers about its potential effects and promising an industry update in 
the near future.  See Abernethy & Schiller, supra note 100. 
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determine the health risks involved with these types of products, 
FDA warnings and educational messages could help consumers think 
critically about these products before ingesting them.  FDA public 
statements are helpful, but the FDA should more closely meet 
consumers where they are—in the marketplace—to help ensure that 
they understand the health risks of not only the plant-based food 
additives discussed in this paper, but also those yet to come.  
VII.  Conclusion 
The self-care industry will not slow down to accommodate 
for regulatory concern, consumer confusion, or manufacturers’ 
perfection of their products or processes.  The unknown or 
misunderstood lurking health risks associated with products 
containing un-regulated or under-regulated ingredients will require a 
village rather than a single government or consumer advocacy group 
to help shield consumers from deceptive advertisements.  Where the 
marketplace has revealed consumers’ interests, it has also exposed 
the need for increased scrutiny from industry, the public, and 
government to help ensure that risks to human health are minimal as 
such self-care products come available for sale.   
Industry influence is at an incredible high to shape the U.S. 
legal and regulatory framework for food and drug policy in the self-
care space.  The bright spot remains the industry’s opportunity to 
influence how the U.S. federal and state governments decide to 
regulate the products that entice consumers due to their potential 
therapeutic effects as well as consumers’ ability to experience 
managing their own health.  The FDA and consumers are listening 
as well, and each party has a significant role to play.  By each stating 
and justifying their interests and through their collaborative efforts, 
the three actors can help the U.S. expedite its journey towards 
increased government regulation that fits both the industry’s and 
consumers’ appetites for guidance while remaining flexible enough 
to allow for innovative self-care food products and food additives to 
develop for years to come.   
Going Hemp Wild: Understanding the Challenges and 
Opportunities for FDA Regulation of CBD in Food 
Products1 
Hannah Catt* 
 Abstract 
After the passage of the 2018 Farm Bill, champions of hemp 
began to tout opportunities for farmers and businesses involved with 
the crop.  The industry has rallied around one of hemp’s major 
byproducts, cannabidiol, or CBD.  However, the demand for CBD 
has left the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) playing catch-
up.  This article explains what CBD is, how it is derived, current 
FDA-approved uses, and a current path forward for the FDA in 
creating guidance for industry and consumers. 
I.  Introduction  
It is difficult today to read the news, browse social media, or 
even shop in some stores without encountering people extolling the 
virtues of cannabidiol (“CBD”) or questioning its therapeutic value.2  
The Food and Drug Administration has been challenged by the 
proliferation of CBD in many markets.  The hype has not escaped the 
FDA’s notice, but a federal agency is not poised to quickly respond 
to trends like these, therefore, the agency has yet to promulgate a full 
set of regulations.   
The production and use of CBD involve competing interests, 
from the pharmaceutical sector, food producers, farmers, and 
consumers.  Each of these parties has an interest in regulations being 
developed sooner rather than later, in part because there is currently 
significant market opportunity for CBD products.  This article 
explores the following issues relating to CBD: what CBD is; how it 
is different from other cannabis products; what CBD is being used 
for; and how the federal government can appropriately regulate the 
production and use of the product.  Due to the limited existing 
research on the effects of CBD, the best option may be for the FDA 
 
* Hannah Catt holds a J.D. with certificates in Environmental and Health Law from 
the University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law, as well as an LL.M. 
in Agricultural & Food Law from the University of Arkansas School of Law.  
1 Some companies that market CBD products are mentioned by name in this article.  
No mention of a specific company serves as an endorsement; it is purely for 
illustrative purposes.   
2 See, e.g., Alex Williams, Why is CBD Everywhere?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/27/style/cbd-benefits.html. 
2019]                          GOING HEMP WILD                             75 
 
 
 
to allow CBD to be sold as a supplement in limited concentrations 
while also working towards new drug approvals.     
II.  Hemp and Cannabinoids  
In recent years, many states have legalized medicinal and/or 
recreational marijuana use.3  Recent legislation expanding programs 
for legal hemp production has increased interest in by-products of 
the plant beyond traditional, industrial uses.4  Despite the differences 
in the use and availability of marijuana and hemp, the two are 
inextricably linked, usually under the banner of “cannabis.”  While 
confusing, this is not a mistake.  Marijuana and hemp are both 
products of Cannabis sativa, however, they are distinguishable based 
on their relative concentration of tetrahydrocannabinol (“THC”).5  
The plants can also be distinguished by their physical features when 
growing, as explained in Section II.   
Marijuana is often consumed for the psychoactive effects of 
THC, which is present in varying amounts based on the plant variety 
or cultivar.6  CBD is commonly considered non-psychoactive 
because it does not produce the “high” associated with consuming 
marijuana.7  In his work, prominent cannabis researcher Dr. Ernest 
Small has clarified that this common usage of the term non-
psychoactive for describing CBD is not proper because any 
significant change in mental state, including anxiety changes, should 
be considered a psychoactive effect.8   
CBD and THC are also both cannabinoids, a chemical 
component of the cannabis sativa plant.9  While cannabinoids have 
been found in other plants, CBD is noted as the “principal 
cannabinoid of hemp.”10  There have been over 100 cannabinoids 
identified in cannabis.11  The cannabinoids act by binding to 
 
3 NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, MARIJUANA OVERVIEW (2019), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/marijuana-overview.aspx.  
4 7 U.S.C. § 5940 (2018).  
5 CONG. RES. SERV., Defining Hemp: A Fact Sheet 1 (March 22, 2019), https://fas.org 
/sgp/crs/misc/R44742.pdf. 
6 Variety is technically used to note the plant types that are found in nature, while 
cultivars are bred for specific characteristics. Id. (citing Cindy Haynes, Cultivar 
Versus Variety, IOWA ST. UNIV. HORTICULTURE & HOME PEST NEWS (Feb. 6, 2008), 
https://hortnews.extension.iastate.edu/2008/2-6/CultivarOrVariety.html).   
7 ERNEST SMALL, CANNABIS: A COMPLETE GUIDE 204 (2016). 
8 Id.   
9 Id. at 205. 
10 Id. 
11 Genevieve Lafaye, et al., Cannabis, Cannabinoids, and Health, 19 DIALOGUES IN 
CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCE 3, 309 (2017). 
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receptors in the body’s endocannabinoid system.12  This system and 
the resulting effects of cannabinoids in the body were not discovered 
until the late twentieth century.13   
CB1 and CB2 are both found in the central nervous system 
and various organs throughout the body.14  Because of the relatively 
recent discovery of the endocannabinoid system and the many 
restrictions around research related to cannabis, a full understanding 
of the effects of cannabinoids is still developing.  The different 
receptor locations where the binding takes place can impact the 
ultimate effects of cannabis consumption, the potency of the product, 
and how CBD and THC will impact the body.15 
An additional area of study is how different cannabinoids 
work together.  Those involved in the illicit trade or consumption of 
marijuana are seeking out a higher THC content, which will increase 
the psychoactive effects.  New strains of cannabis have been bred to 
have a higher THC content at the expense of the CBD content.  In 
the reverse, cannabis bred for fiber or oilseed has high CBD content 
and minimal THC.16  Further, manufacturers of marijuana edibles do 
not currently have an incentive to add CBD to the final product.17  
This may change as more is discovered about the combined effects 
of THC and CBD, referred to as “entourage” or “ensemble” effects.18  
Consumption of THC and CBD has been shown to lessen some of 
the psychoactive symptoms of THC.19  The reason for this is not 
immediately clear, but researchers have noticed this in patients who 
take approved drugs with THC, such as Marinol, an appetite 
stimulant primarily prescribed for patients with AIDS.20 
CBD is produced through an extraction process which 
should be highly monitored to ensure there is no THC present.  To 
 
12 Pál Pacher, et al., The Endocannabinoid System as an Emerging Target of 
Pharmacotherapy, 58 PHARMACOL REV. 3, 389 (2006). 
13 Matt Simon, THC! CBD! Terpenoids! Cannabis Science is Getting Hairy, WIRED 
(Nov. 6, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/cannabis-science-entourage-effect/. 
14 Id.    
15 SMALL, supra note 7, at 304–06. 
16 Id. at 208. 
17 Simon, supra note 13. 
18 Some researchers prefer the term “ensemble effect” because it does not suggest 
that THC is the most important cannabinoid for the endocannabinoid system 
response.  Simon, supra note 13. 
19 Ethan B. Russo, Taming THC: Potential Cannabis Synergy and Phtocannabinoid 
Terpenoid Entourage Effects, 163 BRIT. J. PHARMACOLOGY 1344, 1354 (2011). 
20 Simon, supra note 13; Pácher, et al., supra note 12, at Table 1 (reporting that 
patients taking Marinol experienced improvement in the areas of “spasticity, pain, 
and sleep quality” and “was found to suppress otherwise intractable cholestatic 
pruritus in a case report”).  
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extract the CBD, hemp plants are harvested and then left to cure for 
a few weeks.21  The flower of the plant is then removed and sent to a 
processor.22  The processor grinds the flowers, then steeps them to 
remove some terpenoids.23  After a cold treatment, it is distilled, 
sometimes twice, to achieve the right color and purity.24  Many 
brands have their products tested to guarantee purity and low or no 
THC content.25 
III.  Examining Hemp Production  
The revenue that states and businesses have generated from 
selling recreational marijuana is frequently labeled as a “Green 
Rush.”26  The value of the CBD market could be a second wave in 
this rush because it is worth around half a billion dollars today and 
has the potential to reach twenty billion dollars by 2020.27  However, 
hemp has a long history of use for other industrial purposes and has 
proven to be a versatile crop.28  Hemp uses less inputs than a more 
traditional crop like corn.29  Once out of the initial development time, 
producers use less water, pesticides, and fertilizers.30  The terpenoids 
 
21 Eric Hurlock, Harvesting, Drying, Trimming, & Curing Industrial Hemp Flower, 
LANCASTER FARMING (Sep. 3, 2019), https://www.lancasterfarming.com (search 
article name) (discussing measures a farm takes to monitor CBD and THC levels in 
hemp flowers prior to harvest); Rajul Punjabi, There’s CBD in Everything so We 
Found Out How It’s Made, VICE (Oct. 23, 2018), http://www.vice.com/en_us/article 
/wj9knb/i-visited-a-cannabis-farm-to-find-out-how-cbd-oil-is-made. 
22 Punjabi, supra note 21. 
23 Id. 
24 Id.  
25 Medterra is an example of this.  This company sources all of its hemp from 
products grown as a part of the Kentucky Department of Agriculture Pilot Program.  
Frequently Asked Questions, MEDTERRA, https://medterracbd.com/faq (last visited 
Nov. 9, 2019) (linking interested consumers to the third-party lab test results of the 
company’s CBD products). 
26 See, e.g., Nick Kovacevich, Green Rush: How Legal Hemp Opens the Door for 
Cannabis Investment, FORBES (Aug. 8, 2019), https://www.forbes.com (search 
article title). 
27 Brian Barth, The Rise and Rise of the Artisanal Hemp Farm. From Seed-to-CBD, 
Our Writer Doses Up Then Files This Report, MODERN FARMER (Feb. 25, 2019), 
https://modernfarmer.com/2019/02/the-rise-and-rise-of-the-artisanal-hemp-farm-fr 
om-seed-to-cbd-our-writer-doses-up-then-files-this-report/. 
28 Ernest Small & David Marcus, Hemp: A New Crop with New Uses for North 
America, in TRENDS IN NEW CROPS AND NEW USES 284-326 (J. Janick & A Whipkey 
eds., 2002), https://www.hort.purdue.edu/newcrop/ncnu02/v5-284.html (describing 
some of the historical uses of hemp in industry). 
29 Logan Yonavjak, Industrial Hemp: A Win-Win For the Economy and the 
Environment, FORBES (May 29, 2013), https://www.forbes.com/ (search “Industrial 
Hemp Win Win” and select the first result); Brian Barth, So, You Want to Be a Hemp 
Farmer?, MODERN FARMER (July 9, 2018), https://www.modernfarmer.com/2018/0 
7/so-you-want-to-be-a-hemp-farmer/. 
30 Id. 
78               JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY                 [Vol.15 
that give cannabis its unique smell have also been found in other 
plants as a method of insect deterrent.31  Hemp plants grow tall, 
occasionally up to sixteen feet.32  Plant height is one way to easily 
distinguish hemp from marijuana, with the latter usually being short 
and stubby.33  
Once harvested, hemp can be made into almost 25,000 
different products in categories including: textiles, automotive parts, 
food and beverages, and personal care products.34  Most of the hemp 
going into these products had to be imported though, due to 
restrictions on growing hemp.35  China accounts for the largest share 
of production, growing roughly one-fifth of the world supply and 
importing the most to the United States (“U.S.”).36  Hemp fiber and 
seeds can have returns of up to $700 per acre or $1,200 per acre, 
respectively.37  The total market value is approaching one billion 
dollars.38  The opportunity to grow hemp for use in American 
industry and processing is an attractive one, and it presents a valuable 
market opportunity for potential hemp farmers.39  The history of 
hemp production shows that there are many uses for the crop beyond 
focusing exclusively on CBD.  The CBD market could collapse at 
any time or be severely restricted if the FDA takes a more aggressive 
stance on non-prescribed uses of the compound.   
    China has historically produced large volumes of hemp, and 
evidence suggests that they have been growing it for anywhere from 
six to ten thousand years.40  Hemp was spread from China to Western 
Asia and Egypt, and then to Europe.41  The crop did not arrive in 
North America until the seventeenth century.42  From approximately 
that time until the nineteenth century, hemp was at its peak, being 
used for textiles, paper, and even sails for ships.43  Many reasons are 
suggested for its decline in popularity, including the labor involved 
 
31 Russo, supra note 19, at 349. 
32 Cheryl Thayer et al., Industrial Hemp: From Seed to Market, HARVEST N.Y., 
(2017), http://putknowledgetowork.org/resources/industrial-hemp-from-seed-to-ma 
rket. 
33 Id.   
34 Id.   
35 Id.   
36 Id.   
37 CONG. RES. SERV., supra note 5, at 8.  
38 The U.S. Hemp Industry Grows to $820mm in Sales in 2017, HEMP BUS. J., (2017), 
hempbizjournal.com/size-of-us-hemp-industry-2017/. 
39 Comparing it to grain, Brian Barth asserts that fifty acres should be a minimum 
for growing hemp to retain profitability.  Barth, supra note 29. 
40 SMALL, supra note 7, at 91. 
41 Id. at 92. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 93–94. 
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with cultivation, cheaper fibers becoming available during the 
Industrial Revolution, and the decreased use of sailing ships in favor 
of fuel-powered ships.44   
Until the 2014 Farm Bill hemp provisions, hemp was 
regulated along with marijuana.45  Hemp was listed as a Schedule I 
substance under the Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”), and the 
Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) provided oversight.46  
This classification required anyone who wanted to grow hemp to get 
approval from the DEA, but applications were usually not 
approved.47  One early university research plot was approved in 
North Dakota, but it involved significant costs.48  Similar to states 
choosing to allow recreational marijuana consumption while it is 
restricted federally, states could create their own policies to allow 
hemp cultivation if a DEA license was granted.      
Hemp provisions found in the 2014 Farm Bill created an 
agricultural pilot program “to study the growth, cultivation, or 
marketing of industrial hemp.”49  While states are allowed to create 
their own regulations for programs, growing sites have to be 
registered with and certified by the state’s department of agriculture, 
and the growing is limited to research purposes of agriculture 
departments or colleges and universities.50  “Industrial hemp” is 
defined as cannabis sativa with less than 0.3% THC on a dry weight 
basis.51  This figure is widely used to distinguish hemp from 
marijuana.  The THC amount was proposed by Ernest Small, who 
indicated that, at 1% THC presence, marijuana begins to have 
“intoxicating potential.”52  In addition to the U.S., Canada and 
portions of Europe and Australia use the same threshold.53  Small is 
quick to note this is a low threshold but contends that this makes it 
 
44 Id. at 94. 
45 CONG. RES. SERV., supra note 5, at 3–4. 
46 21 U.S.C § 812 (b)(1) (2018) (providing that Schedule I substances have “a high 
potential for abuse,” “no currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United 
States,” and a “lack of accepted safety for use of the drug or other substance under 
medical supervision.”) 
47 Christine A. Kolosov, Evaluating the Public Interest: Regulation of Industrial 
Hemp Under the Controlled Substances Act, 57 UCLA L. REV. 237, 247 (2009) 
(providing an overview of the legal status of hemp cultivation over time in the U.S. 
and explaining how state programs to allow cultivation are limited by DEA 
approval).   
48 Id. 
49 7 U.S.C. § 5940.   
50 Id. § 5940(A)–(B).   
51 Id.  
52 SMALL, supra note 7, at 208. 
53 Id. 
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highly unlikely that hemp would be repurposed for illegal 
consumption.54   
 The 2018 Farm Bill loosened the restrictions on hemp 
further, officially removing it from the federal schedule of controlled 
substances.55  Because it was removed from the schedule, the DEA 
also cannot interfere with the passage of hemp across state lines.56  
Growers still have to operate under a state pilot program, of which 
there are currently forty-one.57   
Kentucky was an early leader in the U.S. hemp market after 
pilot program rules were released in the 2014 Farm Bill.  State law 
requires producers, handlers, processers, and marketers to obtain a 
license from the Kentucky Department of Agriculture.58  Violation 
of the licensing requirements is penalized by the same provisions for 
violations of state rules relating to marijuana.59  These penalties are 
found in state statutes for controlled substances.60  The state 
publishes a list of licensees, which can help facilitate the market for 
hemp.61  There are over one hundred processors and handlers 
licensed, and, in 2018, farmers were paid over $17 million for hemp, 
and over $50 million of gross products were sold.62  The acreage in 
use is also rapidly increasing, approaching 10,000 acres.63  Kentucky 
Commissioner of Agriculture Ryan Quarles has noted that these 
 
54 Id. 
55 KY. DEP’T OF AGRIC., 2018 FARM BILL AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR HEMP IN 
KENTUCKY (2018), http://www.kyagr.com/marketing/program_id/70/documents/H 
EMP_OV_2018FarmBillandKentuckyHemp.pdf. 
56 Id.  
57 INDIGENOUS FOOD & AGRIC. INITIATIVE, THE 2018 FARM BILL AND THE LEGAL 
LANDSCAPE FOR INDUSTRIAL HEMP PRODUCTION IN INDIAN COUNTRY 3, UNIV. OF 
ARK. (2019), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5aaaa2bd4611a0a9a6f8353d/t/5 
c996196104c7b647468f5da/1553555912189/Final+IFAI+Hemp+Analysis.pdf 
(showing that the nine states that still outlaw hemp are Idaho, Georgia, South 
Dakota, Texas, Iowa, Louisiana, Mississippi, Ohio, and Connecticut); Fran Howard, 
Hemp Producers Stuck Somewhere Between Two Farm Bills, AGRI PULSE (April 17, 
2019), https://www.agri-pulse.com/articles/12104-regulatory-confusion-leaves-he 
mp-producers-stuck-somewhere-between-two-farm-bills. 
58 INDUSTRIAL HEMP RESEARCH PILOT OVERVIEW, KY. DEP’T OF AGRIC., 
https://www.kyagr.com/marketing/hemp-overview.html (last visited Nov. 27, 
2019). 
59 HEMP AND THE LAW, KY. DEP’T OF AGRIC., https://www.kyagr.com/marketing/he 
mp-law.html (last visited Nov. 27, 2019). 
60 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 218A.140 (West 2011). 
61 2018 LICENSE HOLDER LIST (2018), KY. DEP’T OF AGRIC., https://www.kyagr.com/ 
marketing/documents/HEMP_OV_License-Holder-List_2018.pdf. 
62 Bruce Schreiner, Hemp is Growing Like Crazy in Kentucky.  Just Look at Last 
Year’s Sales, COURIER J. (March 18, 2019), https://www.courier-journal.com/story/ 
news/2019/03/18/kentucky-hemp-sales-surged-2018-ryan-quarles-says/320199500 
2/. 
63 Id. 
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figures represent a small portion of the state’s total agricultural 
production, but the program’s goal was to ensure that Kentucky 
could gain a lead on the market when it became legal to start 
production and interstate transport.64  
The hemp provisions found in the 2018 Farm Bill have not 
yet been enacted by the United States Department of Agriculture 
(“USDA”).  Until enacted, the market needs to operate under the 
rules from the 2014 bill.  Growers have major questions about crop 
insurance, organic certification, interstate transportation, and 
banking access.65  Secretary of Agriculture Sonny Perdue estimated 
that there will not be rules in time for this season, but they will be 
ready for 2020 planting.66  Growers are also having trouble getting 
access to seeds to purchase, because they may have to be imported, 
and growers need to ensure they have varieties with THC levels 
below the legal threshold.67  
Due to the natural resilience of hemp, it is well-suited to 
organic growing methods.68  The USDA, which oversees the 
National Organic Program, has allowed organic certification for 
hemp, but not marijuana.69  Allowing organic certification for hemp 
byproducts like CBD could be beneficial, particularly if it is being 
utilized as an ingredient in pharmaceuticals.  Organic textiles are also 
specially marketed, often for clothing.70  Kentucky is home to the 
Kentucky Organic Hemp Cooperative, one of the country’s first, 
which has brought together farmers with smaller-than-usual acreage 
who want to get market access.71  Many of these farmers are growing 
on land that has not recently been used for conventional crops, so 
they do not have to wait through the three-year transitional period 
that conventional farms need for organic certification.72  Most of 
 
64 Id.  
65 Ryan McCrimmon, Washington Has Work to Do on CBD, Hemp, POLITICO (Feb. 
26, 2019), https://www.politico.com/newsletters/morning-agriculture/2019/02/27/ 
washington-has-work-to-do-on-cbd-hemp-526036. 
66 Ryan McCrimmon, Perdue, Senate Ag Talk Farm Bill Today, POLITICO (Feb. 28, 
2019), https://www.politico.com/newsletters/morning-agriculture/2019/02/28/perd 
ue-senate-ag-talk-farm-bill-today-528350. 
67 Howard, supra note 57. 
68 Seth Waggener, Organically Grown Hemp: Why Is It So Important?, PURE 
SPECTRUM (Feb. 8, 2018), https://www.purespectrumcbd.com/organically-grown-
hemp-why-is-it-so-important/. 
69 Barth, supra at note 29.   
70 Does Organic Fabric Really Make a Difference?, HYDE YOGA BLOG (Aug. 1, 
2019), https://yogahyde.com/yoga-wear-organic-vs-non-organic/. 
71 Austyn Gaffney, Kentucky Farmers Gamble on the South’s First Organic Hemp 
Cooperative, SOUTHERLY (Mar. 13, 2019), https://southerlymag.org/2019/03/13/ken 
tucky-farmers-gamble-on-the-souths-first-organic-hemp-cooperative/.   
72 Id. 
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them are also growing hemp that will have CBD extracted because 
as much as seventy percent of the state’s hemp is sold to the CBD 
market.73          
IV.  Current FDA Stance  
A.  Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act Rules  
At its core, the primary concern with the regulation of CBD 
products is about consumer safety.  The FDA does not want the 
public taking products that have not been tested for purity or because 
a company has made a wild claim about CBD’s ability to cure an 
ailment.74  Concerns about the safety of food and drugs have existed 
since time immemorial, but the first major U.S. legislation on the 
subject was the 1906 Food and Drugs Act, passed by President 
Theodore Roosevelt.75  This Act cracked down on adulterated and 
misbranded food and drugs.76  The enactment was motivated by 
problems in the industry, including a 1902 tragedy in St. Louis, when 
thirteen children died after taking a contaminated drug.77  The 
children were administered a diphtheria antitoxin, but it was 
contaminated with tetanus spores.78   
The Act was updated under the administration of President 
Franklin Roosevelt, with the 1938 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act (“FDCA”).79  Although the FDCA has been amended since its 
inception, it remains the key starting point for understanding food 
and drug regulation.   
 
73 Id.   
74 WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW (AND WHAT WE’RE WORKING TO FIND OUT) ABOUT 
PRODUCTS CONTAINING CANNABIS OR CANNABIS-DERIVED COMPOUNDS, INCLUDING 
CBD, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (July 17, 2019), https://www.fda.gov/consumers/ 
consumer-updates/what-you-need-know-and-what-were-working-find-out-about-
products-containing-cannabis-or-cannabis. 
75 MILESTONES IN U.S. FOOD LAW, N.D. STATE UNIV., https://www.ag.ndsu.edu/food 
law/overview/history/milestones (last visited Dec.2, 2019). 
76 HOW DID THE FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT COME ABOUT, U.S. 
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Mar. 28, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/fda-basics/h 
ow-did-federal-food-drug-and-cosmetic-act-come-about. 
77 Linda Bren, The Road to the Biotech Revolution – Highlights of 100 Years of 
Biologics Regulation, FDA CONSUMER MAG. 1 (Jan.-Feb. 2016), https://www.fda.go 
v/files/about%20fda/published/The-Road-to-the-Biotech-Revolution--Highlights-o 
f-100-Years-of-Biologics-Regulation.pdf. 
78 PETER BARTON HUTT ET AL., FOOD & DRUG LAW 6–7 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 
4th ed. 2014).   
79 HISTORIES OF PRODUCT REGULATION: THE 1938 FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT, 
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Jan. 31, 2019), https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/historie 
s-product-regulation/1938-food-drug-and-cosmetic-act. 
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The FDCA defines drugs as “articles intended for use in the 
diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in 
man or other animals and articles (other than food) intended to affect 
the structure or any function of the body of man or other animals.”80  
Before any drug can be sold, manufacturers submit an application to 
the FDA Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER).81  New 
products are submitted under a new drug application; however, there 
are many other types of approval processes, including for 
investigational new drugs, therapeutic biologics, and over-the-
counter drugs.82  All of this application information will help the 
FDA make a decision about approved doses, potential interactions 
with other drugs, side effects that require warnings, and whether a 
drug can be used continuously.83  
Although the 2018 Farm Bill removed hemp from DEA 
oversight, it did not modify the FDA’s authority on cannabis 
products or compounds.84  Cannabis remains a Schedule I drug 
according to the DEA, indicating no accepted medical use.85  
However, the FDA has approved one cannabis-derived drug and 
three “cannabis-related” drugs.86  The only approved drug with CBD 
as an active ingredient is Epidiolex, and it was approved to treat 
seizures in children suffering from Lennox-Gastaut or Dravet 
syndrome.87  The cannabis-derived drugs rely on synthetic THC, 
either dronabinol or nabilone.  The drugs are Marinol, Syndros, and 
Cesamet.88  The first two have been useful in combatting appetite 
loss in AIDS patients.89  Cesamet was approved for chemotherapy 
patients to reduce nausea and vomiting from the treatment.90  
 
80 Federal Food, Drug, And Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 321 (2016). 
81 HOW DRUGS ARE DEVELOPED AND APPROVED, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Jan. 7, 
2019), https://www.fda.gov/drugs/development-approval-process-drugs/how-drugs 
-are-developed-and-approved. 
82 Id.   
83 Id.   
84 FDA REGULATION OF CANNABIS AND CANNABIS-DERIVED PRODUCTS: QUESTIONS 
AND ANSWERS, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Apr. 2, 2019), https://www.fda.gov/news-
events/public-health-focus/fda-regulation-cannabis-and-cannabis-derived-products 
-questions-and-answers [hereinafter U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., REGULATION OF 
CANNABIS]. 
85 Id.   
86 Id.   
87 Id.   
88 Id.   
89 Id. 
90 Valeant Pharmaceuticals, Cesamet FDA Application, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. 
(May 2006), https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/2006/018677s0 
11lbl.pdf. 
84               JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY                 [Vol.15 
The trial conducted for epilepsy, which led to the approval 
of Epidiolex, was supported by the drug manufacturer GW 
Pharmaceuticals.91  This presents a challenge for drug development–
large pharmaceutical companies have significant resources to pour 
into research and development, go through the lengthy 
administrative process to get a drug approved by the FDA, and 
conduct testing to ensure they have a pure and safe product.  Once 
hemp research is less restricted, it is possible that these large 
companies may try to get in on the market for legal drugs first, 
capturing most of the revenue.  However, an increase in the number 
of approved hemp-derived drugs could create a stable market for 
farmers.92   
The FDA approval of CBD as an active ingredient in 
Epidiolex was a victory for the patients it will help.  The market for 
CBD supplements and food products was hindered, however, 
because of FDCA rules which restrict the use of active ingredients in 
FDA-approved drugs for food and dietary supplements.  A dietary 
supplement can contain an herb or botanical, but because it is an 
active ingredient in a drug, CBD cannot be marketed as a dietary 
supplement.93  The FDA does have the discretion to go through the 
notice and comment process to create a regulation allowing the sale 
of dietary supplements with an approved-drug active ingredient.94  
However, the FDA has not chosen to exercise that discretion at this 
time.95  
The same restriction outlaws the introduction of CBD-
containing products into interstate commerce.  Section 331 of the 
FDCA prohibits “[t]he introduction or delivery for introduction into 
interstate commerce of any food to which has been added a drug 
approved under section 355 of this title.”96  Similar to the rules on 
supplements, the FDA Secretary can use his discretion to issue a 
regulation that allows the use of the drug in food.97  There are already 
 
91 Orrin Devinksy et. al., Trial of Cannabidiol for Drug-Resistant Seizures in Dravet 
Syndrome, 376 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2011, 2012 (2017). 
92 April Simpson, Farmers Hope for Hemp Riches Despite Risks, PEW CHARITABLE 
TRUSTS (Feb. 27, 2019), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/ 
stateline/2019/02/27/farmers-hope-for-hemp-riches-despite-risks. 
93 21 U.S.C.A. § 321(ff).   
94 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., REGULATION OF CANNABIS, supra note 84. 
95 Id.   
96 21 U.S.C. § 331(ll) (2018). 
97 Id. 
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foods derived from hemp, and some, like hempseed, are easy to 
find.98   
The interest in CBD for food products is not limited to 
humans, either.  Martha Stewart has formed a partnership with the 
Canadian company “Canopy Growth” to launch a line of pet products 
with CBD.99  Another celebrity getting in on the market is rock star 
Gene Simmons, who recently announced a CBD soda.100 There are 
many other edible products, topical products, and cosmetics that are 
available, creating a lot of work for anyone attempting to enforce the 
FDCA provisions, whether by preventing products from being 
shipped in interstate commerce or completely stopping their sale.101    
An additional and interesting component of the market for 
CBD products is how they move in commerce, either inter- or 
intrastate.  Earlier this year, the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) issued 
an advisory about the mailing of CBD products.102  Specifying that 
these rules are temporary until the 2018 Farm Bill can be fully 
implemented, the USPS is allowing shipment of CBD products under 
certain circumstances.103  In connection with the permitted research 
production of hemp, mailers have to sign a statement certifying that 
they have a valid license from the state department of agriculture in 
the mail piece’s originating state.104     
 
98 Cathy Siegner, Now That Hemp and CBD are Legal, What Comes Next for Food 
and Beverage?, FOOD DIVE (Dec. 20, 2018), https://www.fooddive.com/news/now-
that-hemp-and-cbd-are-legal-what-comes-next-for-food-and-beverage/544354. 
99 Thomas Franck & Angela LaVito, Martha Stewart Partnering with Marijuana 
Grower Canopy Growth to Develop Hemp-Derived Products, CNBC (Feb. 28, 
2019, 6:36 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/02/28/martha-stewart-to-join-marijua 
na-grower-canopy-growth.html.  The regulation of pet food and the potential 
implications for CBD is a topic deserving of its own article, particularly because of 
the potential, diverse side effects various animal species could have to CBD.  See 
generally Consumer Reports, CBD for Pets’ Ailments? Many People Swear By it, 
But There’s Very Little Animal Research., THE WASHINGTON POST (Feb. 18, 2019, 
1:00 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com (search “CBD for pets ailments” and 
select the first result). 
100 Joanne Cachapero, KISS Co-founder Gene Simmons Debuts CBD-Infused Soda 
Line, MG (Apr. 30, 2019), https://mgretailer.com/cannabis-news/kiss-co-founder-
gene-simmons-debuts-cbd-infused-soda-line/. 
101 Mary Schmich, CBD Oil is Suddenly Everywhere. It is Really Going to Cure Your 
Anxiety, Your Migraines and Your Acne?, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (May 1, 2019, 5:00 
AM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/columnists/schmich/ct-met-mary-sch 
mich-cbd-20190430-story.html. 
102 Kyle Jaeger, U.S. Postal Service Issues Advisory On Mailing Hemp-Derived 
CBD, MARIJUANA MOMENT (Mar. 19, 2019), https://www.marijuanamoment.net/u-
s-postal-service-issues-advisory-on-mailing-hemp-derived-cbd/. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
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The FDA has been proactive in releasing information about 
CBD and ensuring that the public can find and understand the 
agency’s position.  However, the momentum was stalled when FDA 
Commissioner Scott Gottlieb announced in March that he would be 
stepping down from his post in April.  Gottlieb surprised many 
people with his progressive work during his two years at the agency, 
and he commented frequently on CBD in particular.105  Because of 
the limits of agency rulemaking, he suggested that Congress make 
rules for the use of CBD in food products, because Congress could 
act more quickly.106  Gottlieb has since left the FDA, but the agency 
moved ahead with a public hearing on May 31, 2019, with the 
purpose to “obtain scientific data and information about the safety, 
manufacturing, product quality, marketing, labeling, and sale of 
products containing cannabis or cannabis-derived compounds.”107   
At the hearing, presentations were made on topics ranging 
from prescription interactions with cannabidiol to the use of hemp-
derived ingredients in animal feed.108  There were representatives 
from consumer groups, state departments of agriculture, and 
academia, among others.109  The breadth of representation is a good 
indication of the interest in creating regulations for cannabinoids and 
creating a path for researchers to understand them.  In a letter 
addressed to Ned Sharpless, the acting commissioner of the FDA 
after Gottlieb’s departure, a bipartisan group of Congressional 
 
105 See Kyle Jaeger, FDA Is Exploring ‘Alternative Approaches’ to CBD Regulation, 
Commissioner Says, MARIJUANA MOMENT (Feb. 26, 2019), https://www.marijuana 
moment.net/fda-is-exploring-alternative-approaches-to-cbd-regulation-commission 
er-says/; see also Helena Bottemiller Evich (@hbottemiller), Twitter (Feb. 26, 2019, 
11:21 AM), https://twitter.com/hbottemiller/status/1100476071252758528. 
106 Scott Gottlieb, Comm’r, Food and Drug Admin., Speech: New Steps to Promote 
Food Safety (Feb. 26, 2019), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/speeches-fda-officia 
ls/new-steps-promote-food-safety-02262019. 
107 Scientific Data and Information About Products Containing Cannabis or 
Cannabis-Derived Compounds; Public Hearing; Request for Comments, 84 Fed. 
Reg. 12,969, 12,969 (Apr. 3, 2019) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 15). 
108 See Presentations: FDA’s Scientific Data and Information about Products 
Containing Cannabis or Cannabis-Derived Compounds Public Hearing, U.S.  FOOD 
& DRUG ADMIN. (last updated July 3, 2019), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/fda-
meetings-conferences-and-workshops/presentations-fdas-scientific-data-and-infor 
mation-about-products-containing-cannabis-or-cannabis (listing the presentations 
given at the FDA public hearing on cannabis or cannabis-derived products, including 
presentations by Erin Bubb on hemp-derived ingredients in animal feed and Barry 
Gidal on drug interactions with cannabis-derived products). 
109 See id. (listing the various representatives present at the FDA public hearing on 
cannabis or cannabis-derived products, including those from consumer groups, state 
departments of agriculture, academia, health professions, manufactures, and other 
interested parties). 
2019]                          GOING HEMP WILD                             87 
 
 
 
representatives addressed the issue of CBD in food products.110  They 
specifically proposed that the agency create an interim final rule for 
the use of CBD in food products and dietary supplements in addition 
to creating enforcement guidance and standards evaluating the safety 
and accuracy of labeling.111   
The agency rulemaking process has many layers and can 
seem quite complex, but every step is designed to ensure interested 
parties can make their voice heard and that the agency can gather 
appropriate technical information before promulgating a new rule.  
Agencies publish a proposed rule or Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
(“NPRM”) in the Federal Register.112  Comment periods are typically 
thirty to sixty days, but can be longer if the rule is particularly 
complicated.113  The upcoming public meeting on CBD will allow 
people to share comments and information with the FDA, and the 
agency is also taking written comments.  A final rule should be based 
on the entire rulemaking record, including these public comments.  
Former Commissioner Gottlieb expanded on the potential of 
rulemaking for CBD in an interview with the Brookings Institution 
in March.114  He stated that a standard rule takes “two to three years,” 
and that he didn’t believe he could have accomplished rule formation 
during his tenure, nor will the person who succeeds him.115  Gottlieb 
considers a rule for CBD in food to be novel and complex, because 
it has already been used in a drug and was not previously approved 
for use in food.116  He also described the imminent creation of a 
workgroup that would consider methods for Congress to create a 
legal route, noting that this was done for human growth hormone and 
fish oil.117     
The FDA has less control over dietary supplements than it 
does over prescription drugs.  Premarket approval or notification to 
the FDA is limited, and the labeling rules are more expansive than 
 
110 See Letter from Cong. of the United States to Ned Sharpless, Acting Comm’r, 
U.S. Food & Drug Admin. 1 (Sept. 19, 2019), https://pingree.house.gov/uploadedfil 
es/pingree_comer_cbd_letter_to_fda_9.19.19.pdf.   
111 Id. at 2. 
112 A Guide to the Rulemaking Process, OFF. OF THE FED. REG.,  https://www.federalr 
egister.gov/uploads/2011/01/the_rulemaking_process.pdf. 
113 Id. 
114 Interview by Anna Edney with Scott Gottlieb, Former Comm’r, Food and Drug 
Admin., at Brookings Institution, (Mar. 19, 2019), (transcript available at 
https://www.brookings.edu/events/a-conversation-with-departing-fda-commissione 
r-scott-gottlieb-on-his-tenure-and-policy-reforms/). 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
117 Id.   
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those for prescription drugs.118  Presently, there are companies that 
market CBD and label it as supplements.119  Medterra, the company 
that sources hemp from Kentucky, labels its products as 
supplements.120  The company does list a disclaimer at the bottom of 
every web page that reads: “[r]epresentations regarding the efficacy 
and safety of Medterra have not been evaluated by the Food and Drug 
Administration. These products are not intended to diagnose, 
prevent, treat, or cure any disease.”121  This has not stopped many 
reviews from extolling the uses of the product for joint paint, anxiety, 
hearing loss, and other issues.122  The company ships to every state 
in the U.S. and internationally.   
Other companies advertising CBD supplements are easy to 
find.  The FDA has issued warning letters to numerous companies, 
most of them for making unsubstantiated therapeutic claims about 
the products for sale.123  Warning letters give businesses time to take 
corrective action before more serious consequences are imposed, 
including product seizures or injunctions to halt the sale of items.124   
At the local and state level, health departments are cutting 
into the sales of CBD in food.  The Los Angeles County Health 
Department issued its own guidance for restaurants, noting that 
beginning in July 2019, points would be deducted on inspections for 
selling food products adulterated with CBD.125  One reason that 
health officials are concerned is their belief that it can be difficult for 
customers to differentiate products with and without CBD and the 
 
118 Rahi Azizi, “Supplementing” the DSHEA: Congress Must Invest the FDA with 
Greater Regulatory Authority over Nutraceutical Manufacturers by Amending the 
Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 439, 440 (2010). 
119 CBD Oil – How Do You  Successfully Market Products With No Standards?, 
CLOCK TOWER INSIGHT, (Apr. 20, 2019), http://clocktowerinsight.com/cbd-oil-how-
do-you-successfully-market-a-product-with-no-standards/. 
120 MEDTERRA CBD, https://medterracbd.com/category-wellness (last visited Nov. 
8, 2019). 
121 MEDTERRA CBD, https://medterracbd.com/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2019). 
122 See MEDTERRA CBD,  https://medterracbd.com/reviews (last visited Nov. 7, 
2019). 
123 WARNING LETTERS AND TEST RESULTS FOR CANNABIDIOL-RELATED PRODUCTS, 
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/news-events/public-health-focus/ 
warning-letters-and-test-results-cannabidiol-related-products (last visited Nov. 7, 
2019). 
124 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., WARNING LETTER TO POTNETWORK HOLDINGS, INC., 
(Mar. 28, 2019), https://www.fda.gov/inspections-compliance-enforcement-and-
criminal-investigations/warning-letters/potnetwork-holdings-inc-564030-0328201 
9. 
125 INDUSTRIAL HEMP DERIVED PRODUCTS, L.A. CTY DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH, 
http://publichealth.lacounty.gov/eh/docs/IndustrialHempDerivedProducts.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 7, 2019).  
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relative dosage in each product.126  Acting under rules created for the 
state’s medical marijuana program, officials from the Ohio 
Department of Agriculture, Health Departments, and Policy have 
visited stores and instructed them to stop selling CBD products or 
risk having them seized.127  The state’s law prohibits the sale of CBD 
except in a licensed dispensary.128   
Despite the de-scheduling of hemp, there can still be a stigma 
associated with the consumption of hemp products.  Consumers of 
untested products also run the risk of testing positively for THC if 
they are drug-tested, which can lead to serious consequences, 
especially for work-related drug testing.129  Some evidence shows 
that consuming large amounts of CBD can yield a false positive.130  
One expert in cannabis testing has clarified that most drug tests are 
designed for finding THC, not other cannabinoids.131  This is an 
extremely discrete issue related to CBD consumption, so most people 
would be better off locating information related to their specific 
situation rather than relying on anecdotal information online. 
V.  Why should the FDA make rules for CBD? 
The CBD market is not slowing down, and full 
implementation of the 2018 Farm Bill is likely to expand it.  The 
FDA needs to make rules for consumer safety and to allow the 
regulated creation of new drugs.  The FDA can create rules for testing 
products, creating a guarantee that a product is CBD, verifying the 
levels of THC, and confirming product purity.132  Access to quality 
CBD products will also assist researchers, who can conduct approved 
trials for new drugs and therapies that use CBD.  Researchers at 
 
126 Amanda Mull, The CBD Crackdown Has Begun, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 6, 2019), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2019/02/new-york-city-cbd-crack-dow 
n/582193/. 
127 Randy Tucker, Officials in Ohio Raid CBD Sellers, Order Products Removed, 
CINCINNATI ENQUIRER (Feb. 4, 2019, 6:26 PM), https://www.cincinnati.com/story/m 
oney/2019/02/04/local-cbd-products-under-scrutiny-for-food-safety/2766115002/. 
128 Id.  
129 Mike Adams, Marijuana Madness: This is How CBD Oil Can Cause a Failed 
Drug Test, FORBES (Oct. 18, 2018, 3:38 PM), https://www.forbes.com (search 
“Mike Adams Marijuana Madness”).   
130 Id.   
131 Elizabeth Brico, We Looked Into Whether CBD Would Show Up in a Drug Test, 
VICE (Dec. 14, 2018, 12:40 PM), https://tonic.vice.com/en_us/article/xwjmpj/cbd-
drug-test. 
132 Helena Bottemiller Evich, Gottlieb Suggests ‘Alternative Approaches’ for CBD 
to Discuss in Congress, POLITICO, (Feb. 26, 2019, 1:34 PM), https://politicopro.com 
(search “Gottlieb suggests alternative”). 
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Johns Hopkins University are planning a clinical trial that will test 
the potential benefits of CBD for smoking cessation.133   
Many potential benefits have been advertised, but not as 
much focus has been put on the side effects.  The listed side effects 
of Epidiolex can include: decreased appetite, diarrhea, rashes, and 
lower sleep quality.134  Consumers also need guidance on dosing and 
the variety of ingestion methods that could change the effectiveness 
of a CBD drug.  Research into CBD could also yield information 
about other cannabinoids and a new understanding of the ensemble 
effect in cannabinoids.   
   It is possible for research to be conducted with synthetic 
cannabinoids.135  The FDA-approved, cannabis-related drugs rely on 
synthetic cannabinoids.136  More recently, yeast has been used to 
produce synthetic THC and CBD.137  The obvious benefits are for 
companies that want to begin research without cultivating hemp and 
also ensure that the CBD is uncontaminated by THC.  There is also 
an opportunity to produce other synthetic cannabinoids and begin to 
understand how many there actually are, potentially with more 
benefits than what we are already aware of.138  If synthetic CBD were 
marketed, though, regulators would do right by consumers by 
requiring a new name for the synthetic chemical, or a clear label that 
indicates it is not a naturally-derived product.   
VI.  How should CBD be treated?  
Regulators have many options for designing CBD rules.  The 
most formal process, and what would allow the most public input, 
would be agency rulemaking.  However, the agency could, through 
rulemaking, use its discretion to allow the use of CBD in food 
products and supplements, despite it not being used in either of these 
products prior to the approval of Epidiolex.  It also seems likely that 
 
133 Roni Caryn Rabin, CBD is Everywhere, but Scientists Still Don’t Know Much 
About It, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/25/well/liv 
e/cbd-cannabidiol-marijuana-medical-treatment-therapy.html. 
134 See Greenwich Biosciences, Inc., Highlights of Prescribing Information, 
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/2018/210365lbl.pdf (listing 
common “Adverse Reactions” from the drug Epidiolex) (last visited Nov. 10, 2019).   
135 See e.g., Devinksy et al., supra note 91, at 2011 (noting the research trials 
conducted before Epidiolex was FDA-approved). 
136 See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., REGULATION OF CANNABIS, supra note 84 
(discussing approved medical products). 
137 Matt Simon, Forget Growing Weed – Make Yeast Spit Out CBD and THC 
Instead, WIRED (Feb. 27, 2019, 1:00 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/yeast-cbd-
and-thc/. 
138 Id. 
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there will be more research on the therapeutic value of CBD, so 
Epidiolex will not be the only drug on the market for very long.  
In addition to his comments supporting Congressional action 
on the regulation, Gottlieb envisioned it as a tier or schedule of 
concentrations for different products containing CBD, in part 
because the side effects at different concentrations are not yet studied 
and understood.139  Congress could authorize the use in food and 
supplements and then direct the FDA to establish the acceptable 
thresholds for each product.140  The collaboration between Congress 
and the agency is not uncommon and would be the fastest way to 
reach at least a temporary resolution until the FDA can solidify rules.  
Gottlieb also believes that the committee will have recommendations 
by the summer,141 which would be prior to the full 2018 Farm Bill 
implementation.  If producers of CBD products have a better idea of 
their legality, it will also give farmers some clarity on the market for 
hemp.         
VII.  Conclusion  
CBD has captured the interest of many different groups and 
created a headache for federal and state agencies.  This is an exciting 
product, simply because of its untapped potential.  It is, of course, 
added to the long list of useful hemp products, providing farmers 
with a new way to use their crops.  The FDA and Congress should 
work together to create rules that allow food and drug producers to 
each have a piece of the market and provide consumers with tools for 
health and overall wellness.    
 
139 Interview with Scott Gottlieb, supra note 114. 
140 Id.; see also Evich, supra note 132.   
141 Interview with Scott Gottlieb, supra note 114. 
Agricultural Exceptionalism and Industrial Animal Food 
Production: Exploring the Human Rights Nexus* 
 
Charlotte E. Blattner** & Odile Ammann*** 
 
Abstract 
 
The host of negative effects of animal agriculture on the 
immediate environment, workers, and local communities are well-
documented, yet little is known about the global repercussions of 
animal agriculture, especially on human rights guarantees.  This 
contribution attempts to begin filling this soaring gap.  It examines 
the nexus between industrial animal agriculture (with a focus on 
concentrated animal feeding operations (CAFOs)) on the one hand, 
and specific international human rights violations on the other hand.  
Our emphasis is on the role of government in producing these 
violations, rather than on the agribusiness itself.  Laws originally 
designed to govern small family farms—so-called “farmers’ rights” 
laws, including right-to-farm laws and exemptions from 
environmental and animal law—now protect corporate giants, many 
of which are multinationals.  Governments enacting and upholding 
farmers’ rights shield agribusiness activities that are damaging to the 
environment and humans’ livelihoods from regulation.  While they 
are prima facie at liberty to do so under domestic law, their laws are 
subject to the scrutiny of international law, particularly the human 
rights regime that promises to put a halt to the ongoing insulation of 
animal agriculture.  The human rights perspective adds valuable 
dynamics to the ongoing debate, is novel in application to the issue, 
and opens new pathways for academic inquiries and legal strategies 
because—unlike nuisance laws, environmental laws, and animal 
protection laws, which de facto exempt the issue from judicial 
scrutiny—these laws can be used to hold governments accountable.  
The human rights discourse also gives rise to community 
empowerment and innovative forms of advocacy and forges 
connections between the different social justice issues implicated in 
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animal agriculture.  Finally, we show how scholars, researchers, 
stakeholders, and the public concerned about human rights issues can 
bring animal agriculture into the conversation and prompt their 
governments to address the issue proactively. 
 
Key words: Animal Agriculture, Human Rights, Right to Food, 
Right to Water, Right to a Safe Environment, Right to Land, 
Farming, Food Security, Animal Protection, Food Sovereignty, 
CAFO 
 
I.  North Carolina, the Front Line 
 
Violet Branch, seventy-one, is one of innumerable residents 
of North Carolina that have an acrid odor of rotting eggs fill their 
homes at least twice per week, causing them nausea and heavy 
vomiting.1  Branch flees to the nearby supermarket, where she “paces 
the aisles until her breathing returns to normal.”2  The odor is a toxic 
slurry that comes from nearby factory farms, known as CAFOs,3 that 
confine animals by the thousands, spray manure over nearby fields 
and houses, and store it in uncovered cesspools.  In North Carolina 
alone, about nine million pigs are raised on 2,300 factories, 
producing ten billion pounds of wet animal waste per year. 4  
Research shows that the fecal bacteria finds its way into open water, 
ground water, the air, and homes, and causes hepatitis, typhoid, 
dysentery, and other diseases.5  Long-term health hazards include 
higher risks of cancer and spontaneous abortions. 6   Along with 
Branch, over five hundred plaintiffs brought a total of twenty-six 
suits against Murphy Brown, a subsidiary of Smithfield Foods, for 
degrading their quality of life and reducing the value of their 
property.7  The smell drove away their customers; cookouts, playing 
 
1 Lily Kuo, The World Eats Cheap Bacon at the Expense of North Carolina’s Rural 
Poor, QUARTZ (July 14, 2015), https://qz.com/433750/the-world-eats-cheap-bacon-
at-the-expense-of-north-carolinas-rural-poor/. 
2 Id. 
3 In the US, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) classifies concentrated 
animal feeding operations into CAFOs and AFOs (under the NPDES Program).  
AFO is a “medium-sized” CAFO with 200-699 dairy cows, 750-2499 pigs, 9,000-
29,000 laying hens, or 37,500 to 124,999 chickens.  40 C.F.R. § 122.23(b)(6) (2019).  
Anything beyond that is considered a CAFO.  40 C.F.R. § 122.23(b)(4) (2019). 
4  Zoë Schlanger, What Will Happen When Hurricane Florence Hits North 
Carolina’s Massive Pig Manure Lagoons?, QUARTZ (Sept. 11, 2018), https://qz.com 
/1386629/hurricane-florence-threatens-north-carolinas-pig-manure-lagoons/. 
5 C.D. Heaney et al., Source Tracking Swine Fecal Waste in Surface Water Proximal 
to Swine Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations, 511 SCI. TOTAL ENV’T 676, 
676–77 (2015). 
6 JoAnn Burkholder et al., Impacts of Waste from Concentrated Animal Feeding 
Operations on Water Quality, 115 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 308, 310 (2007). 
7 Kuo, supra note 1. 
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in the yard, or just sitting on the porch became impossible; they could 
not have friends over anymore; feces collected on their houses and 
cars; swarms of flies followed them; and their children were teased 
at school.8  In this place where “the smell of excrement seeps into all 
aspects of routine life,”9 people are “held prisoners in their own 
home.”10 
 
In spring 2018, juries awarded plaintiffs in five cases a total 
of $574 million. 11   This is the first success for North Carolina 
communities in a twenty-five-year series of public concern, outrage, 
and sheer helplessness.  Twenty-one of the twenty-six cases are still 
outstanding—opening a window for an alternative future.12  Yet, the 
horrors people living near factory farms incur do not seem to bother 
North Carolina lawmakers, who just passed new legal protections for 
the companies, restricting suits over pollution, odor, and other 
“nuisance” claims.13  Following North Carolina, legislators in Utah, 
Nebraska, Georgia, West Virginia, and Oklahoma have proposed 
and, in some cases, passed legislation that will make similar lawsuits 
impossible.14  Republican Representatives Jimmy Dixon of Duplin 
County, John Bell of Wayne County, and Tim Moore of Cleveland 
County, the House speaker, issued a statement saying they “will 
continue to fight for hardworking North Carolina farm families and 
their communities by opposing any coordinated legal assault that 
seeks to profit off their livelihoods and potentially shut down their 
farms. . . . There is no right more fundamental than the right to feed 
our families.”15 The spokesman for the North Carolina Pork Council, 
Robert Brown, said that the lawsuits are just “another effort by fringe 
groups” that lacks merit and that “farms and farmers take seriously 
the obligation to feed people in a responsible way that protects our 
communities.”16  
 
 
8 Id. 
9 Schlanger, supra note 4. 
10 Kuo, supra note 1. 
11 The nature of these laws varies.  Some reduce the damages (e.g., by banning 
punitive damages), others limit the distance from the farm at which the neighbor 
must live.  Leah Douglas, Big Ag is Pushing Laws to Restrict Neighbors’ Ability to 
Sue Farms, NPR (Apr. 12, 2019), https://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2019/04/12/ 
712227537/big-ag-is-pushing-laws-to-restrict-neighbors-ability-to-sue-farms. 
12 Id. 
13 Will Doran, After Smithfield Lost Millions in Lawsuits, NC Changed A Law. Was 
It Constitutional?, THE COURIER-TRIBUNE (June 21, 2019), https://www.courier-
tribune.com/news/20190621/after-smithfield-lost-millions-in-lawsuits-nc-changed-
law-was-it-constitutional. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
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What responsibility means in these circles is as little 
discussed as the fact that the “hardworking North Carolina farm 
families” are in fact a single $15 billion corporation.17  Another fact 
kept under wraps by the industry is that black residents are 1.54 times 
as likely to be affected by industrial pork operations than white 
residents, American Indian residents 2.18 times as likely, and 
Hispanic residents 1.39 times as likely. 18   Though Smithfield 
pledged in 2000 to spend $17 million to research waste alternatives, 
“environmentally superior technologies” were never adopted, for the 
simple reason that they were “too costly.”19  In a place where pigs 
outnumber humans thirty-two to one, the real concern of corporate 
giants is their benefits of keeping the pork as low as $2.50 per 
pound,20 rather than the detriments to the community, animals, or the 
environment. 
 
With democratic processes and the law now being blocked, 
communities are turning to extra-legal measures.  In May 2019, the 
documentary Right to Harm was released, shining light on how 
people live (and die) for their battles for health, quality of life, and a 
safe environment.21  However, with climate change proceeding at an 
astounding rate and extreme weather becoming more frequent, North 
Carolina’s happy years of ignorance and denial are numbered.  
Hurricanes Floyd (in 1999), Matthew (in 2016), and Florence (in 
2018) hit North Carolina with storms, floods, and feces that haunted 
the area for the past twenty-five years and washed ashore the many 
human and animal bodies that fall victim to the industry on a daily 
basis.22 
 
The topic brings to the fore a host of ethical, socio-political, 
and economic issues that, as we argue, are not germane to North 
 
17 Id. 
18  Steve Wing & Jill Johnston, Industrial Hog Operations in North Carolina 
Disproportionately Impact African-Americans, Hispanics and American Indians, U. 
N.C. CHAPEL HILL (Aug. 29, 2014), http://www.ncpolicywatch.com/wp-content/upl 
oads/2014/09/UNC-Report.pdf.  This disparate impact is also witnessed with regard 
to the enjoyment of specific human rights.  See, e.g., U.N. Human Rights, Office of 
the High Comm’r for Human Rights, The Right to Adequate Food: Fact Sheet No. 
34, at 9–17 (Apr. 2010), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet 
34en.pdf [hereinafter Fact Sheet No. 34]. 
19 Kuo, supra note 1. 
20 Id. 
21 See Lisa Held, New Film Captures the Brutal Reality of Living Near Factory 
Farms, CIVIL EATS (May 2, 2019), https://civileats.com/2019/05/02/new-film-captu 
res-the-brutal-reality-of-living-near-factory-farms/. 
22 Schlanger, supra note 4; Emily Moon, North Carolina’s Hog Waste Problem Has 
a Long History–Why Wasn’t It Solved in Time for Hurricane Florence?, PACIFIC 
STANDARD (Sept. 16, 2018), https://psmag.com/environment/why-wasnt-north-caro 
linas-hog-waste-problem-solved-before-hurricane-florence. 
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Carolina, but that plague the world as a whole.  Research has shown 
the effects of animal agriculture on the environment, local 
communities, and workers’ rights, but we have yet to uncover how 
the growth and intensification of animal production have begun to 
threaten and violate human rights more broadly, indirectly, and 
pervasively.  So while the most direct and short-term impacts of 
agriculture are now well-documented,23 its long-term impacts and 
effects on environments and communities more distant are still 
underexplored.  Moreover, the North Carolina experience of 
nuisance lawsuits and efforts to block them is part of a much larger, 
worldwide topography in which animal agriculture enjoys quasi-
immunity from the law. 
 
In this paper, we analyze factory farming in connection with 
the laws protecting these businesses under international human rights 
law, a dimension yet unexamined by legal scholarship and largely 
unaddressed in public and parliamentary deliberations.  We show 
how animal agriculture—and with it, the laws that insulate it—
compromise human rights guarantees such as the right to water, land, 
food, and a safe environment, and how this must affect public 
discourse about the legitimacy and continued support of the industry.  
Our focus is on establishing how governments, by passing these laws 
or failing to regulate, threaten these human rights, rather than on 
showing whether agricultural enterprises, as non-state actors, can be 
held accountable.24  This is not to say that the activities of non-state 
 
23 See discussion infra Section II.A. 
24  In other words, we are focusing on the state duty to protect rather than the 
corporate duty to respect human rights.  Multiple sources discuss corporate 
responsibility for human rights violations.  See Human Rights Council, Protect, 
Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/8/5 (Apr. 7, 2008); John Ruggie (Special Representative of the Secretary-
General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other 
Business Enterprises), Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: 
Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, U.N. 
Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011); U.N. Human Rights, Office of the High 
Comm’r for Human Rights, The Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights: 
An Interpretative Guide (United Nations 2012), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents 
/Publications/HR.PUB.12.2_En.pdf.  The  Chiquita  cases  provide  an  example, 
involving allegations of payments made by Chiquita to a paramilitary organization 
that targeted and killed over four hundred Colombians.  After bringing lawsuits in 
domestic forums for over a decade, in May 2017, human rights organizations urged 
the International Criminal Court to investigate actions of fourteen former and current 
Chiquita executives and employees, suggesting they committed or were complicit in 
crimes against humanity.  Chiquita Lawsuits (re Colombia), BUS. & HUMAN RIGHTS 
RES. CTR., https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/chiquita-lawsuits-re-colombia 
(last visited Dec. 28, 2019); see Caleb Wheeler, Commentary: ICC Prosecution for 
Crimes Committed by Chiquita Banana Employees in Columbia Will Most Likely 
Fail, BUS. & HUMAN RIGHTS RESOURCE CTR. (Sept. 13, 2018), 
https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/commentary-icc-prosecution-for-crimes-
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actors are not urgent or do not deserve our attention, but in this 
article, we choose to first center the discussion on the role of states. 
 
The rights we examine in this article are social, cultural, and 
economic rights, which are typically more difficult to secure and 
enforce than civil and political rights.25  Hence, the violation of these 
rights might (wrongly) be shrugged off by powerful corporate and 
governmental actors.  Despite these practical obstacles, the human 
rights perspective adds valuable dynamics to the ongoing debate, is 
novel in application to the issue, and may open new pathways for 
academic inquiries and legal strategies.  While to date, nuisance laws, 
environmental laws, and animal protection laws have remained de 
facto exempt from judicial scrutiny in numerous states, human rights 
guarantees can be used to hold governments accountable.  The 
human rights discourse also gives rise to a community of 
empowerment, new forms of advocacy, and the use of legal 
instruments in defense of marginalized groups. 26   It offers new 
avenues for providing help to vulnerable persons and forges 
connections between the different social justice issues implicated in 
animal agriculture.  Finally, our aim is to show how scholars, 
researchers, stakeholders, and the public concerned about human 
rights issues can bring animal agriculture into the conversation, and 
begin to use their power to hold their governments accountable and 
prompt them to address the issue proactively. 
 
We begin with a brief overview of the environmental and 
social realities of agriculture, the role of law in producing them, and 
new research uncovering its global ramifications (Part II).  We then 
identify and discuss the most invasive farmers’ rights—a broad term 
that we define as encompassing right-to-farm laws and exemptions 
from environmental and animal laws—and show how they have 
come to primarily protect large corporations.  We examine the 
existence, scope, and form of these laws in comparative perspective 
in the United States (US), Canada, and Australia.  We also highlight 
the situation at the level of the European Union (EU), which—due to 
its limited competences—does not have comparable right-to-farm 
laws (Part III).  In a third step, we analyze whether and how farmers’ 
 
committed-by-chiquita-banana-employees-in-columbia-will-most-likely-fail 
(providing a recent update). 
25 See PAUL FARMER, PATHOLOGIES OF POWER: HEALTH, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE 
NEW WAR ON THE POOR 29 (Univ. of Cal. Press 2005). 
26  Morten Broberg & Hans-Otto Sano, Strengths and Weaknesses in a Human 
Rights-Based Approach to International Development: An Analysis of a Rights-
Based Approach to Development Assistance Based on Practical Experiences, 22 
INT’L J. OF HUM. RTS. 664, 668 (2018), https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.108 
0/13642987.2017.1408591. 
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rights threaten the enjoyment of international human rights law (Part 
IV).  We emphasize the right to food and the right to water and 
sanitation, which are entwined with the right to land.27  We also 
examine whether farmers’ rights undermine the people’s right to a 
safe environment and the emerging human right to animal protection.  
Finally, we connect these developments to show that international 
human rights law cannot afford to ignore animal agriculture and its 
impacts on human rights any longer, and sketch the contours of an 
emerging body of litigation and advocacy (Part V). 
 
Throughout this article, we focus on the biggest contributors 
to human rights violations in the area of animal agriculture, without 
regard to corporate form and including sub-contractors.  For reasons 
of scope, we do not grapple with small-scale agriculture and its effect 
on human rights.  We do not deny that such violations take place or 
deserve our attention, but given the novelty of this topic, we focus on 
where we think attention is most needed.  We also do not examine 
the human rights implications of plant-based agriculture in this 
paper.  However, as we highlight the drawbacks of animal 
agriculture, it is important to acknowledge that plant-based 
agriculture engenders its own difficulties—though on a much lesser 
scale—including with respect to international human rights law.28  
Given the breadth of issues covered in this paper, scope precludes 
offering an analysis of existing litigation and advocacy, but we do 
point to different entry points for operationalizing our arguments. 
 
II.  Animal Agriculture, Farmers’ Rights, and Food 
Sovereignty 
 
A.  The Realities of Agriculture 
 
Since 1960, the global population has more than doubled, 
increasing from three billion to over seven billion people.  During 
this period, meat production has tripled, and egg and dairy 
production has quadrupled.29 The high demand for animal products 
is predominantly satisfied by intensifying production in CAFOs 
where animals are housed in-doors in extreme confinement.30  
 
 
27 Olivier de Schutter, The Emerging Right to Land, 12 INT’L COMMUNITY L. REV. 
303 (2010). 
28  See, e.g., WWF, THE GROWTH OF SOY: IMPACTS AND SOLUTIONS (2014), 
http://d2ouvy59p0dg6k.cloudfront.net/downloads/wwf_soy_report_final_feb_4_20
14.pdf. 
29  PEW COMM’N, REPORT ON INDUSTRIAL FARM ANIMAL PRODUCTION, PUTTING 
MEAT ON THE TABLE: INDUSTRIAL FARM ANIMAL PRODUCTION IN AMERICA 50 
(2008). 
30 Id. 
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Due to its intensification and proliferation, the animal 
industry has become one of the largest factors in environmental 
degradation.  It consumes 70% of the global freshwater, drains on 
38% of the global land in use, and causes 14% of the world’s 
greenhouse gas emissions, generating more methane (CH4), nitrous 
oxide (N2O), and carbon dioxide (CO2) than the global transport 
sector. 31   CAFOs release immense amounts of ammonia (NH3), 
hydrogen sulfide (H2S), volatile organic compounds (VOCs), nitrous 
oxide (N2O), and particulate matter (PM) that pollute air and water 
surfaces. 32   CAFOs also produce disproportionate amounts of 
manure that overwhelm environmental systems and prevent natural 
cleansing or lead to overflow of manure lagoons. 33 Farmers’ 
widespread use of antibiotics and antimicrobials to increase 
production has become a driving force in causing antimicrobial 
 
31 Thereby, animal production has a much larger ecological footprint (or hoof print!) 
than plant-based diets.  Oxford researchers Poore and Nemecek were the first to 
conduct a meta analysis of ∼38,000 farms producing forty different agricultural 
goods around the world to assess the impacts of food production and consumption.  
They found, specifically, that plant-based diets reduce food emissions by up to 73% 
depending on where a person lives.  Moreover, the impacts even of the lowest-impact 
animal products typically exceed those of vegetable substitutes.  J. Poore & T. 
Nemecek, Reducing Food’s Environmental Impact Through Producers and 
Consumers, 360 SCI. 987, 988 (2019); see also Camille Lacour et al., Environmental 
Impacts of Plant-Based Diets: How Does Organic Food Consumption Contribute to 
Environmental Sustainability?, FRONTIERS IN NUTRITION, Feb. 2018, at 4–5 (2018) 
(finding that “a higher pro-vegetarian score was associated with lower environmental 
impacts”); see also 2050: A Third More Mouths to Feed, FAO.ORG (Sept. 23, 2009), 
http://www.fao.org/news/story/en/item/35571/icode/; UNEP, ASSESSING THE 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF CONSUMPTION AND PRODUCTION: PRIORITY PRODUCTS 
AND MATERIALS 51, 79 (2010). 
32 Susan M. Brehm, From Red Barn to Facility: Changing Environmental Liability 
to Fit the Changing Structure of Livestock Production, 93 CAL. L. REV. 797, 813 
(2005); Sarah C. Wilson, Hogwash! Why Industrial Animal Agriculture Is Not 
Beyond the Scope of Clean Air Act Regulation, 24 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 439, 441, 
444 (2007).  To put this into perspective, in Oregon, 52,300 dairy cows at Threemile 
Canyon Farms, LLC produce 5,675,500 pounds of ammonia per year, exceeding the 
top manufacturing source of ammonia pollution in the US by 75,000 pounds.  Id. at 
439, 441, 456. 
33 JIM MASON & PETER SINGER, ANIMAL FACTORIES 122 (Harmony Books 1990);  
PEW COMM’N, supra note 29, at 50;  FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., LIVESTOCK’S LONG 
SHADOW, ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES AND OPTIONS 272 (2006); ORG. FOR ECON. AND 
CO-OPERATION DEV., AGRICULTURE AND THE ENVIRONMENT: LESSONS LEARNED 
FROM A DECADE OF OECD WORK (2004), http://www.oecd.org/greengrowth/sustain 
able-agriculture/agri-environmentalindicatorsandpolicies/33913449.pdf.  A CAFO 
that holds 500,000 pigs produces 6.5 million pounds of waste per day, the equivalent 
of waste produced per day by the city of Philadelphia with 6.2 million people.  US 
CENSUS BUREAU, POPULATION CHANGE AND DISTRIBUTION: 1990 TO 2000, at 6 (Apr. 
2001), https://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/c2kbr01-2.pdf.  In 1995, a lagoon 
overflowed in North Carolina, spilling twenty-five million gallons of pig waste onto 
land and rivers; the Exxon Valdez oil spill, by contrast, emitted half of the volume.  
Brehm, supra note 32, at 812. 
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resistance in bacteria.34  For example, pork industry workers in many 
countries are more often infected by streptococcus aureus than other 
individuals who do not work in this sector.35  The most common 
bacterium is the ST 398 strain, which is multi-resistant to 
antibiotics. 36  The resulting reservoirs of resistant bacteria are of 
great concern from a public health and food security perspective.37  
Overuse of antimicrobials and antibiotics also increases the 
probability of new treatment-resistant strains (“superbugs”) that 
sometimes jump between species, and have been declared 
epidemic. 38   Persons suffering from zoonoses such as A/H7N7, 
AH5N1, AH1N1, and swine flu are chiefly industrial farm workers, 
who often lack protection by either their employer or the state.39 
 
More and more organizations are documenting these human 
rights violations in animal agriculture.  Human Rights Watch, for 
example, found that:  
 
Employers put workers at predictable risk of serious 
physical injury even though the means to avoid such 
injury are known and feasible. They frustrate 
workers’ efforts to obtain compensation for 
workplace injuries when they occur. They crush 
workers’ self-organizing efforts and rights of 
association. They exploit the perceived vulnerability 
 
34 Michael J. Martin et al., Antibiotics Overuse in Animal Agriculture: A Call to 
Action for Health Care Providers, 105 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2409 (2015); PEW 
COMM’N, supra note 29, at 11.  In 2017, the World Health Organization (WHO) 
recommended that farmers and the food industry stop using antibiotics routinely to 
promote growth and prevent disease in healthy animals.  See Stop Using Antibiotics 
in Healthy Animals to Prevent the Spread of Antibiotic Resistance, WORLD HEALTH 
ORG. (Nov. 7, 2017), https://www.who.int/news-room/detail/07-11-2017-stop-
using-antibiotics-in-healthy-animals-to-prevent-the-spread-of-antibiotic-resistance 
(“WHO strongly recommends an overall reduction in the use of all classes of 
medically important antibiotics in food-producing animals, including complete 
restriction of these antibiotics for growth promotion and disease prevention without 
diagnosis.  Healthy animals should only receive antibiotics to prevent disease if it 
has been diagnosed in other animals in the same flock, herd, or fish population.”). 
35 Anne Oppliger et al., Antimicrobial Resistance of Staphylococcus Aureus Strains 
Acquired by Pig Farmers from Pigs, 78 APPLIED AND ENVTL. MICROBIOLOGY 8010 
(2012). 
36 Id. 
37 PEW COMM’N, REPORT ON ANTIMICROBIAL RESISTANCE AND HUMAN HEALTH 11 
(2008); COMM’N ON GENETIC RES. FOR FOOD AND AGRIC., GLOBAL PLAN OF ACTION 
FOR ANIMAL GENETIC RESOURCES AND THE INTERLAKEN DECLARATION (2007). 
38 PEW COMM’N, supra note 29, at 15; WORLD HEALTH ORG., REPORT ON GLOBAL 
SURVEILLANCE OF EPIDEMIC-PRONE INFECTIOUS DISEASES 25–31 (2000), 
https://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/surveillance/plague.pdf?ua=1.  
39 JOCELYNE PORCHER, THE ETHICS OF ANIMAL LABOR: A COLLABORATIVE UTOPIA 
57 (Palgrave Macmillan 2017). 
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of a predominantly immigrant labor force in many 
of their work sites.40 
 
B.  Farmers’ Rights and Agricultural Exceptionalism 
 
These inquiries and observations have brought issues to the 
fore that have been plaguing animal agriculture for many years.  A 
key driver responsible for the ongoing proliferation of CAFO issues 
are “farmers’ rights,” which denote laws and regulations set up with 
the purpose of protecting farmers and their businesses by either 
shielding them from lawsuits or exempting them from the law 
altogether.   
 
“Farmers’ rights” come in two forms: (i) right-to-farm laws 
and (ii) exemptions from environmental and animal laws.  Right-to-
farm laws prevent nuisance lawsuits41 against farmers engaging in 
“practices that are commonly or reasonably associated with 
agricultural production.” 42   These laws declare such practices 
indefeasible through statutory limitations for nuisance suits, through 
exemptions from zoning and disclosure, by declaring void opposing 
local ordinances, or by granting a fee recovery for the successful 
defense of a nuisance lawsuit.43  By 1992, all fifty states of the US 
had enacted such laws, and equivalent legislation was passed in 
Australia and Canada soon after.44  Right-to-farm laws emerged from 
an effort to preserve and promote small-scale farmers, to whom most 
people have an emotional connection and who many think make a 
valuable contribution to society. 45   Today, thanks to the 
corporatization of animal agriculture, these laws have come to 
benefit vertically integrated and monopolized corporations by 
insulating their actions and giving them virtual standard-setting 
authority.46  Pointing to the host of environmental and social harms 
that emerged from this blanket authorization, critics label these laws 
 
40  HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, BLOOD, SWEAT, AND FEAR: WORKERS’ RIGHTS IN US 
MEAT AND POULTRY PLANTS 1–2 (2004). 
41 E.g., nuisance lawsuits regarding noise, odors, visual clutter, or cruelty inflicted 
on animals. 
42 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 2-4-107(b)(1) (West 2009). 
43 See, e.g., id. 
44 Laura Alford & Sarah Berger Richardson, Right-to-Farm Legislation in Canada: 
Exceptional Protection for Standard Farm Practices, 50 OTTAWA L. REV. 131, 136 
(2018). 
45 Id. at 150. 
46 Id. at 151; David Pimentel, Ethical Issues of Global Corporatization: Agriculture 
and Beyond, 83 POULTRY SCI. SYMP.: BIOETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN ANIMAL 
PRODUCTION 321 (2004). 
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“right-to-harm bills.”47  Parallel to the rise of right-to-farm laws, 
agribusiness successfully lobbied for numerous exemptions from 
laws seeking to protect water, land, soil, air, and, ultimately, human 
health and life.48  
 
These exemptions and right-to-farm laws are the most 
noteworthy farmers’ rights we examine herein, but they are only one 
manifestation of a broader, and more pervasive problem, namely that 
of agricultural exceptionalism.  Agricultural exceptionalism is a 
belief system that fuels a range of exemptions or laws protecting 
agriculture from the purview of the public, including in the areas of 
environmental law, animal law, and property law (as we examine in 
this article), but also in trade law, employment law, and many other 
areas.49  Agricultural exceptionalism became “fully established as 
part of the post-war welfare consensus”50 and is today sustained by 
widely held views among the public, legislators, and the judiciary 
that farmers do us a service by providing the public with food.  Even 
with readily available evidence showing that large animal 
agricultural business is often doing the opposite, as we will show in 
this article, the industry has resisted substantial transformation.51  
Agricultural exceptionalism, by insulating agricultural producers 
from regulation, remains the dominant paradigm. 
 
 
 
47 Greg Stotelmyer, Right to Farm or Right to Harm?, PUB. NEWS SERV. (Apr. 3, 
2015), http://www.publicnewsservice.org/2015-04-03/animal-welfare/right-to-farm 
-or-right-to-harm/a45361-1. 
48  See generally Alexandra Lizano & Elizabeth Rumley, States’ Right-To-Farm 
Statutes, NAT‘L AGRIC. L. CTR., https://nationalaglawcenter.org/state-compilations/r 
ight-to-farm/ (last updated June 11, 2019) (compilation of right-to-farm statutes for 
all fifty states). 
49 In the area of employment law, general health and safety regulations, minimum 
wage, and overtime requirements are all subject to exceptions for agricultural 
workers under the Fair Labor Standards Act.  29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(6) (2006).  
Regarding labor law, the most notable exemption is that the National Labor Relations 
Act, the US’s primary legislation governing the rights of workers to bargain 
collectively, excludes “agricultural laborers” from its definition of “employee” and 
its attendant protections.  29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(12) (2006); see generally Guadalupe 
T. Luna, An Infinite Distance?: Agricultural Exceptionalism and Agricultural Labor 
1 U. OF PA. J. OF LAB. AND EMP. L. 487 (1998); Michael Trebilcock & Pue Kristen, 
The Puzzle of Agricultural Exceptionalism in Trade Policy, 18 J. OF INT’L ECON. L. 
233 (2015) (analyzing agricultural exceptionalism in trade law). 
50  Carsten Daugbjerg & Peter Feindt, Post-Exceptionalism in Public Policy: 
Transforming Food and Agricultural Policy, 24 J. OF EUR. PUB. POL’Y 1565, 1570 
(2017). 
51 CARSTEN DAUGBJERG & ALAN SWINBANK, IDEAS, INSTITUTIONS, AND TRADE: THE 
WTO AND THE CURIOUS ROLE OF EU FARM POLICY IN TRADE LIBERALIZATION 12–14 
(Oxford University Press 2009). 
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C.  North Carolina is Everywhere 
 
The short-term impacts of animal agriculture (and, thus, the 
laws exempting it) are now well-documented,52 but the long-term 
impacts and effects of these farming activities on the environments 
and communities further apart are still underexplored, including their 
contribution to global food shortages.53  CAFOs remain the standard 
method of generating animal products while being grossly 
unsustainable from an ecological perspective and a driving cause of 
food scarcity.  The ever-increasing consumption of animal products 
requires a significant portion of the world’s crop production, raises 
cereal prices, and depletes grain available for direct human 
consumption.  Because meat-based diets use far more of the global 
food and water resources than they provide, the high demand for 
water and protein-rich plants to produce meat threatens agriculture 
and drinking water supplies.54  The inefficiency of animal agriculture 
compared to plant agriculture is striking: CAFOs require ten times 
the land and eleven times the fossil fuel-based energy that plant 
farming uses.55 
 
The continuingly high contribution of animal agriculture to 
food insecurity56 has a disparate impact on the poor, locally and 
internationally.  Locally, agricultural business practices stifle low-
income communities, racial minorities, and migrant workers. 57  
Animal agriculture is also contributing considerably to hunger and 
death on foreign soil: “[e]ighty-two percent of the world’s starving 
children live in countries where food is fed to animals, which are then 
killed and eaten by wealthier individuals in developed countries like 
 
52 See discussion infra Section II.A. 
53 See discussion infra Sections IV.A, IV.D. 
54  See FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., STATISTICAL POCKETBOOK WORLD FOOD AND 
AGRICULTURE 30 (2015); UNEP, supra note 31, at 5; Felicity Carus, UN Urges 
Global Move to Meat and Dairy-Free Diet, THE GUARDIAN (June 2, 2010), 
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2010/jun/02/un-report-meat-free-diet. 
55 Claus Leitzmann, Nutrition Ecology: The Contribution of Vegetarian Diets, 78 
AM. J. CLINICAL NUTRITION 657 (2003); David Pimentel & Marcia Pimentel, 
Sustainability of Meat-Based and Plant-Based Diets and the Environment, 78 AM. 
J. CLINAL NUTRITION 660S (2003). 
56 FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., WORLD FOOD SUMMIT PLAN OF ACTION ¶ 1 (1996) (“Food 
security exists when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to 
sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences 
for an active and healthy life.”). 
57  E.g., ROBERT D. BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE: RACE, CLASS, AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY (Routledge 3d ed. 2000); Catarina Passidomo, Whose 
Right to (Farm) the City? Race and Food Justice Activism Post-Katrina New 
Orleans, 31 AGRIC. & HUM. VALUES 385 (2014);  MARY JANE ANGELO, JASON J. 
CZARNEZKI & WILLIAM S. EUBANKS II, FOOD, AGRICULTURE, AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAW 90–91 (Envtl. Law Inst. 2013). 
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the US, UK, and in Europe.” 58   As the Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO) explains, due to the ongoing growth of CAFOs, 
“Sub-Saharan Africa’s share in the global number of hungry people 
could rise from 24 percent to between 40 and 50 percent” by 2050.59  
In line with this prediction, in March 2017, the United Nations (UN) 
announced that the world will soon witness the most severe famine 
since 1945.60  Twenty million people face the threat of starvation and 
famine in Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, and Yemen.61 
 
Civil society’s growing awareness of the threat of food 
scarcity and dependence on foreign nations has sparked a global 
movement for food sovereignty, mostly in majority world 
countries.62  In 2007, five hundred delegates from eighty countries 
signed the Declaration of Nyéléni, a soft law instrument which 
recognizes peoples’ right to define their own agriculture and food 
 
58 Richard Oppenlander, Animal Agriculture, Hunger, and How to Feed a Growing 
Global Population: Part One of Two, FORKS OVER KNIVES (Aug. 20, 2013), 
https://www.forksoverknives.com/animal-agriculture-hunger-and-how-to-feed-a-gr 
owing-global-population-part-one-of-two/#gs.nl6lav; see also ERIC HOLT-GIMÉNEZ, 
POLICY BRIEF NO. 16: THE WORLD FOOD CRISIS: WHAT’S BEHIND IT AND WHAT CAN 
WE DO ABOUT IT (Food First: Inst. for Food and Dev. Policy 2008). 
59 FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., HOW TO FEED THE WORLD IN 2050, at 30 (2009). 
60 See UN Aid Chief Urges Global Action as Starvation, Famine Loom for 20 Million 
Across Four Countries, U.N. NEWS (Mar. 10, 2017), https://news.un.org/en/story/20 
17/03/553152-un-aid-chief-urges-global-action-starvation-famine-loom-20-million 
-across-four (stating “at the beginning of the year [2017] we are facing the largest 
humanitarian crisis since the creation of the UN”). 
61 U.N. NEWS, supra note 60.  In the year 2017 alone, 1.4 million children were 
expected to starve to death.  UNICEF Warns That 1.4 Million Children Could Die 
from Famine in Four Countries, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Feb. 21, 2017), 
https://www.dw.com/en/unicef-warns-that-14-million-children-could-die-from-fam 
ine-in-four-countries/a-37643854 (stating “[a]lmost 1.4 million children suffering 
from severe malnutrition could die this year from famine in Nigeria, Somalia, South 
Sudan and Yemen . . .”). 
62  In international law, we typically speak of “developing states” or the “Third 
World” to denote countries in juxtaposition to “developed countries.”  These terms 
imply that development is a standardized and linear process, and that certain 
countries have finished developing while others are still striving to reach this form 
of development.  Because there are many ways in which states evolve over time, and 
because nations should be recognized for their different strengths and challenges, 
these terms seem both incorrect and inappropriate.  In recognition thereof, 
scholarship is increasingly using the terms “majority world” and “minority world.”  
The former highlights the fact that the majority of the world’s population lives in 
these parts of the world previously identified as “developing,“ and the latter refers 
to those countries traditionally identified as “developed,” where a minority of the 
world’s population resides.  See, e.g., Shahidul Alam, Majority World: Challenging 
the West’s Rhetoric of Democracy, 34 AMERASIA J. 87 (2008); Samantha Punch, 
Exploring Children’s Agency Across Majority and Minority World Contexts, in 
RECONCEPTUALISING AGENCY AND CHILDHOOD: NEW PERSPECTIVES IN CHILDHOOD 
STUDIES 183 ff. (Florian Esser et al. eds., 2016). 
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policies.63  In the years following the declaration, Bolivia, Ecuador, 
Egypt, Mali, Nepal, Senegal, Venezuela, and other states have 
enshrined the right to food sovereignty in their constitutions, making 
it a core aspiration of their policies to reclaim authority in decision-
making and the production of food. 64   This movement strongly 
resonates with the early motivations for right-to-farm laws, namely 
to ensure that food can be produced locally and feeds the people.  
Thanks to the appropriation of right-to-farm laws by corporate 
giants, however, the two are now diametrically opposed: the Global 
South struggles to regain security over food, while the Global North 
claims a right to harm. 
 
This brief overview of the most pressing issues that dominate 
the intersections of animal agriculture, the environment, and human 
rights paints a dire picture, yet a loosely connected one.  In what 
follows, we zoom in on the most invasive farmers’ rights in the US, 
Canada, Australia, and the EU.  We focus on existing laws and 
regulations, but also discuss proposed bills.  We show how these laws 
have withstood judicial and public scrutiny even in the face of the 
most flagrant pollutions and human rights violations, among others, 
because they have come to protect primarily large corporations.  As 
we will argue, it is these farmers’ rights—forming part of the web of 
agricultural exceptionalism—that make human rights violations 
possible.  After all, states are not only uncommitted to regulating the 
issue, but they aim to declare legal grossly illegal practices.  While 
states are prima facie at liberty to do so under domestic law (when it 
comes to environmental law, animal law, etc.), their laws are subject 
to international scrutiny, particularly the international human rights 
law regime, which can put a halt to the ongoing insulation of animal 
agriculture.   
 
III.  The Rise of Farmers’ Rights 
 
A.  United States 
 
Under the long-standing US common law nuisance rule, 
agricultural operations could not unreasonably interfere with other 
landowners’ use and enjoyment of land or cause them personal or 
emotional harm.65  In 1980, due to the rapid demographic expansion 
 
63 See, e.g., Declaration of Nyéléni, NYELENI.ORG (Feb. 27, 2007), https://nyeleni.org 
/spip.php?article290. 
64 Adam Payne & Stanka Becheva, Food Sovereignty from the Ground Up, ILEIA 
(Apr. 18, 2017), https://www.ileia.org/2017/04/18/editorial-food-sovereignty-from-
the-ground-up/. 
65 Jason Jordan, A Pig in the Parlor or Food on the Table: Is Texas’ Right to Farm 
Act an Unconstitutional Mechanism to Perpetuate Nuisances or Sound Public Policy 
106                JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY              [Vol.15 
 
and urbanization witnessed in the US, the country was estimated to 
lose close to three million acres of land previously used for 
agricultural purposes per year.66  In reaction to the growing urban 
sprawl, Iowa, Louisiana, and Wyoming passed the first right-to-farm 
statutes in 1978.67  The goals of these laws were to shield farmers 
from nuisance suits and to prevent further loss of agricultural land.68  
Starting in the 1980s, all fifty states began to enact right-to-farm 
laws,69 a development pushed by strong agricultural lobbying and 
spurred by Congressional plans to exempt farms from federal 
environmental laws.70 
 
While US right-to-farm laws widely differ in terms of scope 
and applicability, they all protect agricultural practices through one 
or several of the following means:  
 
• The “Coming to the Nuisance Doctrine”: Nuisance 
lawsuits aimed at halting disproportionate noise, 
odors, visual clutter, or cruelty inflicted on animals 
cannot be brought against operations that preexisted 
surrounding land uses.71 
 
• Statutes of Limitations: Plaintiffs can introduce a 
lawsuit during a limited period of time only (usually 
one year) after the beginning of a harmful activity.  US 
 
Ensuring Sustainable Growth?, 42 TEX. TECH L. REV. 943, 951 (2010); see, e.g., 
Pendoley v. Ferreira, 187 N.E.2d 143, 146–47 (Mass. 1963) (providing an example 
in which a pig producer had to liquidate his business as he expanded his pig 
production, due to nuisance suits by the nearby village). 
66 NAT’L AGRIC. LANDS STUDY, FINAL REPORT 1981, at 8, 35 (1981) (stating “the 
United States has been converting agricultural land to nonagricultural uses at the rate 
of about three million acres per year . . .”).  In Oakland County, for example, 50.8% 
of the land area constituted farmland in 1950, while in 1978, this proportion had 
shrunk to 13.9%.  1 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, UNITED 
STATES CENSUS OF AGRICULTURE: 1950, pt. 6, at 46 (1952); 1 BUREAU OF THE 
CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, 1978 CENSUS OF AGRICULTURE 1978, pt. 22, at 
504 (1981). 
67 Jeffry R. Gittins, Bormann Revisited: Using the Penn Central Test To Determine 
the Constitutionality of Right-To-Farm Statutes, 2006 BYU L. REV. 1381, 1383. 
68 Id. 
69  Ross H. Pifer, Right to Farm Statutes and the Changing State of Modern 
Architecture, 46 CREIGHTON L. REV. 707, 710 (2013). 
70  David N. Cassuto, THE CAFO HOTHOUSE: CLIMATE CHANGE, INDUSTRIAL 
AGRICULTURE AND THE LAW 8 (Animals & Soc’y Inst., 2010). 
71 Terence J. Centner, Governments and Unconstitutional Takings: When Do Right-
to-Farm Laws Go Too Far? 33 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. Rev. 87, 95 (2006). 
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states that have adopted this rule include Minnesota,72 
Mississippi,73 Pennsylvania,74 and Texas.75 
 
• Immunity for Agricultural Startups or Business 
Expansion: When agribusiness expands, or when a 
new agricultural business may pose a new 
environmental threat or nuisance to its neighbors, 
some states, such as Georgia, deny a new running 
period for statutes of limitations.  They thereby allow 
farms to expand to whatever size they prefer, 
regardless of the nature and scale of their impact on 
the environment.76  In other states, such as Minnesota, 
new claims can only be made if an operation expands 
by at least 25%.77 
 
With right-to-farm laws in place, it is possible for 
agricultural businesses to enjoy de facto immunity from law, 
especially if a state chooses to combine these three means.  However, 
it is worth noting that, while said exemptions cover all types of 
agricultural businesses, only “practices commonly or reasonably 
associated with agricultural production” 78  (known as “generally 
accepted agricultural management practices,” or “GAAMPs”) 
remain exempt from review.79  Moreover, many states still require 
that agribusinesses do not negligently80 or illegally81 impact their 
neighbors or public goods.   
 
Still, CAFOs remain very well protected.  In the best case, 
what counts as a generally accepted practice is determined by 
 
72 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 561.19(2) (West Supp. 2010). 
73 MISS. CODE ANN. § 95-3-29(1) (West Supp. 2009). 
74 3 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 951–957, §954(a) (Westlaw through 2019 
Sess.). 
75 TEX. AGRIC. CODE ANN. §§ 251.001–.006, § 251.004 (West Supp. 2009). 
76 GA. CODE ANN. § 41-1-7(d) (West Supp. 2009) (“If the physical facilities of the 
agricultural operation or the agricultural support facility are subsequently expanded 
or new technology adopted, the established date of operation for each change is not 
a separately and independently established date of operation and the commencement 
of the expanded operation does not divest the agricultural operation or agricultural 
support facility of a previously established date of operation.”). 
77 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 561.19(b) (West Supp. 2010). 
78 Bormann  v.  Bd.  of  Supervisors  In  and  For  Kossuth  Cty.,  584  N.W.2d  309,  
315–21 (Iowa 1998). 
79 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 823.14(4)(a) (West 2012); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 165-4 
(West 2001); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 286.473 (West 1981).   
80 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 413.072 (West 2010) (exempting negligent behavior). 
81 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3767.13 (West 1982) (failing to exempt any action that 
becomes injurious to the health, comfort, or property of individuals or of the public). 
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commissions of agriculture.82  Such bodies suffer from a democratic 
deficit because they lack an electorate and, therefore, public 
accountability.83  In all other cases, the agri-food industry itself sets 
the standard for GAAMPs, and farmers are allowed to set up and rely 
on unwritten GAAMPs. 84   Thus, even if a practice is woefully 
intrusive, it can be deemed “generally accepted.”85  GAAMPs in 
most cases do not demand adherence to practices a reasonable person 
would consider adequate, but, instead, revolve around a standard of 
“normalcy.” 86   “Normal farm practices” are those practices that 
prevail in the industry and are shared by a large enough number of 
agribusinesses. 87  This is a considerable degree of self-regulation 
given to agricultural corporations that risks threatening public goods, 
as the practices these corporations set often do not reflect the same 
balancing of interests between economic growth, sustainability, and 
food security that would be expected from legislatively-defined 
standards.88 
 
Most states only lift CAFOs’ nuisance immunity if their 
activities have “a substantial adverse effect on public health and 
safety.”89  This caveat is highly questionable from a common good 
perspective, because the public cannot be assumed to have agreed to 
sweeping immunities threatening public goods, such as a safe 
environment, sustainable food policies, and the humane treatment of 
animals.  Moreover, specific provisions state that farms that did not 
constitute a nuisance prior to land use changes need not comply with 
GAAMPs to benefit from nuisance protection.90  Right-to-farm laws 
also often shift the burden of proof to the affected parties, who must 
show that the CAFO producer acted unreasonably.91  This conflicts 
with the aforementioned long-standing rule under the common law.92 
 
 
82 See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 286.472(d) (West 1995). 
83 Also, the GAAMPs are neither debated and passed by parliament nor published in 
administrative codes.  Patricia Norris, Gary Taylor & Mark Wyckoff, When Urban 
Agriculture Meets Michigan’s Right to Farm Act: The Pig’s in the Parlor, 2 MICH. 
ST. L. REV. 365, 388, 397 (2011). 
84 Milan Twp. v. Jaworski, No. 240444, 2003 Mich. App. LEXIS 3105, at *14 (Mich. 
Ct. App. Dec. 4, 2003) (relying on the absence of a provision that determines the list 
is conclusive to argue that other practices are covered as GAAMPs). 
85 Alford & Berger Richardson, supra note 44, at 152. 
86 Id. at 131. 
87 Id. at 142–43. 
88 Id. at 143. 
89 WASH. REV. CODE, § 7.48.305 (2009) (emphasis added). 
90 Norris, Taylor & Wyckoff, supra note 83, at 383–84 (reading MICH. COMP. LAWS 
§ 286.473(1) and (2) (1995) independently). 
91 Gittins, supra note 67, at 1392. 
92 Garrett Chrostek, A Critique of Vermont’s Right-to-Farm Law and Proposals for 
Better Protecting the State’s Agricultural Future, 36 VT. L. REV. 233, 236 (2012). 
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Many states (such as Georgia)93 do not provide immunity to 
farmers from only private nuisance; they also shield them from 
public nuisance claims, i.e., claims pertaining to nuisances 
threatening public health, safety, or welfare, or community 
resources, such as water supplies. 94   The right-to-farm laws of 
several states also preclude nuisance claims against zoning 
ordinances and other local laws.95  In Kentucky, legislators have 
gone so far as to make it a statutory rule that “[n]o agricultural or 
silvicultural operation or any of its appurtenances shall be . . . subject 
to any ordinance that would restrict the right of the operator of the 
agricultural or silvicultural operation to utilize normal and accepted 
practices.”96  
 
Right-to-farm laws emerged from a relatively innocuous 
desire to support traditional family-run farms as more and more 
people moved to the countryside.97  Today, most continue to defend 
the legitimacy of these laws by invoking this narrative.98  However, 
in the past decades, agriculture has been subject to immense 
restructuring, in particular as regards the concentration of 
production.  As technological changes have increased the number of 
animals that can be handled at a plant, producers keeping up with 
economies of scale have driven out or taken over weaker competitors 
through horizontal integration.  Corporations with large assets began 
to take over the landscape through vertical integration, setting up 
mergers and acquisitions with feed producers, breeders, food 
processors, and meatpackers. 99   The structural changes of 
agribusiness mean that right-to-farm laws are now primarily 
 
93 GA. CODE ANN. § 41-1-7 (West 2018). 
94 Commonwealth v. MacDonald, 347 A.2d 290, 301 (Pa. 1975); Jennifer L. Beidel, 
Pennsylvania’s Right-to-Farm Law: A Relief for Farmers or an Unconstitutional 
Taking? 110 PENN ST. L. REV. 163, 167 (2005). 
95 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 286.473 (West 2018); Charter Twp. of Shelby v. 
Papesh, 704 N.W.2d. 92, 96–102 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005) (“[I]f defendants’ farm is 
commercial in nature and in compliance with the GAAMPs, it is a farm operation 
protected by the RTFA. The ordinance conflicts with the RTFA to the extent that it 
allows plaintiff [township] to preclude a protected farm operation by limiting the 
size of a farm.”). 
96 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 413.072(2) (Westlaw through 2019 Sess.). 
97 See Madeleine Skaller, Protecting the Right to Harm: Why State Right to Farm 
Laws Should Not Shield Factory Farms from Nuisance Liability, 27 SAN JOAQUIN 
AGRIC. L. REV. 209, 216 (2018) (stating “[r]ight to farm laws were passed to ensure 
the viability of agricultural operations when people were moving from urban to rural 
areas”).  Some criticize that the fear of urban sprawl impacting agriculture is a myth 
and that most complainants were in fact rural residents.  Alford & Berger 
Richardson, supra note 44, at 149–50. 
98 Brehm, supra note 32, at 797. 
99 Note, Challenging Concentration of Control in the American Meat Industry, 117 
HARV. L. REV. 2643 (2004). 
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profiting large-scale and industrialized methods of production, but 
these laws are ill-equipped to handle the impact of these methods on 
the environment, animals, and human health.  Moreover, in some 
cases, state legislatures have begun to limit right-to-farm laws to 
commercial operations and have denied non-commercial farmers and 
hobbyists the benefits of anti-nuisance protection.100  In this sense, 
and as Alford and Berger Richardson argue, “RTFs [right-to-farm 
laws] are less about ensuring the right to ‘farm’ and more about 
ensuring the right to cheaply ‘produce’ large quantities of food.”101  
 
These various features of right-to-farm laws confirm that 
unlike food sovereignty legislation, which seeks to empower the 
public, right-to-farm laws protect the interests of agribusiness at the 
expense of the collective.  In Bormann (1998), the Iowa Supreme 
Court became the first US judicial institution to invalidate a state’s 
right-to-farm laws—which granted farmers unlimited immunity, 
regardless of how long they had been running their business.102  The 
Court found that these laws were an unconstitutional taking.103  The 
Bormann ruling, however, has been widely criticized for qualifying 
the issue as a per se taking, instead of a regulatory taking.104  Six 
years later, in Gacke, the same court declared Iowa right-to-farm 
laws to be in violation of the state’s constitutional clause on 
inalienable rights. 105   This trend, though anxiously awaited by 
agricultural industries, was followed only by few neighboring 
states.106 
 
Besides benefitting from right-to-farm laws, animal 
agriculture enjoys exemptions from environmental and animal 
protection laws across the US at both the federal and state level.  On 
the federal plane, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), which provides 
that polluters are responsible for the expenses of the cleanup of 
hazardous substances release, does not expressly cover agricultural 
 
100 Sean McElwain, The Misnomer of Right to Farm: How Right-to-Farm Statutes 
Disadvantage Organic Farming, 55 WASHBURN L. J. 223, 243 (2015). 
101 Alford & Berger Richardson, supra note 44, at 149. 
102 Bormann, 584 N.W.2d at 309; IOWA CODE ANN. § 352.11(1)(a) (Westlaw through 
2019 legislation). 
103 Bormann, 584 N.W.2d at 309; IOWA CODE ANN. § 352.11(1)(a) (Westlaw through 
2019 legislation). 
104 Centner, supra note 71, at 124–25; Beidel, supra note 94, at 177. 
105 Gacke v. Pork Xtra, L.L.C., 684 N.W.2d 168, 179 (Iowa 2004). 
106 Examples of states that followed this trend include Maryland and North Carolina.  
McIlrath v. Prestage Farms of Iowa, L.L.C., No. 15-1599, 2016 WL 6902328 (Iowa 
Ct. App. Nov. 23, 2016); In re NC Swine Farm Nuisance Litig., No. 5:15-CV-00013-
BR, 2017 WL 5178038 (E.D. N.C., Nov. 8, 2017). 
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practices. 107   While there is a recent trend to hold agricultural 
producers liable under the CERCLA, 108  animal agricultural 
industries continue to escape the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act (RCRA).  The RCRA, the nation’s principal hazardous 
waste management and disposal regulation law, fails to classify 
waste from CAFOs as hazardous.109  The situation is markedly better 
under the federal Clean Water Act (CWA).  Since 2002, large 
CAFOs must obtain a permit under the National Pollutant Discharge 
Elimination System (NPDES) to discharge animal waste, fertilizers, 
and pesticides into the waters of the US.110  Nonetheless, the CWA 
remains largely toothless, as it expressly excludes agricultural 
stormwater “discharges . . . [and] return flows from irrigated 
agriculture,” 111  permitting “most agricultural sources to escape 
Section 402 regulation . . .”112  Another major federal law, the Clean 
 
107 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 
1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9676 (1994). 
108 City of Tulsa v. Tyson Foods Inc., 258 F. Supp. 2d 1263 (N.D. Okla. 2003) 
(finding Tyson Foods to be liable under CERCLA due to eutrophication in Tulsa 
area lakes); Sierra Club v. Seaboard Farms Inc., 387 F.3d 1167 (10th Cir. 2004) 
(holding Dorman Farms, a pig CAFO, responsible for ammonia emissions); City of 
Waco v. Schouten, 385 F. Supp. 2d 595 (W.D. Tex. 2005) (holding that phosphorus 
in cow manure is a hazardous substance under CERCLA). 
109 40 C.F.R. § 261.4(b)(2)(ii) (1999); see also 42 U.S.C.A. § 6903(27) (Westlaw 
through Pub. L. No. 116-91).  
110 This is because CAFOs, given the requisite size, qualify as a “point source.”  To 
successfully apply for a permit, CAFOs must, among others, develop and implement 
nutrient management plans.  See Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 
Stat. 1566 (1977) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (1997 & Supp. 
III 1997)).  The Clean Water Act of 1977 was amended by the National Pollutant 
Discharge Elimination System Permit Regulation and Effluent Limitation 
Guidelines and Standards for Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations, which 
explicitly stated that “[t]his rule establishes a mandatory duty for all CAFOs to apply 
for an NPDES permit and to develop and implement a nutrient [manure and 
wastewater] management plan.”  National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System 
Permit Regulation and Effluent Limitation Guidelines and Standards for 
Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations, 68 Fed. Reg. 7176 (Feb. 12, 2003) 
(codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 122, 123, 412). 
111 33 U.S.C. § 1342(l)(1) (1997 & Supp. III 1997) (“The Administrator shall not 
require a permit under this section for discharges composed entirely of return flows 
from irrigated agriculture, nor shall the Administrator directly or indirectly, require 
any State to require such a permit.”); 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (1997 & Supp. III 1997) 
(providing that the term “point source” “does not include agricultural stormwater 
discharges and return flows from irrigated agriculture”); 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f)(1)(A) 
(1997 & Supp. III 1997) (exempting from the prohibition of discharge of dredged or 
fill material, material “from normal farming, silviculture, and ranching activities 
such as plowing, seeding, cultivating, minor drainage, harvesting for the production 
of food, fiber, and forest products, or upland soil and water conservation practices”); 
see also J.B. Ruhl, Farms, Their Environmental Harms, and Environmental Law, 27 
ECOLOGY L. Q. 263, 295 (2000). 
112 Jan G. Laitos & Heidi Ruckriegle, The Clean Water Act and the Challenge of 
Agricultural Pollution, 37 VT. L. REV. 1033, 1058 (2013). 
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Air Act (CAA), which regulates hazardous air pollutants,113 exempts 
all CAFOs from coverage.  Indeed, the administrator has the 
authority to “establish a greater threshold quantity for, or to exempt 
entirely, any substance that is a nutrient used in agriculture when held 
by a farmer.”114  Even if the CAA were applicable to CAFOs, it is 
important to consider that the US Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) has declined to bring cases against CAFOs based on CAA 
violations.115  As a result, environmental law has given animal farms 
a “virtual license” 116  to cause habitat loss, soil erosion and 
degradation, water depletion, and to pollute water and air across the 
US. 
 
Similar, if not more sweeping, exemptions have been put in 
place to inhibit animal welfare claims.  The North Dakota 
Constitution was amended in response to California’s Proposition 2 
amendment, which required all confined farmed animals to have 
sufficient space to stand up, turn around freely, and fully extend 
limbs and wings, by adding that: 
 
The right of farmers and ranchers to engage in 
modern farming and ranching practices shall be 
forever guaranteed in this state.  No law shall be 
enacted which abridges the right of farmers and 
ranchers to employ agricultural technology, modern 
livestock production, and ranching practices.117   
 
Thereby, the adoption of laws that would guarantee animals 
a bearable life during confinement has been rendered infeasible.  
Similarly, under the New York Agriculture and Markets Law, local 
laws, ordinances, rules, or regulations may restrict the operations of 
agricultural districts only if public health or safety is threatened.118  
Animal welfare, though of public concern, cannot limit any of these 
agricultural operations, as it is not deemed to fall under these 
exceptions. 
 
Those benefiting from these immunities and rights are 
primarily corporations (rather than individual farmers), which aligns 
with the growing lobbying efforts of business to secure immunity 
through ag-gag laws and veggie libel laws.  Ag-gag laws generally 
 
113 Clean Air Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970) (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7431 (1994 & Supp. III 1997)). 
114 42 U.S.C. §§ 7412(r)(5) (1994 & Supp. III 1997); see also Wilson, supra note 32, 
at 441. 
115 Ruhl, supra note 111, at 263.   
116 Id. at 263. 
117 N.D. CONST., art. XI, § 29; see Pifer, supra note 69, at 716. 
118 N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 305-a(1). 
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criminalize activities that expose and denounce animal agricultural 
activities without the consent of their owner, particularly when these 
activities are inhumane, unsafe, or even illegal.119  In the US, seven 
states have passed ag-gag laws and more than twenty-four such bills 
have been introduced in other states.120  Veggie libel laws, which 
establish (strict) liability for members of the public who publicly 
criticize food production practices, have passed in more than thirteen 
US states.121  
 
In addition, the federal Animal Welfare Act (AWA), the 
Twenty-Eight Hour Law, and the Humane Methods of Slaughter Act 
(HMSA) all turn a blind eye to farmed animals.  The AWA does not 
apply to farmed animals; 122  the Twenty-Eight Hour Law, which 
seeks to protect animals during transport, fails to cover transport by 
truck, by air, and on water (and hence most of farm animal 
transportation);123 and the HMSA, which requires farmed animals to 
be rendered insensible to pain prior to being hoisted, shackled, or cut, 
does not apply to chickens and fish, which represent the highest 
number of animals killed for the purposes of food production.124  On 
a state level, animal anti-cruelty statutes have largely exempted farm 
practices from their application because they consider them to be 
“common farm practices.”125  As Schaffner explains, this creates a 
paradox by which “criminal laws, designed to protect animals from 
the intentional infliction of pain and suffering, perpetuate and in fact 
endorse institutionalized cruelty to animals.”126  As a consequence, 
 
119 What is Ag-Gag Legislation?, ASPCA.ORG, https://www.aspca.org/animal-prote 
ction/public-policy/what-ag-gag-legislation (last visited Dec. 21, 2019). 
120 Aurora Moses & Paige Tomaselli, Industrial Animal Agriculture in the United 
States: Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations (CAFOs), in INTERNATIONAL 
FARM ANIMAL, WILDLIFE AND FOOD SAFETY LAW 185, 199 (Gabriela Steier & Kiran 
K. Patel eds., 2017). 
121  Those are Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Texas.  Id. 
122 7 U.S.C.A. § 2131, § 2132(g) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-91); see F. 
Barbara Orlans, The Injustice of Excluding Laboratory Rats, Mice, and Birds from 
the Animal Welfare Act, 10 KENNEDY INST. OF ETHICS J. 229 (2000) (discussing the 
limits set by the US AWA on research animals); Gaverick Matheny & Cheryl Leahy, 
Farm-Animal Welfare, Legislation and Trade, 70 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 325, 334 
(2007) (discussing the same for farm animals); David J. Wolfson & Mariann 
Sullivan, Foxes in the Hen House, in ANIMAL RIGHTS: CURRENT DEBATES AND NEW 
DIRECTIONS  206 (Cass Sunstein & Martha Nussbaum eds., 2004).  The AWA is, 
therefore, inapplicable to 95% of all animals raised in the US.  Id.; Matheny & Leahy, 
supra. 
123 49 U.S.C. § 80502(a) (2019). 
124 7 U.S.C. §§ 1901, 1902(a) (2019); 9 C.F.R. § 301.2 (2019). 
125 See PAMELA D. FRASCH ET AL., ANIMAL LAW IN A NUTSHELL 335 (West Acad. publ’g 
2d ed. 2016); Wolfson & Sullivan, supra note 122, at 212–16.  
126 JOAN E. SCHAFFNER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ANIMALS AND THE LAW 28 (2011); Paul 
Waldau, Second Wave Animal Law and the Arrival of Animal Studies, in ANIMAL 
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only wrongs committed against animals that do not restrict farmers’ 
common economic interests (such as causing animals to starve or 
giving them inappropriate shelter) constitute animal cruelty. 127  
Considering that the US is home to over 450,000 CAFOs,128 these 
far-reaching exemptions have the effect of rendering most laws 
generally inapplicable to the animal agricultural sector. 
 
B.  Canada 
 
Nuisance laws protecting property owners from interference 
in their property rights have been part of a long-standing common 
law rule in Canada since the 1880s.129  Under these nuisance laws, 
plaintiffs could ask the court to issue an injunction to cease 
disturbance (such as excessive noise, manure smell or overflow, or 
even excessive screams by animals), and seek monetary damages and 
compensation for harms.130  
 
Over the past forty years, however, all states and provinces 
of Canada have passed right-to-farm laws that greatly limit anti-
nuisance claims.  The first right-to-farm laws were enacted in 
Manitoba in 1976.131  They were followed by Quebec (1978), New 
Brunswick (1986), Alberta (1987), Ontario (1988), British Columbia 
(1989), Saskatchewan (1995), Prince Edward Island (1998), and 
Newfoundland and Labrador (2003).132  The initial purpose of these 
laws was to prevent urban encroachment on agricultural land through 
nuisance complaints about odor, noise, chemicals, pests, etc., 
because “those moving into the country may be seeking fresh air, 
quiet, and scenery.  The expectations of new country residents can 
come into conflict with agriculture when they experience the realities 
of modern agricultural production.”133  
 
 
 
 
 
LAW AND WELFARE: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 37 (Deborah Cao & Steven 
White eds., 2016). 
127 E.g., Westfall v. State, 10 S.W.3d 85 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999); see also FRASCH ET 
AL., supra note 125, at 79. 
128 Wilson, supra note 32, at 440. 
129 BETH BILSON, THE CANADIAN LAW OF NUISANCE (Butterworths 1991); Rylands 
v. Fletcher [1868], UKHL 1, 3 H.L. 330. 
130 Patrick McCormally, Right-to-Farm Legislation in Canada, PROBE INT’L 1 (July 
2007), http://www.probeinternational.org/envirowaterarticles/rightofarmcanada.pdf. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. 
133 Keith Wilson, Are You Losing Your Right to Farm?, 20 WCDS ADVANCES IN 
DAIRY TECH. 245, 246 (2008). 
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The scope of Canadian right-to-farm laws is typically 
restricted to “normal farm practices.”  British Columbia, for instance, 
defines such a practice as one that “is conducted by a farm business 
in a manner consistent with”: 
 
(a) proper and accepted customs and standards as 
established and followed by similar farm businesses 
under similar circumstances, and 
 
(b) any standards prescribed by the Lieutenant 
Governor in Council, and includes a practice that 
makes use of innovative technology in a manner 
consistent with proper advanced farm management 
practices . . .134 
 
The burden of proof usually lies on the complainant, who 
must show that a disturbance lies outside normal agricultural 
practices.135  The effect of right-to-farm laws in Canada is analogous 
to that of their US counterparts: no damages can be awarded for the 
infringement of private property by “normal agricultural practices,” 
and no injunction can be obtained to stop the nuisance.136  
 
The more disturbing aspect of right-to-farm laws in Canada 
and elsewhere, however, is that the concept of “normal agricultural 
or farm practice” may render legal otherwise illegal practices, such 
as dumping toxic waste or inflicting cruelty to animals, provided a 
sufficiently representative number of farmers engages in them.137  
This is, for example, the case in Saskatchewan. 138  Another 
illustration is Ontario’s Farming and Food Production Protection 
Act, which determines that “[n]o municipal by-law applies to restrict 
a normal farm practice carried on as part of an agricultural 
operation.”139  Thus, not only are people prevented from accessing 
courts to ask for economic and injunctive relief: they are further 
barred from using their political rights in local policy-making.140  
Because environmental regulation may fall under the authority of the 
municipalities, scholars have linked rising environmental pollution 
 
134 Farm Practices Protection (Right to Farm) Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 131, s. 1 (Can. 
B.C.). 
135 E.g., Agriculture Operations Practices Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. A-7, s. 2(3) (Can. 
Alta.); see also R.J. Farms & Grain Transport Ltd. v. Saskatchewan (Agric. Review 
Bd.), 2011 SKQB 185 (Can. Sask.). 
136 McCormally, supra note 130, at 2. 
137 Id. 
138 The Agricultural Operations Act, R.S.S. 1995, c. A-12.1, s. 3, amended by S.S. 
2013, c. 27 (Can. Sask.). 
139 Farming and Food Production Protection Act, S.O. 1998, c. 1, 6(1) (Can. Ont.). 
140 Alford & Berger Richardson, supra note 44, at 156. 
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and degradation to the adoption of right-to-farm laws.141  Only a few 
Canadian provinces (such as British Columbia, Prince Edward 
Island, and Quebec) have determined that nuisance suits can only be 
excluded if the practices do not violate other laws, such as 
environmental protection acts or laws protecting human health.142 
 
Canadian right-to-farm laws provide that claims about 
nuisances are adjudicated by the Agricultural Operations Review 
Board, and not by a court.143  The board is headed by current or 
former farmers, 144  is only rarely used, and does not make its 
decisions publicly available.145  Although judicial bodies can review 
board decisions using the standard of reasonableness,146 they usually 
show great deference, commending the specialized knowledge of 
these boards and their ability to gather firsthand evidence.147  The 
immunization from administrative adjudication, paired with broad 
judicial deference and strict time limits for appeal, all “insulate the 
farming industry from civil liability.”148 
 
In Canada, agriculture is mainly regulated on a provincial 
level, and occasionally on a municipal level, with the exception of, 
inter alia, the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, the Pest 
Control Products Act, the Water Act, and the Fisheries Act.149  All 
of Canada’s provinces lay down environmental standards that 
prohibit depositing pollutants into water bodies unless the discharge 
 
141 ELIZABETH BRUBAKER, GREENER PASTURES: DECENTRALIZING THE REGULATION 
OF AGRICULTURAL POLLUTION (Andrew Stark ed., 2007); DAVID R. BOYD, 
UNNATURAL LAW: RETHINKING CANADIAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 
(Sarah Wight ed., 2003). 
142 E.g., Farm Practices Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1998, c. 87, s. 2 (Can. P.E.I.); Act Respecting 
the  Preservation  of  Agricultural  Land  and  Agricultural  Activities,  R.S.Q.  1996,  
c. 26, s. 79.17–79.19.2, s. 100 (Can. Que.); Farm Practices Protection (Right to Farm) 
Act, R.S.B.C. 1996 c. 131, s. 2 (Can. B.C.). 
143 McCormally, supra note 130, at 3. 
144 In Saskatchewan, the Board is composed of six members representing the milk 
industry, cattle feeder producers, three producers at large, and a representative of the 
Saskatchewan Association of Rural Municipalities.  Id. 
145 There is an exception for the Farm Industry Review Board of British Columbia, 
which publishes all of its decisions online.  Id. 
146 R.J. Farms & Grain Transport Ltd. v. Saskatchewan (Agric. Review Bd.), 2011 
SKQB 185, paras. 17–22 (Can. Sask.). 
147 Lubchynski v. British Columbia (Farm Practices Bd.), 2004 BCSC 657 (Can. 
B.C.) (“[A]bsent special circumstances, questions of whether, in the context of a 
nuisance action, a disturbance constitutes a ‘normal farm practice’ should generally 
be left to the Board to determine.”); see also Lone Pine Comm. v. Alberta (Nat. Res. 
Conservation Bd.), 2005 ABCA 348, paras. 14, 16 (Can. Alta.); Pyke v. Tri Gro 
Enterprises Ltd. 2001 CarswellOnt 2762, paras. 55–57 (Can. Ont. C.A.).  
148 Alford & Berger Richardson, supra note 44, at 156. 
149 BRUBAKER supra note 141, at 10. 
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has been expressly permitted. 150   Some have also introduced 
“minimum distance separation” requirements between livestock 
facilities and their neighbors.151  Among the Canadian provinces, 
only Quebec152 and Saskatchewan153 have specific acts designed to 
cover CAFOs.  Many of the laws still lack limitations on livestock 
densities or total sizes. 154   Another notable weakness of 
environmental policy regulation in Canada is the fact that these are 
merely guidelines or best practices issued by private organizations.  
As a result, CAFO regulation chiefly lies with corporate authorities, 
and the odor and water effects of CAFOs remain outside the reach of 
collective agricultural supply management policies.155 
 
In May 2000, the city of Walkerton, Ontario, suffered a 
widespread contamination of Escherichia coli and Campylobacter 
jejuni bacteria that came from manure that had been spread on a 
nearby farm, as a consequence of which seven people died and many 
more suffered long-lasting injuries.156  Since then, many provinces 
have reviewed their laws,157 though sweeping exemptions are still 
common.  To date, the rules on waste of the Ontario Environmental 
Protection Act do “not apply to animal wastes disposed of in 
accordance with both normal farming practices and the regulations 
 
150 E.g., Environmental  Management  and  Protection  Act,  R.S.S.  2010, c. E-10.22,  
s. 8 (Can. Sask.); e.g., Clean Water Act, R.S.N.B. 1989, c. C-6.1, s. 12(1) (Can. 
N.B.); e.g., Environment Quality Act, C.Q.L.R., c. Q-2, s. 20, 22 (Can. Que.); e.g., 
Règlement sur les exploitations agricoles, R.R.Q., Q-2 r. 26, s. 4–5 (Can. Que.). 
151  Most of these range at minimum at 150 meters. E.g., Standards and 
Administration Regulation, Alta. Reg. 267/2001, s. 3 (Can. Alta.).  The distance is 
typically calculated based on a specific formula.  E.g., A x B x C; A equals 500 
meters, B equals manure factor, and C equals livestock factor.  JERRY SPEIR ET AL., 
COMPARATIVE STANDARDS FOR INTENSIVE LIVESTOCK OPERATIONS IN CANADA, 
MEXICO, AND THE UNITED STATES 54 (Comm’n for Envtl. Cooperation 2003). 
152 Agricultural Operations Regulation, C.Q.L.R., c. Q-2, s. 1–2 (Can. Que.). 
153 Agricultural Operations Act, R.S.S. 1995, c. A-12.1 s. 19–23 (Can. Sask.).   
154 Most of them only do so indirectly via Nutrient Management Plans (NMPs).  A 
Review of Selected Jurisdictions and Their Approach to Regulating Intensive 
Farming Operations, ONT. MINISTRY OF AGRIC., FOOD, AND RURAL AFFAIRS, 
http://www.omafra.gov.on.ca/english/agops/otherregs1.htm (last udpated May 23, 
2003). 
155  Joel Novek, Intensive Livestock Operations, Disembedding, and Community 
Polarization in Manitoba, 7 SOC’Y & NAT. RESOURCES 567, 567 (2003). 
156 Scott Prudham, Poisoning the Well: Neoliberalism and the Contamination of 
Municipal Water in Walkerton, Ontario, 35 GEOFORUM 343, 349 (2004).  
157 Until relatively recently, environmental policies have also exempted Canadian 
agriculture from scrutiny. Predrag Rajsic et al., Canadian Agricultural 
Environmental Policy: From the Right to Farm to Farming Right, in THE ECONOMICS 
OF REGULATION IN AGRICULTURE: COMPLIANCE WITH PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 
STANDARDS 55, 56 (Floor Brouwer, Glenn Fox, Roel Jongenee & R. A. Jongeneel 
eds., 2012). 
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made under the Nutrient Management Act.”158  Similarly, under the 
British Columbia Environmental Management Act, rules on waste 
disposal do not prohibit “emission into the air of soil particles or grit 
in the course of agriculture or horticulture.”159  Under the Manitoba 
Environment Act, “[a] person involved in an agricultural operation” 
will not be punished for the unauthorized release of pollutants “if the 
release occurred through the use of normal farm practices.”160 
 
Analogously to their US counterparts, Canadian agricultural 
industries enjoy substantial discretion as to how they treat the 
animals they own.  Cruelty inflicted on animals used for agricultural 
purposes is exempt under the laws of Alberta,161 British Columbia,162 
Manitoba, 163  Nova Scotia, 164  Ontario, 165  Prince Edward Island,166 
Quebec, 167  Saskatchewan, 168  and Yukon. 169   Thus, in these 
provinces, “common farm practices,” regardless of whether they 
inflict suffering or even blatant cruelty on animals, never constitute 
animal cruelty in a legal sense.170  As a consequence, harm caused to 
animals in the agricultural sector is deemed legal.171 
 
C.  Australia 
 
Australian law (like English law, upon which it heavily 
draws) in principle provides that claims can be brought against both 
public and private nuisances to stop a nuisance and to claim 
 
158 Environmental Protection Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.19, s. 6(2) (Can. Ont.). 
159 Environmental Management Act, S.B.C. 2003, c. 53, s. 2(6)(5)(i) (Can. B.C.). 
160 The Environment Act, C.C.S.M. 2019, c. E125, 30.1(2) (Can. Man.). 
161 Animal Protection Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. A-41, s. 2(2) (Can. Atla.) (“This section 
does not apply if the distress results from an activity carried on in accordance with 
the regulations or in accordance with reasonable and generally accepted practices of 
animal care, management, husbandry, hunting, fishing, trapping, pest control or 
slaughter.”). 
162 Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 372, s. 24.02 (Can. B.C.) 
(“A person must not be convicted of an offence under this Act in relation to an animal 
in distress if . . . the distress results from an activity that is carried out in accordance 
with reasonable and generally accepted practices of animal management that apply 
to the activity in which the person is engaged, unless the person is an operator and 
those practices are inconsistent with prescribed standards.”). 
163 Animal Care Act, C.C.S.M. 2015, c. A84, s. 2(2) (Can. Man.). 
164 Animal Protection Act, S.N.S. 2008, c. 33, s. 21(4) (Can. N.S.). 
165 Ontario  Society  for  the  Prevention  of  Cruelty  to  Animals  Act,  R.S.O. 1990,  
c. O.36, s. 2(a) (Can. Ont.). 
166  Animal Health and Protection Act, R.S.P.E.I. 2005, c. A-11.1, s. 4(1) (Can. 
P.E.I.). 
167 Animal Welfare and Safety Act, C.Q.L.R. 2016, c. B-3.1, s. 7 (Can. Que.). 
168 Animal Protection Act, R.S.S. 2018, c. A-21.2, s. 2(3)(b) (Can. Sask.). 
169 Animal Protection Act, R.S.Y. 2002, c. 6, s. (3)(3) (Can. Yukon). 
170 See also Wolfson & Sullivan, supra note 122, at 205. 
171 See also id. 
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damages.172  Sometimes, however, the activity at stake is authorized 
under the law of the Australian states (New South Wales, 
Queensland, South Australia, Tasmania, Victoria, and Western 
Australia) and territories. 173   Compared to the US and Canada, 
Australian right-to-farm legislation is recent and scarce. 
  
Like most states, Australia witnessed “a socio-historical 
transition from small, family-operated farming concerns to large, 
corporate-owned agricultural enterprises.”174  As Alex Bruce and 
Thomas Faunce observe, this development severed the close 
relationship and emotional bond that farmers had with their animals 
and the environment.175  Still, in the early 1990s, Australian authors 
noted that the US experience with right-to-farm laws did not provide 
compelling reasons for introducing similar legislation in Australia.176  
The first and, to date, only 177  Australian right-to-farm law—the 
Primary Industries Activities Protection Act 1995—was passed by 
Tasmania in 1995.178  The reasons leading to the adoption of the Act 
resemble those that motivated the passing of analogous legislation in 
North America, namely the concerns that growing urbanization 
might jeopardize or constrain farming 179  and that environmental 
regulation would restrict farming practices. 180   In light of these 
concerns, the Tasmanian Act aims, on the one hand, to “protect 
persons engaged in primary industry by limiting the operation of the 
common law of nuisance in respect of certain activities that are 
 
172 The law of nuisance is based on the common law, and it has been codified in 
some statutes.  See, e.g.,  Primary  Industries  Activities  Protection  Act  1995 (Tas.)  
s. 3(1) (Austl.). 
173 One example is the statutory exceptions established by the Civil Liability Acts 
adopted in various Australian states.  See, e.g., Wrongs Act 1958 (Vict.) s 30 (Austl.); 
Civil Liability Act 2002 (N.S.W.) s 72(1) (Austl.). 
174 Alex Bruce & Thomas Faunce, Food Production and Animal Welfare Legislation 
in Australia: Failing Both Animals and the Environment, in INTERNATIONAL FARM 
ANIMAL, WILDLIFE AND FOOD SAFETY LAW 359, 360 (Gabriela Steier & Kiran K. 
Patel eds., 2017). 
175 Id. at 363. 
176 E.g., John Paterson, A Right to Farm; A Right to Live?, 28 AUSTRALIAN PLANNER 
8, 8 (1990). 
177  GARETH GRIFFITH, NSW PARLIAMENTARY RESEARCH SERV., RIGHT TO FARM 
LAWS 10 (2014), https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/researchpapers/Documents/rig 
ht-to-farm-laws/The%20right%20to%20farm.pdf. 
178 Primary Industries Activities Protection Act 1995 (Tas.) (Austl.). 
179 DEP’T OF PRIMARY INDUS., PARKS, WATER & ENV’T., REVIEW OF THE PRIMARY 
INDUSTRIES ACTIVITIES PROTECTION ACT 1995–ISSUES PAPER 9 (2014).  Such 
concerns are for instance expressed by the Victorian Farmers Federation.  VICTORIAN 
FARMERS FED’N., INQUIRY INTO THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT OF AGRIBUSINESS 
IN OUTER SUBURBAN MELBOURNE (2009). 
180  E.g., ANDREW MACINTOSH & RICHARD DENNISS, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT:SHOULD FARMERS HAVE A RIGHT TO COMPENSATION? (Austl. Inst. 
2004), https://www.tai.org.au/sites/default/files/DP74_8.pdf. 
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incidental to efficient and commercially viable primary 
production.”181  It limits the power of courts to order the complete 
cessation of the activity at stake.182  On the other hand, for farming 
activities not to constitute a nuisance, a number of conditions must 
be fulfilled, including the condition that “the activity is not being 
improperly or negligently carried out.” 183   Moreover, farming 
activities must respect state and Commonwealth laws and council by-
laws,184 and they cannot derogate from “the operation or effect of any 
other Act.”185  In other terms, environmental regulation may still 
apply.  In light of these caveats, it is surprising that the Tasmanian 
Environmental Management and Pollution Control Act of 1994 
provides that an activity that conforms with the state’s right-to-farm 
law does not constitute an environmental nuisance. 186   When 
reviewing the Primary Industries Activities Protection Act in 2014, 
the Tasmanian government expressed its intent “to strengthen the 
legal protection of farmers” in the future.187 
 
While Tasmania is, as mentioned, the only Australian state 
that has adopted a right-to-farm law, other states have recently 
witnessed similar legislative proposals.  In New South Wales, 
member of the state parliament, Don Page, introduced the Protection 
of Agricultural Production (Right-to-Farm) Bill in 2005, which is 
based on similar concerns as those that led to the enactment of right-
to-farm legislation in Tasmania and in the US.188  However, the Bill 
did not garner enough support in the state parliament.189  Meanwhile, 
farmers in New South Wales continue to lobby for such a right.190  
The government has adopted a “right-to-farm policy” to respond to 
these concerns and to address land use conflicts.191 
 
181 Primary Industries Activities Protection Act 1995 (Tas.) (Austl.). 
182 Id. at s 5(1). 
183 Id. at s 4(d). 
184 Id. at s 3(1). 
185 Id. at s 6. 
186 Environmental Management and Pollution Control Act 1994 (Tas.) s 53(5)(b)(i) 
(Austl.); see also GRIFFITH, supra note 177, at 11–12. 
187  DEP’T OF PRIMARY INDUS., supra note 179, at 9; see generally AUSTRALIAN 
NETWORK OF ENVTL. DEF. OFFICES INC., SUBMISSION TO THE PRODUCTIVITY 
COMMISSION ON REGULATION OF AGRICULTURE: ISSUES PAPER (2015). 
188  Protection of Agricultural Production (Right to Farm) Bill 2005 (N.S.W.) 
(Austl.); see also GRIFFITH, supra note 177, at 13–15 (showing the similarity of  the 
clauses used in the legislation).  
189 GRIFFITH, supra note 177, at 13. 
190  Nicola Bell & Samantha Noon, NSW Farmers Want Their Right to Farm 
Enshrined in Law, NSW FARMERS (Jan. 2019), http://www.nswfarmers.org.au/NSW 
FA/Posts/The_Farmer/Rural_Affairs/NSW_farmers_want_their_right_to_farm_ens
hrined_in_law.aspx. 
191  See Right to Farm Policy, N.S.W. GOV’T DEP’T OF PRIMARY INDUS., 
https://www.dpi.nsw.gov.au/agriculture/lup/legislation-and-policy/right-to-farm-po 
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In South Australia, member of the state legislative council 
Robert Brokenshire repeatedly proposed the adoption of US-inspired 
right-to-farm legislation.192  One of the stated goals of the bill is to 
“ensure that protected farming activities are not subject to civil or 
criminal liability under environmental legislation.”193  So far, none 
of Brokenshire’s proposals have been endorsed by the state 
parliament, but farmers are pushing for the right-to-farm to be 
recognized by the law.194 
 
Further steps have been taken in order to protect farmers’ 
rights in Australia.  One example is the Intergovernmental 
Agreement on a National Water Initiative. 195   This agreement—
between the Commonwealth of Australia and the governments of the 
Australian Capital Territory, New South Wales, the Northern 
Territory, Queensland, South Australia, and Victoria—grants 
farmers a right to compensation when the amount of water they need 
to irrigate their fields is restricted by environmental policy. 196  
Moreover, farming lobbies have sought to obtain a statutory right to 
compensation for environmental measures. They have done so by 
drawing on the Inquiry Report published by the Australian 
government’s Productivity Commission in 2004. 197   This report 
states:  
 
[T]he wider public should bear the costs of actions 
to promote public-good environmental services—
such as biodiversity, threatened species preservation 
and greenhouse gas abatement—that it apparently 
 
licy (last visited Dec. 30, 2019). 
192 See GRIFFITH, supra note 177, at 16–18 (explaining the bill was also introduced 
in 2009, 2010, 2012, and 2015). 
193 Right to Farm Bill 2012 (S. Austl.) ss 4–5 (Austl.). 
194 Tom Nancarrow & Sowaibah Hanifie, Land Clash: Farmers Battle Urban Creep 
With ‘Right to Farm’ Legislation, ABC RURAL (Mar. 13, 2018, 12:13 AM), 
https://www.abc.net.au/news/rural/2018-03-13/sa-growers-push-for-right-to-farm-l 
egislation-amid-urbanisation/95433062019. 
195  Intergovernmental Agreement On a National Water Initiative Between the 
Commonwealth of Australia and the Governments of New South Wales, Victoria, 
Queensland, South Australia, the Australian Capital Territory and the Northern 
Territory, AUSTRALIAN GOV’T DEP’T OF AGRIC. (June 25, 2004), 
https://www.agriculture.gov.au/sites/default/files/sitecollectiondocuments/water/Int
ergovernmental-Agreement-on-a-national-water-initiative.pdf.  
196  See, e.g., id. at ¶ 50.  But cf. MACINTOSH & DENNISS, supra note 180, at 2 
(providing a critical appraisal of the intergovernmental agreement).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
197 E.g., MACINTOSH & DENNISS, supra note 180, at 2.  The Productivity Commission 
is an independent body advising the Australian government on a range of issues 
pertaining to industry.  See Productivity Commission Act 1998 (Cth) (Austl.) 
(defining the functions of the Commission). 
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demands, and which are likely to impinge 
significantly on the capacity of landholders to utilise 
their land for production.198 
 
It is also important to stress that farmed animals are, in 
practice, excluded from the scope of Australian animal welfare 
legislation.  Since the 1980s, the Australian states and territories have 
typically been regulating farmed animal welfare in codes.  These 
codes are often based on Model Codes of Practice elaborated by 
federal and local industries ministers.199  Yet, Steven White notes 
that such codes are significantly less protective of animals than 
standard animal welfare legislation because farmers are among the 
issuers of the codes and they themselves are not legally obliged to 
comply with the codes.200  More generally, scholars highlight that the 
regulation of factory farming is hampered by lobbying efforts of the 
farming industry and conflicts of interest on the part of the 
regulators.201  A further issue is the use of indeterminate language, 
which leaves considerable discretion to decisionmakers and may 
serve the interests of the factory farming industry.202 
 
A contrary trend to these laws and legislative proposals 
consists in limiting farmers’ rights—or at least in not taking those 
rights for granted.  Such a tendency is observed in the state of 
Victoria, where the Sales of Land Amendment Act 2014 provides 
that prospective purchasers of land must be given a due diligence 
checklist.203  The checklist recommends that potential buyers of land 
in a rural zone assess whether the “surrounding land use [is] 
compatible with [their] lifestyle expectations . . .”204 
 
198  PRODUCTIVITY COMM’N, IMPACTS OF NATIVE VEGETATION AND BIODIVERSITY 
REGULATIONS: PRODUCTIVITY COMMISSION INQUIRY REPORT NO. 29 
(Commonwealth of Austl. 2004), https://www.pc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/000 
5/49235/nativevegetation.pdf; MACINTOSH & DENNISS, supra note 180, at 8. 
199 Arnja Dale, Animal Welfare Codes and Regulations–The Devil in Disguise?, in  
ANIMAL LAW IN AUSTRALASIA 174 (Peter White et al. eds., 2d ed. 2013).  
200  Steven White, Regulation of Animal Welfare in Australia and the Emergent 
Commonwealth: Entrenching the Traditional Approach of the States and Territories 
or Laying the Ground for Reform? 35 FED. L. REV. 347, 355 (2007); see also Bruce 
& Faunce, supra note 174, at 381. 
201  Jed Goodfellow, Regulatory Capture and the Welfare of Farm Animals in 
Australia, in ANIMAL LAW AND WELFARE–INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 195, 195 
(Deborah Cao & Steven White eds., 2016); Elizabeth Ellis, Making Sausages & Law: 
The Failure of Animal Welfare Laws to Protect Both Animals and Fundamental 
Tenets of Australia’s Legal System, 4 AUSTL. ANIMAL PROTECTION L. J. 6, 9 (2010). 
202 Ellis, supra note 201, at 8. 
203 Sales of Land Amendment Act 2014 (Vict.) s 5 (Austl.). 
204 Due Diligence Checklist–for Home and Residential Property Buyers, CONSUMER 
AFFAIRS VICT., https://www.consumer.vic.gov.au/duediligencechecklist (last visited 
Nov. 26, 2019); see also Sales of Land Amendment Act 2014 (Vict.) s 5 (Austl.); see 
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   Notwithstanding, the Australian legal landscape paints an 
overall dreadful picture: the various measures and compensatory 
claims in place to protect farmers neglect to recognize that the 
environment is a public good.  This is all the more worrisome given 
Australian farmers’ intent to further intensify their production to 
meet an ever-growing global demand (especially in Asia) for animal 
products.205  Another obstacle is the multilayered and fragmented 
character of the Australian regulatory framework pertaining to 
animals.206 
 
D.  European Union 
 
In contrast to the other jurisdictions under scrutiny in this 
paper, right-to-farm legislation is, by and large, foreign to EU law.  
One important explanation for this is that agriculture and fisheries 
are a shared competence between the EU and its member states,207 
and the EU can only act pursuant to the principle of conferral.208  
Moreover, when comparing agricultural policies in and outside the 
EU, and more generally across states, one component to factor in is 
the demand for environmental regulation tailored to the 
characteristics of the agriculture of one state or group of states.209  
The present subsection examines how EU law regulates the activity 
of CAFOs.  It focuses on the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP), which represents a substantial share of the EU budget.210  It 
also examines EU laws on animal welfare, which apply to animals in 
CAFOs.   
 
The CAP, the establishment of which dates back to the 
Treaty of Rome, has undergone various changes since the late 
 
also New Landholders, AGRIC. VICT., http://agriculture.vic.gov.au/agriculture/farm-
management/business-management/new-landholders (last visited Nov. 26, 2019) 
(drawing the attention of prospective purchasers to their legal obligations and 
recommending sustainable land management). 
205 Bruce & Faunce, supra note 174, at 366.  
206 Id. at 389. 
207 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
art. 4(2)(d), June 7, 2016, 2016 O.J. (C 202) 47. 
208 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, arts. 4–5, June 7, 2016, 
2016 O.J. (C 202) 13. 
209 For instance, Rajsic et al. note that “the demand for agricultural environmental 
regulation in countries like the Netherlands and Belgium might be much more 
intense than would be the case in relatively low nutrient intensity agricultures like 
Australia, Argentina and Canada.ˮ  Rajsic et al., supra note 157, at 61. 
210  See Reform of the Common Agricultural Policy Post 2013, EUROPEAN COUNCIL, 
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/cap-reform/# (last visited Nov. 25, 
2019) (noting that the CAP policy for 2014-2020 takes up 38% of the EU’s overall 
budget, but that the percentage should drop over the next few years). 
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1950s.211  Initially, reforms were primarily aimed at improving the 
economic efficiency of farming—for instance, by encouraging large-
scale agriculture. 212   More recently, the CAP has shifted to 
incorporate non-economic concerns, including health, social 
concerns, animal welfare, and environmental considerations.213  One 
important reform occurred in 2003 with the adoption of the Single 
Payment Scheme (granting direct payments to farmers) and the 
decoupling of subsidies from the types (and quantities) of crops 
produced. 214   Instead, payments became contingent on farmers 
complying with specific environmental, animal welfare, and food 
safety standards (this process is known as “cross-compliance”).215  
 
The last reform of the CAP entered into force in 2014 and 
covers the period of 2014-2020.216   It provides for the so-called 
“greening” of farm payments, i.e., the financial encouragement of 
agricultural businesses that are “beneficial for the climate and the 
environment.”217  It also seeks to reduce inequalities between small-
scale and large-scale farming, e.g., by introducing a cap on subsidies 
for farms exceeding a specific size.218  
 
 
211 Both the official webpage of the Directorate General for Agriculture and Rural 
Development and the webpage of the Commissioner for Agriculture and Rural 
Development provide today’s focus of the CAP.  Agriculture and Rural 
Development, EUROPEAN COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/info/departments/agricultu 
re-and-rural-development_en (last visited Nov. 25, 2019); Commissioner of the 
Agriculture & Rural Development, EUROPEAN COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/comm 
ission/commissioners/2014-2019/hogan_en (last visited Nov. 25, 2019).  
212 E.g., Memorandum on the Reform of Agriculture in the European Economic 
Community and Annexes, at ¶¶ 36, 89, COM (68), 1000 Parts A and B (Dec. 18, 
1968), https://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/sites/agriculture/files/cap-history/crisis-years 
-1970s/com68-1000_en.pdf.  
213 Alicia Epstein, The Ecological and Perpetual Dimensions of European Food 
Security: The Case for Sustainable Agriculture, in AGRICULTURAL LAW CURRENT 
ISSUES FROM A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 19, 20 (Mariagrazia Alabrese et al. eds., 2017).  
214 Id. at 34. 
215 Id. at 32. 
216 EUROPEAN COUNCIL, supra note 210. 
217 Regulation 1307/2013, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 
December 2013 on Establishing Rules for Direct Payments to Farmers Under 
Support Schemes Within the Framework of the Common Agricultural Policy and 
Repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 637/2008 and Council Regulation (EC) No 
73/2009, 2013 O.J. (L 347) 608, art. 37 [hereinafter Regulation 1307/2013].  But cf. 
CHARLES E. HANRAHAN & JEFFREY ZINN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32624, GREEN 
PAYMENTS IN THE U.S. AND EUROPEAN UNION AGRICULTURAL POLICY 1–21 (2005), 
https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metacrs9126/m1/1/high_res_d/RL32624_
2005Nov22.pdf (providing a skeptical view on whether the European model can 
inspire other jurisdictions to adopt the same legislations, as it is unclear whether 
some aspects of EU policy, such as cross-compliance, could garner enough political 
support elsewhere, for example in the US). 
218 Regulation 1307/2013, supra note 217, at art. 11(1). 
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The CAP has been criticized on several counts. 219  With 
respect to the 2014 amendments, Diane Ryland notes that “[t]he 
reformed CAP instruments are disappointing in that they do not aim 
explicitly and directly to improve farm animal welfare.”220  Others 
criticize the fact that the CAP leads to deforestation221 and other 
types of environmental degradation,222 or that it does not sufficiently 
support small-scale farming.223  Another point is that the CAP does 
not prohibit specific practices. Instead, it merely creates incentives 
for farmers to conform to specific environmental and animal welfare 
standards. 
 
In 2018, the EU Commission published regulatory proposals 
to “modernize and simplify” the CAP for 2021-2027.224 The budget 
proposed for this period is expected to represent close to one-third of 
the total EU budget.225  The Commission’s proposal moves away 
from a “one-size-fits-all” approach to a more flexible scheme, 
allowing Members States to better account for local specificities.226  
It puts greater emphasis on environmental goals and on fighting 
climate change.  Through the new CAP, the Commission also seeks 
to encourage “small and medium sized family farms.”227  At the time 
of writing, the EU institutions were debating the new CAP.228  The 
extent to which the proposal will be accepted and implemented 
remains to be seen. 
 
Several EU legal instruments deal with animal welfare in 
CAFOs.  One example is the Directive 98/58/EC,229 which regulates 
 
219 See, e.g., FRIENDS OF THE EARTH EUR., A NEW FOOD AND AGRICULTURE POLICY 
FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION (2010), https://www.foeeurope.org/sites/default/files/cap 
_pp_full_final1.pdf (highlighting the range of problems caused by CAFOs in the 
EU). 
220 Diane Ryland, Animal Welfare in the Reformed Common Agricultural Policy: 
Wherefore Art Thou?, 17 ENVTL. L. REV. 22, 22 (2015). 
221  E.g., Markus Sommerauer, Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the EU, 
FLEGT and REDD+, FOREST INDUS., http://www.forestindustries.eu/content/comm 
on-agricultural-policy-cap-eu-flegt-and-redd (last visited Nov. 23, 2019). 
222 Epstein, supra note 213, at 20.  
223  E.g., FRIENDS OF THE EARTH, BRIEFING: FACTORY FARMING IN EUROPE: THE 
IMPACTS AND OUR DEMANDS OF THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY 2 (2012), 
https://www.foe.co.uk/sites/default/files/downloads/cap_briefing_2012.pdf. 
224  See EUROPEAN COMM’N , EU BUDGET: THE CAP AFTER 2020 (2018), 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/budget-may2018-moderni 
sing-cap_en.pdf (providing a summary). 
225 Id. at 1. 
226 Id. at 1. 
227 Id. at 3. 
228See, e.g., Future of the CAP Post 2020, EUR. COUNCIL, https://www.consilium.eu 
ropa.eu/en/policies/cap-future-2020/ (last visited Nov. 23, 2019) (providing a 
timeline of the CAP progression).  
229 Council Directive 98/58, 1998 O.J. (L 221) 23.  
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the protection of animals kept for farming purposes.  The Directive 
in a general manner states that the EU Members States “shall ensure 
that the conditions under which animals . . . are bred or kept, having 
regard to their species and to their degree of development, adaptation 
and domestication, and to their physiological and ethological needs 
in accordance with established experience and scientific knowledge, 
comply with the provisions set out in the Annex.”230  The Directive 
has been subject of extensive literature, which we do not want to 
replicate here.231  It suffices to note that the Directive “cleaned up 
around the edges,”232 but by and large failed to change the status quo, 
namely that animals are industrially produced and killed by the 
billions. 233   Moreover, the Directive does not deal with other 
externalities caused by CAFOs, such as their effects on the 
environment or human rights affected by their operation. 
 
EU norms on organic farming address some concerns 
relating to animal welfare. 234   Regulation 834/2007 on Organic 
Production and Labelling of Organic Products defines organic 
production as: 
 
[A]n overall system of farm management and food 
production that combines best environmental 
practices, a high level of biodiversity, the 
preservation of natural resources, the application of 
high animal welfare standards[,] and a production 
method in line with the preference of certain 
consumers for products produced using natural 
substances and processes.235   
 
 
230 Id. art. 4. 
231  E.g., Magdalena Gajdzinska, Implementation of Council Directive 98/58/EC 
Concerning the Protection of Animals Kept for Farming Purposes, EUROPEAN ENF’T 
NETWORK (Sept. 8, 2016), http://www.lawyersforanimalprotection.eu/2016/09/08/i 
mplementation-of-council-directive-9858ec-concerning-the-protection-of-animals-
kept-for-farming-purposes/.  
232  THOMAS G. KELCH, GLOBALIZATION AND ANIMAL LAW: COMPARATIVE LAW, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 99 (2d ed. 2017).  
233 See, e.g., CHARLOTTE E. BLATTNER, PROTECTING ANIMALS WITHIN AND ACROSS 
BORDERS: EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION AND THE CHALLENGES OF 
GLOBALIZATION 345–46 (Oxford Univ. Press 2019). 
234 Council Regulation (EC) No 834/2007 of June 28, 2007 on Organic Production 
and Labelling of Organic Products and Repealing Council Regulation (EEC) No 
2092/91, 2007 O.J. (L 189) 1 [hereinafter Council Regulation 834/2007]; 
Commission Regulation (EC) 889/2008 of 5 September 2008 Laying Down Detailed 
Rules for the Implementation of Council Regulation (EC) No. 834/2007 on Organic 
Production and Labelling of Organic Products with Regard to Organic Production, 
Labelling and Control, 2008 O.J. (L 250) 1. 
235 Council Regulation 834/2007, supra note 234, at recital 1 (emphasis added).  
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Yet, these norms only aim at regulating organic production 
and labelling; they do not impose mandatory standards on all 
farmers. 
 
IV.  How Farmers’ Rights Threaten Human Rights 
Guarantees 
 
In this section, we examine how farmers’ rights (rather than 
agriculture itself), including right-to-farm laws and other legislation 
exempting animal agribusiness, threaten and even violate human 
rights.  For reasons of scope, we limit our analysis to five rights: the 
right to food (Part A), the right to water and sanitation (Part B), the 
right to a safe environment (Part C), the emerging right to land (Part 
D), and the right to animal protection (Part E).  However, it is 
important to note that many other human rights, such as the right to 
privacy, home, and family life, may be affected by these laws as well. 
 
A.  Right to Food 
 
The right to food has been described as one of “the least 
realized human rights”236 and even as “the most violated human right 
worldwide.”237  It is rejected by major global players such as the 
US 238  and deemed non-justiciable by states such as Canada. 239  
While European states tend to support the right to food abroad, they 
are much more cautious to implement this right within their own 
jurisdiction.240  Moreover, as highlighted by the Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the right to food is often 
misunderstood.241  Yet the right to food is protected by the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)242 and guaranteed by various 
 
236  Kerstin Mechlem, Food, Right to, International Protection, in MAX PLANCK 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (Rüdiger Wolfrum Online 2017). 
237 See The Most Violated Human Right Worldwide: The Right to Food, CIVIL SOC’Y 
& INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ MECHANISM FOR RELATIONS WITH UN COMM. ON WORLD 
FOOD SECURITY (Oct. 12, 2018), http://www.csm4cfs.org/violated-human-right-worl 
dwide-right-food/.  
238 The US is not a party to the ICESCR, which guarantees the right to adequate food.  
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 
993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR]; see Sandra Raponi, A Defense of the Human 
Right to Adequate Food, 23 RES PUBLICA 99–100 (2017); see also Eve Garrow & 
Jack Day, Strengthening the Human Right to Food, 7 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 275–76 
(2017) (discussing food security in the United States). 
239  See, e.g., Priscilla Claeys, The Right to Food: Many Developments, More 
Challenges, 2 CAN. FOOD STUD. 60 (2015). 
240 Jose Luis Vivero Pol & Claudio Schuftan, No Right to Food and Nutrition in the 
SDGs: Mistake or Success?, 1 BMJ GLOBAL HEALTH 1, 3 (2016). 
241 See Fact Sheet No. 34, supra note 18, at 3. 
242 G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 25(1) (1948) 
[hereinafter UDHR]. 
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international human rights treaties, 243  including the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),244 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC),245 the Convention 
on the Elimination of All Form of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW),246 and the Convention on the Rights of Persons With 
Disabilities (CRPD).247  Many of the UN human rights treaty bodies 
have dealt with this right, 248  and the Human Rights Council has 
called upon states to protect it.249  Scholars endorse the right to food 
as well. 250   Some commentators point to several UN General 
Assembly resolutions that acknowledge the existence of the right to 
food 251  to argue that this right has the status of customary 
international law,252 and the OHCHR considers that “at least freedom 
from hunger can be considered as a norm of international customary 
law.”253  All in all, human rights lawyers converge in saying that the 
right to food is one of the most fundamental human rights.254 
 
Article 11 ICESCR, upon which we focus in this subsection, 
“deals more comprehensively”255 with this right in international law.  
It states that the parties to the Covenant “recognize the right of 
everyone to . . . adequate food.”256  Moreover, it provides that states 
commit to “improve methods of production . . . of food,” inter alia 
 
243  See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R OF HUMAN RIGHTS, International 
Standards, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Food/Pages/Standards.aspx (last visited 
Dec. 30, 2019) (providing a list of internationals standards and rights). 
244 We do not focus on the right to be free from hunger, which is also guaranteed by 
the ICESCR.  ICESCR, supra note 238, art. 11(2). 
245 Convention on the Rights of the Child, arts. 24(2)(c),(e), 27(3), Nov. 20, 1989, 
1577 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CRC]. 
246 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 
art. 12(2), Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW]. 
247 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, art. 25(f), Dec. 13, 2006, 
2515 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CRPD]. 
248 See Fact Sheet No. 34, supra note 18, at 34–35. 
249 See Human Rights Council Res. 7/14, ¶ 8 (Mar. 27, 2008). 
250 Ana Ayala & Benjamin Mason Meier, A Human Rights Approach to the Health 
Implications of Food & Nutrition Insecurity, 38 PUB. HEALTH REV. 1 (2017); Vivero 
Pol & Schuftan, supra note 240, at 1; Garrow & Day, supra note 238, at 275; Naomi 
Hossain & Dolf te Lintelo, A Common Sense Approach to the Right to Food, 10 J. 
HUM. RTS. PRAC. 367 (2018) (discussing how an understanding of the right to food 
is shared across different cultures). 
251 G.A. Res. 71/191 The Right to Food (Jan. 18, 2017). 
252 Mechlem, supra note 236, at 13. 
253 See Fact Sheet No. 34, supra note 18, at 9. 
254 See, e.g., Hilal Elver (Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food), Interim Report 
on the Right to Food, U.N. Doc. A/72/188, ¶ 5 (July 21, 2017). 
255 U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 12: The 
Right to Adequate Food, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/5 (May 12, 1999) [hereinafter 
General Comment 12]. 
256 ICESCR, supra note 238, art. 11(1).  
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“by developing or reforming agrarian systems in such a way as to 
achieve the most efficient development and utilization of natural 
resources.”257  Pursuant to article 2(1) ICESCR, states have a duty of 
progressive realization with respect to this right.258  They cannot 
discriminate against specific groups of individuals when giving 
effect to the right to food (article 2(2) ICESCR), nor can they take 
so-called retrogressive measures impairing its realization.259 
 
It is widely held that agriculture is necessary to realize the 
right to food.260  On this basis, one could consider that guaranteeing 
the right to food requires maintaining and further developing existing 
agricultural practices, including industrial animal agriculture 
businesses.  However, several arguments show that this assumption 
is treacherous and actually prevents states from complying with their 
duty to respect, protect, and fulfill261 the right to food.  As the UN 
Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights has stressed, 
the concepts of adequacy, sustainability, availability, and 
accessibility are central to the right to food.262  For our purposes, 
adequacy and sustainability are particularly important.263 
 
In regards to adequacy, the UN Committee on Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights has noted:  
 
 
257 Id. at art. 11(2). 
258 Id. at art. 2(1). 
259  Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Food/Pages/FoodIndex.aspx (last 
visited Dec. 30, 2019). 
260  See, e.g., Kerstin Mechlem, Harmonizing Trade in Agriculture and Human 
Rights: Options for the Integration of the Right to Food Into the Agreement on 
Agriculture, 10 MAX PLANCK YEARBOOK OF U.N.  L. 127 (2006); see Fact Sheet No. 
34, supra note 18, at 10; see also Jean Ziegler (Special Rapporteur on the Right to 
Food), Rep. of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the 
Right to Food, ¶ 22, U.N. Doc. A/57/356 (Aug. 27, 2002) [hereinafter U.N. Doc. 
A/57/356] (emphasizing the importance of access to land); Olivier de Schutter 
(Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food), Interim Rep. of the Special Rapporteur 
on the Right to Food, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/66/262 (Aug. 4, 2011) [hereinafter U.N. Doc. 
A/66/262]. 
261 See, e.g., Mechlem, supra note 236, at 19; see also HENRY SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS: 
SUBSISTENCE, AFFLUENCE, AND US FOREIGN POLICY (Princeton Univ. Press 1980). 
262  General Comment 12, supra note 255, ¶ 7; see also Hilal Elver (Special 
Rapporteur on the Right to Food), Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur on the 
Right to Food, U.N. Doc. A/70/287 (Aug. 5, 2015) [hereinafter U.N. Doc. A/70/287]. 
263 However, other aspects are relevant as well, considering that the UN Committee 
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights has stated that the “roots of the problem 
of hunger and malnutrition are not lack of food but lack of access to available food.”  
Meat production, in particular, deprives individuals from crops and other plant-based 
food because these products are fed to animals in large quantities rather than being 
directly used to feed local populations.  See  General  Comment 12,  supra  note  255,  
¶ 5. 
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[T]he right to adequate food implies: [t]he 
availability of food in a quantity and quality 
sufficient to satisfy the dietary needs of individuals, 
free from adverse substances, and acceptable within 
a given culture; [t]he accessibility of such food in 
ways that are sustainable and that do not interfere 
with the enjoyment of other human rights.264   
 
It has further stated that the meaning of adequacy is “to a 
large extent determined by prevailing social, economic, cultural, 
climatic, ecological and other conditions.”265  As previously stated in 
the  introductory  section,266  the  prevailing  animal  agricultural 
production methods (CAFOs) create massive negative externalities 
from an environmental perspective, which puts into question their 
adequacy as a means to guarantee the right to food. 
 
Similarly, sustainability, which can be defined as the 
accessibility of food for both present and future generations, 267 
supports abandoning agricultural products that are major drivers of 
climate change and that jeopardize food security. 268  It has been 
shown, in this context, that meat production consumes particularly 
large amounts of resources (e.g., water, energy, and land) compared 
to plant-based diets.  For instance, the production of 1 kg of beef 
meat consumes over 15,400 liters of water.269 The water footprint of 
the same quantity (1 kg) of rice consumes 2,497 liters; 1 kg of cereals 
uses 1,644 liters; and 1 kg of potatoes requires 287 liters.270  Because 
 
264 Id. ¶ 8. 
265 Id. ¶ 7. 
266 See supra Part I. 
267 See General Comment 12, supra note 255, ¶ 7. 
268 See U.N. Doc. A/70/287, supra note 262, ¶ 41. 
269  Water Footprint of Crop and Animal Products: A Comparison, WATER 
FOOTPRINT NETWORK, https://waterfootprint.org/en/water-footprint/product-water-
footprint/water-footprint-crop-and-animal-products/ (last visited Dec. 10, 2019); see 
also How Much Water Is Needed to Produce Food and How Much Do We Waste?, 
THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 10, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2013/ 
jan/10/how-much-water-food-production-waste#data; see also How Much Water 
Does It Take to Produce Meat?, THE CATTLE SITE (Apr. 26, 2016), 
http://www.thecattlesite.com/news/49594/how-much-water-does-it-take-to-produce 
-meat/; ANKE SONNENBERG ET AL., DER WASSER-FUSSABDRUCK DEUTSCHLANDS 7 
(WWF 2009), http://www.wwf.de/fileadmin/fm-wwf/Publikationen-PDF/wwf_stud 
ie_wasserfussabdruck.pdf (last visited on Oct. 14, 2019). 
270 WATER FOOTPRINT NETWORK, supra note 269; see also THE GUARDIAN, supra 
note 269.  The Water Footprint Network is a non-profit organization which, to date, 
constitutes the main source of information in terms of the water used to produce 
various goods.  See also Global Water Footprint Standard, WATER FOOTPRINT 
NETWORK, https://waterfootprint.org/en/water-footprint/global-water-footprint-stan 
dard/ (last visited Dec. 15, 2019) (providing the methodology used in this context).  
While some methodological concerns remain, the water footprint standard is widely 
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meat-based diets are so nutritionally inefficient and unsustainable, 
animal agricultural production greatly inhibits states’ ability to 
ensure food security in the long term.  As Alex Bruce and Thomas 
Faunce put it, animal farming has a highly damaging “environmental 
domino effect.”271   
 
Civil society actors are increasingly highlighting that a 
rational solution to world hunger would consist of shifting toward a 
plant-based diet.272  A report of the UN Environmental Programme 
published in 2010 reached the same conclusion, stating:  
 
Impacts from agriculture are expected to increase 
substantially due to population growth increasing 
consumption of animal products.  Unlike fossil 
fuels, it is difficult to look for alternatives: people 
have to eat.  A substantial reduction of impacts 
would only be possible with a substantial worldwide 
diet change, away from animal products.273 
 
Despite compelling evidence regarding the environmental 
and human rights benefits of a plant-based diet, the UN Special 
Rapporteurs on the right to food have thus far refrained from 
explicitly describing an adequate diet as primarily plant-based—or 
even as based on the consumption of little meat.  This omission might 
be owed to political and strategic reasons given that the Rapporteurs 
readily highlight the health benefits of consuming fruit and 
vegetables 274  and that they stress the health and other (including 
food-supply) problems created by increasing meat consumption.275  
The Rapporteurs have also pointed to the negative nutritional effects 
of industrial food, which is typically the product of factory 
 
regarded as directionally accurate.  See Jonathan Chenoweth, Michalis Hadjikakou 
& Christos Zoumides, Quantifying the Human Impact on Water Resources: A 
Critical Review of the Water Footprint Concept, 18 HYDROLOGY & EARTH SYS. SCI. 
2325, 2337 (2014). 
271 Bruce & Faunce, supra note 174, at 385. 
272 Nachhaltige Ernährung, SENTIENCE POLITICS, https://sentience-politics.org/de/po 
sitionspapiere/nachhaltige-ernaehrung-ch (last visited Dec. 15, 2019). 
273See UNEP, supra note 31, at 82; see also HARALD VON WITZKE, STEFFEN NOLEPPA 
& INGA ZHIRKOVA, FLEISCH FRISST LAND: ERNÄHRUNGSWEISEN FLEISCHKONSUM 
FLÄCHENVERBRAUCH (WWF 2014), https://www.wwf.de/fileadmin/fm-wwf/Publik 
ationen-PDF/WWF_Fleischkonsum_web.pdf. 
274 See, e.g., Olivier de Schutter (Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food), Rep. of 
the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/19/59 (Dec. 26, 
2011). 
275 Olivier de Schutter (Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food), Rep. of the Special 
Rapporteur on the Right to Food, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc A/HRC/16/49 (Dec. 20, 2010) 
[hereinafter U.N. Doc. A/HRC/16/49]. 
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farming,276 and they have recommended shifting away from this type 
of industrial agricultural production. 277   They have further 
emphasized states’ obligation to respect farmers’ right to food.278  
However, instead of advocating for changing food habits, the UN 
Special Rapporteurs have primarily recommended relying on 
agroecology as an alternative to industrial agriculture.279  They have 
stressed that article 11 ICESCR calls for small-scale farming in light 
of the benefits that this type of farming generates, e.g., in terms of 
employment, sustainability, and non-discrimination of vulnerable 
populations.280 
 
As scholars note, “[a] strong linkage exists between the right 
to food, sustainable agriculture, and sustainable soil 
management.”281  Goal 2 of the UN’s 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development states that the UN members undertake to “end hunger, 
achieve food security and improved nutrition[,] and promote 
sustainable agriculture.”282  Similarly, the FAO recommends that 
“[s]tates should assist farmers and other primary producers to follow 
good agricultural practices,” so as to ensure the progressive 
realization of the right to adequate food.283 
 
In view of the aforementioned observations, however, 
profound reforms of current agricultural practices, and especially of 
factory farming, appear necessary to guarantee the right to food.  
 
276 Hilal Elver (Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food), Interim Rep. on the Right 
to Food, ¶¶ 22, 23, U.N. Doc. A/71/282 (Aug. 3, 2016) [hereinafter U.N. Doc. 
A/71/282]; Hilal Elver (Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food), Interim Rep. on 
the Right to Food, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. A/73/164 (July 16 2018). 
277 U.N. Doc. A/71/282, supra note 276, ¶ 92. 
278 Id. 
279  See U.N. Doc. A/HRC/16/49, supra note 275 (on agroecology); see also 
Anastasia Telesetsky, Fulfilling the Human Right to Food and a Healthy 
Environment: Is It Time for an Agroecological and Aquaecological Revolution?, 40 
VT. L. REV. 791, 806–07 (2016). 
280 U.N.  Doc.  A/66/262,  supra  note  260;  U.N.  Doc.  A/57/356,  supra  note  260,  
¶¶ 22–42; Olivier de Schutter (Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food), Interim 
Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, ¶¶ 27–38, U.N. Doc. A/65/281 
(Aug. 11, 2010) [hereinafter U.N. Doc. A/65/281]; Human Rights Council, Rep. of 
the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, ¶ 104, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/34/48 (Jan. 
24, 2017). 
281  Tina Beuchelt et al., The Human Right to Food and Sustainable Soil 
Management: Linking Voluntary Agricultural Sustainability Standards with Food 
Security, in INTERNATIONAL YEARBOOK OF SOIL LAW AND POLICY 2016 237, 242 
(Harald Ginzky et al. eds., 2017). 
282 G.A. Res. 70/1, Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development, at 14 (Sept. 25, 2015) [hereinafter G.A. Res. 70/1] (emphasis added). 
283  See FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., VOLUNTARY GUIDELINES ON THE PROGRESSIVE 
REALIZATION OF THE RIGHT TO ADEQUATE FOOD IN THE CONTEXT OF NATIONAL FOOD 
SECURITY 20 (2005), http://www.fao.org/3/a-y7937e.pdf. 
2019]               AGRICULTURAL EXCEPTIONALISM               133 
 
Indeed, “[i]ndustrial agriculture and fishing practices encourage the 
waste of natural capital, such as soil, and violate the human right-to-
food.”284  By contrast, plant-based diets “could play an important 
role in preserving environmental resources and reducing hunger and 
malnutrition in poorer nations.”285  This issue needs to be addressed 
urgently, not least because of the steady growth of the global human 
population and its reliance (and dependence) on finite resources.   
 
B.  Right to Water and Sanitation 
 
The CEDAW, adopted in 1979, is the first international 
human rights treaty to have mentioned the right to water and 
sanitation.286  Since then, other treaties have included this right in 
their text.287  In 2002, the UN Committee on Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights stated that this right is contained in article 11 
ICESCR, which protects “the right to an adequate standard of living 
. . . including adequate food, clothing and housing.”288  Moreover, 
the Committee deems the right to water and sanitation “inextricably 
related”289 to article 12(1) ICESCR (which guarantees the right to 
health),290 article 11(1) ICESCR (which protects the right to housing 
and the right to food),291 and the right to life.292  Later, in 2010, the 
UN Human Rights Council reaffirmed these statements 293  a few 
months after the UN General Assembly had recognized the human 
 
284 Telesetsky, supra note 279, at 803. 
285 Simona Baroni et al., Evaluating the Environmental Impact of Various Dietary 
Patterns Combined with Different Food Production Systems, 61 EUROPEAN J. OF 
CLINICAL NUTRITION 279, 285 (2007), https://www.nature.com/articles/1602522.pdf. 
286 CEDAW, supra note 246, art. 14(2)(h).  
287 CRC, supra note 245, arts. 24, 27(3); CRPD, supra note 247, art. 28. 
288 U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 15: The 
Right to Water, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2002/11 (Jan. 20, 2003) [hereinafter General 
Comment 15]. 
289 Human Rights Council Res. 15/9, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/15/9, ¶ 3 (Oct. 6, 2010) 
[hereinafter HRC Res. 15/9] (“[T]he human right to safe drinking water and 
sanitation is derived from the right to an adequate standard of living and inextricably 
related to the right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, 
as well as the right to life and human dignity.”); see also Amanda Cahill, ‘The 
Human Right to Water–A Right of Unique Status:’ The Legal Status and Normative 
Content of the Right to Water, 9 INT’L J. OF HUM. RTS. 389, 391 (2005) (discussing 
the right to water as a “derivative right,” in a broader sense than in the Human Rights 
Council’s terminology).   
290 General Comment 15, supra note 288, ¶ 3.  
291 See e.g., Jean Ziegler (Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food), Rep. Submitted 
by the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food in Accordance with Commission on 
Human Rights Resolution 2002/25, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2003/54 (Jan. 10, 2003). 
292 See also Stephen McCaffrey et al., The Emergence of a Human Right to Water 
and Sanitation: The Many Challenges, 106 PROC. OF THE ASIL ANN. MEETING 43, 
46 (2012). 
293 HRC Res. 15/9, supra note 289, ¶ 3. 
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right to water and sanitation.294  Goal 6 of the UN’s Sustainable 
Development Goals is to “[e]nsure availability and sustainable 
management of water and sanitation for all.”295  However, among 
states and international lawyers, this right remains controversial,296 
and it is not deemed part of customary international law. 297  
Researchers have highlighted “the complex interplay of interests 
behind the recognition of the right to water.”298  This explains why 
the right to water and sanitation has been pictured as a right requiring 
further development and institutionalization.299 
 
Given that the right to water is “inextricably related” to the 
right to food, it comes as no surprise that agricultural practices can 
threaten this right as well.  As a matter of fact, agriculture currently 
consumes, on average, 70% of the water used worldwide.300  Animal 
agriculture absorbs a large share of this portion, since meat-based 
diets require particularly high amounts of water compared to plant-
based diets.301  For instance, in California, agriculture draws more 
than 90% of the total water, with animal agriculture consuming 
47%.302   The  substantial  water  depletion  caused  by  animal 
agriculture jeopardizes water security, which is currently under high 
 
294 U.N. GAOR, 64th Sess., 108th plen. mtg., at 9, U.N. Doc. A/64/PV.108 (July 28, 
2010); G.A. Res. 64/292, ¶ 1 (July 28, 2010). 
295 G.A. Res. 70/1, supra note 282, at 14. 
296 One manifestation of this conflict is that forty-one nations, including Australia, 
Canada, and the US, did not vote in favor of General Assembly Resolution 64/292, 
adopted on July 28, 2010.  U.N. GAOR, 64th Sess., 108th plen. mtg., at 8, 9, 11, 17, 
U.N. Doc. A/64/PV.108 (July 28, 2010); Colin Brown et al., The Human Right to 
Water and Sanitation: A New Perspective for Public Policies, 21 CIÊNCIA & SAÚDE 
COLETIVA 661, 663 (2016). 
297 E.g., Stephen McCaffrey, The Human Right to Water: A False Promise?, 47 U. 
PAC. L. REV. 221, 227, 231 (2016); George S. McGraw, Defining and Defending the 
Right to Water and Its Minimum Core: Legal Construction and the Role of National 
Jurisprudence, 8 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L. REV. 127, 143–45, 161, 189–91 (2011). 
298  JOOTAEK LEE & MARAYA BEST, THE HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER: A RESEARCH 
GUIDE & ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY 4 (Ne. U. Sch. of L. 2017), https://papers.ssrn. 
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2924632. 
299  Lady Justice Arden, Water for All? Developing a Human Right to Water in 
National and International Law, 65 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 771, 782–87 (2016).  
300 Catarina de Albuquerque (Special Rapporteur on the Right to Safe Drinking 
Water and Sanitation), Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Human Right to Safe 
Drinking Water and Sanitation in Accordance with Human Rights Council 
Resolution 16/2, ¶ 35, U.N. Doc. A/68/264 (Aug. 5, 2013) [hereinafter U.N. Doc. 
A/68/264]; see also FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., AGRICULTURE, FOOD AND WATER 17–27 
(2003) (discussing the use of water in agriculture). 
301 See Pimentel & Pimentel, supra note 55, at 660S, 662S; see generally The Water 
Footprint of Beef: Industrial vs. Pasture-Raised, WATER FOOTPRINT CALCULATOR 
(Nov. 29, 2018), https://www.https://www.watercalculator.org/water-use/water-foot 
print-beef-industrial-pasture/. 
302  JULIAN FULTON ET AL., CALIFORNIA’S WATER FOOTPRINT 3 (Pac. Inst. 2012), 
http://pacinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/ca_ftprint_full_report3.pdf. 
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threat across the world.303  While California was the first US state to 
recognize the human right to water (in 2012),304 the implementation 
of this right has been incomplete.305 
 
The FAO306 and the UN Special Rapporteurs on the Human 
Rights  to  Safe  Drinking  Water  and  Sanitation307  have  also 
highlighted the link between agriculture and environmental 
pollution—more specifically, water pollution.308  Animal agriculture 
pollutes water to a disproportionate extent compared to the 
production  of  plant-based  food, 309   notably  through  animal 
excrements, antibiotics, hormones, fertilizers, and pesticides for 
fodder cultivation.310  In the US, for instance, animal agriculture is 
responsible for 37% of all pesticides applied and 50% of all 
antibiotics consumed,311 which run off into ground and fresh water 
reserves. 312   The FAO succinctly summarizes that “the livestock 
sector has an enormous impact on water use, water quality, 
hydrology and aquatic ecosystems.”313  
 
With animal agriculure resulting in water depletion, large 
investments in animal agriculture jeopardize the human right to 
water.  This right, according to the UN Committee on Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights, requires that water be “sufficient, safe, 
acceptable, physically accessible, and affordable . . .”314  Problems 
 
303 C. J. Vörösmarty et al., Rivers in Crisis: “Global Water Insecurity for Humans 
and Biodiversity,” 467 NATURE 555 (2010). 
304 CAL. WAT. CODE § 106.3(a) (West 2013). 
305  KENA CADOR & ANGÉLICA SALCEDA, A SURVEY OF EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE 
UNIVERSAL ACCESS TO WATER AND SANITATION IN CALIFORNIA 1, 3–5, 25 (ACLU 
N. Cal. & Pac. Inst. 2018), https://www.aclunc.org/sites/default/files/SurveyReport. 
pdf. 
306 E.g., FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., supra note 300, 43–46.  
307 The initial denomination (for 2008-2014) was that of “Independent Expert on the 
issue of human rights obligations related to access to safe drinking water and 
sanitation.” This expert was appointed by the Human Rights Council in 2008.  See 
Human Rights Council Res. 7/22, ¶ 2 (Mar. 28, 2008).  The mandate was extended 
and transformed into that of a Special Rapporteur in 2011.  See HRC Res. 16/2 (Apr. 
8, 2011).  
308 U.N. Doc. A/68/264, supra note 300, ¶ 35. 
309 Leo Horrigan et al., How Sustainable Agriculture Can Address the Environmental 
and Human Health Harms of Industrial Agriculture, 110 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 
445, 445–49 (2002); Margot J. Pollans, Regulating Farming: Balancing Food Safety 
and Environmental Protection in a Cooperative Governance Scheme, 50 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 399, 404 (2015); see also FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., supra note 33, at 
125–32. 
310 Ernährung, supra note 272. 
311 FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., supra note 33, at 168.  
312 Id. at 137–39, 142–43, 145. 
313 Id. at 167. 
314 General Comment 15, supra note 288, ¶ 2 (although these terms are sometimes 
replaced by synonyms or by related adjectives). 
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arise with regard to the criterion of safety, which requires that water 
be “free from micro-organisms, chemical substances and 
radiological hazards that constitute a threat to a person’s health.”315  
Of course, when water is accessible to factory farmers to the 
detriment of local populations, the criteria of sufficiency, physical 
accessibility, and affordability are likely to be undermined as well.  
The same problems arise when water is driven away from local 
populations to meet the needs of meat production.  The end product 
is mostly consumed by individuals living in rich, minority world 
countries.  In the US, for instance, the standard food diet requires 
4,200 gallons (15,899 liters) of water per day, while a person on a 
vegan food diet only needs 300 gallons (1,136 liters) of water per 
day.316  What is more, when water is lacking, other human rights can 
be affected.  For instance, inadequate access to water has a disparate 
impact on women and girls.317  Instead of investing water resources 
into an unsustainable system that accounts for adverse and 
discriminatory effects, these resources could be used for direct 
consumption and thereby make it more likely for the human right to 
water of local and foreign populations to be guaranteed.318 
 
C.  Right to a Safe Environment 
 
The strong link between human rights and the environment 
became salient at latest in 1972, when the Stockholm Conference on 
the Human Environment issued a declaration that recognized a 
quality environment as a precondition for “a life of dignity and well-
being.” 319   As political and civil society actors increasingly 
recognized environmental protection as essential for the enjoyment 
of the right to life, health, home life, and property,320 calls for a right 
 
315 Id. ¶ 12(b). 
316 Aisling Maria Cronin, You Can Save Over 200,000 Gallons of Water a Year With 
One Simple Choice, ONE GREEN PLANET, http://www.onegreenplanet.org/environme 
nt/how-to-save-water-with-one-simple-choice/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2019). 
317 Léo Heller (Special Rapporteur), Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Human 
Right to Safe Drinking Water and Sanitation, ¶¶ 1–14, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/33/49 (July 
27, 2016). 
318 See e.g., Mark W. Rosegrant & Claudia Ringler, Impact on Food Security and 
Rural Development of Transferring Water Out of Agriculture, 6 WATER POL’Y 567 
(2000). 
319 U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, Declaration of the United Nations 
Conference on the Human Environment, at 4, princ. 1, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1(June 
 5-16, 1972); see G.A. Res. 45/94 (Dec. 14, 1990). 
320 Melissa Thorme, Establishing Environment as a Human Right, 19 DENV. J. INT’L 
L. & POL’Y 301, 310–11 (1991); Dinah Shelton, Human Rights and the Environment: 
Substantive Rights, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAW 265 (Malgosia Fitzmaurice et al. eds., 2011). 
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to a safe environment became stronger, both nationally and 
internationally.321  
 
Today, over one hundred constitutions worldwide—adopted 
since 1992—enshrine the right to a clean and healthy environment.322  
For  example,  Section  20(2)  of  the  Finnish  constitution  recognizes  
“. . . the right to a healthy environment and for everyone the 
possibility to influence the decisions that concern their own living 
environment.” 323   More than one hundred states incorporated an 
explicit right to a healthy environment in domestic environmental 
legislation, totaling 155 states that are obligated to respect, protect, 
and fulfill the right to a healthy environment under domestic law.324  
On the international level, the African Charter for Human and 
Peoples’ Rights325 and the Protocol to the  American Convention on 
Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights326 both provide for a human right to a healthy environment.  
General Comment No. 14 to article 12 of the ICCPR (which 
guarantees the right to the highest attainable standard of health) 
stipulates that “the right to health embraces a wide range of socio-
 
321  James W. Nickel, The Human Right to a Safe Environment: Philosophical 
Perspectives on Its Scope and Justification, 18 YALE J. INT’L L. 281, 281 (1993).  
322 Those include Angola, Argentina, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Brazil, 
Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chad, Chechnya, Chile, Colombia, 
Congo, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, 
Finland, Georgia, Honduras, Hungary, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Macedonia, Mali, 
Moldova, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Paraguay, 
Philippines, Portugal, Russia, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Tajikistan, Togo, Turkey, Ukraine, and 
Yugoslavia.  EarthJustice Presents 2004 ‘Human Rights and the Environment’ 
Report to UN, EARTHJUSTICE (Apr. 6, 2004), https://earthjustice.org/news/press/200 
4/earthjustice-presents-2004-human-rights-and-the-environment-report-to-un; see 
David R. Boyd (Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and the Environment), Rep. 
of the Special Rapporteur: Issue of Human Rights Obligations Relating to the 
Enjoyment of a Safe, Clean, Healthy and Sustainable Environment, ¶¶ 7–16 ,U.N. 
Doc. A/HRC/40/55 (Jan. 8, 2019) [hereinafter U.N. Doc. A/HRC/40/55]; see also 
Dinah Shelton, Human Rights and the Environment: What Specific Environmental 
Rights Have  Been  Recognized,  35   DENV.  J.  INT’L  L.  &  POL’Y 129, 164–65, 164 
 n. 172 (2008).  Some countries, like Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, and Brazil, 
guarantee this right as a fundamental individual right, while others, like Colombia, 
Costa Rica, and Nicaragua, enshrine it as a collective right.  
323 SUOMEN PERUSTUSLAKI, [CONSTITUTION], June 11, 1999, 731, § 20 (Fin.). 
324 U.N. Doc. A/HRC/40/55, supra note 322, ¶¶ 15–16. 
325 African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, art. 24, June 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 
58 [hereinafter African Charter on Human and People’s Rights] (“All peoples shall 
have the right to a general satisfactory environment favourable to their 
development.”). 
326 Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights “Protocol San Salvador” art. 11, Nov. 17, 
1988, O.A.S.T.S. No. 69, 28 I.L.M. 1641 (stating that “everyone shall have the right 
to live in a healthy environment . . .”). 
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economic factors that promote conditions in which people can lead a 
healthy life, and extends to the underlying determinates of health, 
such as . . . a healthy environment.”327  In 2003, the Council of 
Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly issued a recommendation for the 
governments of the member states of the Council of Europe to 
“recognize a human right to a healthy, viable and decent 
environment.” 328   The European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR) 329  does not expressly provide for a right to a healthy 
environment, but it covers those instances in which an unsafe 
environment threatens people’s right to life (article 2 ECHR), the 
right to privacy and family life (article 8 ECHR) and, in the ECHR’s 
Protocol No. 1, the right to property (article 1).330 
 
Though widely recognized domestically and internationally, 
the content of the right to a healthy environment is still in dispute.  
Some scholars argue for a broad definition of the right, namely as a 
right to a safe, healthy, secure, clean, sustainable, or ecologically-
balanced environment, 331  as enshrined in the constitutions of 
Honduras,332 Portugal,333 or South Korea.334  Another camp argues 
for a narrower interpretation of this right, i.e., for guaranteeing the 
right to a safe environment.335  In this view, environments must not 
 
327 U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 14: The 
Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 
(Aug. 11, 2000) [hereinafter General Comment 14].  “[I]n March 2012, the Human 
Rights Council decided to establish a mandate on human rights and the environment, 
which will (among other tasks) study the human rights obligations relating to the 
enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy, and sustainable environment, and promote best 
practices relating to the use of human rights in environmental policymaking.”  UN 
Mandate, UN SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ENVT., 
http://srenvironment.org/un-mandate (last visited Dec. 30, 2019). 
328 Eur. Parl. Ass., Environment and Human Rights, 3d Sess., Doc. No. 1614, ¶ 9.2 
(2003). 
329 Convention  for   the  Protection  of  Human  Rights  and  Fundamental Freedoms,  
 arts. 2, 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR]. 
330 Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, art. 1, Mar. 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 262. 
331 Thorme, supra note 320, at 310 (1991); see also Shelton, supra note 320, at 265. 
332 See REPÚBLICA DE HONDURAS CONSTITUCIÓN DE 1982 CON REFORMAS HASTA 
2019 [CONSTITUTION], Jan. 29, 2019, art. 145 (Hond.) (mentioning “an adequate 
environment to protect the health of persons”). 
333 See CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA PORTUGUESA [CONSTITUTION], Apr. 2, 1976, 
art. 66, ¶ 1 (Port.) (mentioning the right to “a healthy and ecologically balanced 
human living environment”). 
334 See 대한민국 헌법 [CONSTITUTION], Oct. 29, 1987, art. 35 (S. Kor.) (mentioning 
the right to “a healthy and pleasant environment”). 
335 Nickel, supra note 321, at 281–82.  Scholars argue that, in the environmental 
domain, it is more appropriate to appeal to obligations and responsibilities towards 
the environment, or to the respect of environmental goods.  See Cynthia Giagnocavo 
2019]               AGRICULTURAL EXCEPTIONALISM               139 
 
be destructive to human health and must provide protection from 
contamination and pollution. 336   Activities that cause adverse 
environmental effects but do not manifest a damage or threat to 
human health, such as noises emanating from nearby farms, are not 
covered by this narrower, anthropocentric 337  reading. 338   Critics 
question what such a narrow right adds to existing human rights, such 
as the right to life or the right to property, and denounce a “rights 
inflation”—dangers of “policy and resource overload” that may 
occur because of too many human rights enunciations.339  In the 
following, we examine the right to an environment through the 
narrower lens, due to the fact that this perspective seems to more 
closely follow the current state of international law, and because it 
acknowledges the close connection between human rights and the 
environment.  After all, the environment is the physical basis, the 
sine qua non, without which there are no human rights to enjoy or 
protect, as famously stated by Judge Weeramantry in his separate 
opinion to the Gabçikovo-Nagymaros judgment of the International 
Court of Justice.340  
 
The right to environmental protection only imposes a duty 
on natural and legal persons to refrain from activities that damage or 
threaten the environment to the determined extent (i.e., when these 
activities threaten human safety), and to restore damage and pay 
compensation to those affected. 341  Governments, in contrast, are 
“obligated to respect, protect, and fulfill the right to a healthy 
environment,” as the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and 
the Environment, David R. Boyd, noted in a report unanimously 
adopted by the UN General Assembly in January 2019.342  States 
have both a “negative duty to refrain from actions . . . [threatening] 
human life and health,” and a positive “duty to protect the inhabitants 
of their territories against environmental risks . . . [caused] by 
 
& Howard Goldstein, Law Reform or World Re-form: The Problem of 
Environmental Rights, 35 MCGILL L. J. 345, 359–60, 373–74 (1990). 
336 Nickel, supra note 321, at 284. 
337 Non-anthropocentric values, such as “duties toward the environment” and “rights 
of nature,” are protected by the Earth Charter and numerous international 
environmental law treaties.  Shelton, supra note 322, at 131–32. 
338 Nickel, supra note 321, at 285. 
339 Shelton, supra note 320, at 279; see generally Upendra Baxi, Too Many, or Too 
Few, Human Rights?, 1 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1 (2001) (providing an in-depth 
discussion of the “human rights overload”). 
340 Gabçikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), Separate Opinion of Judge 
Weeramantry, 1997 I.C.J. 7, at 91 (Sept. 25) (“The  protection  of  the  environment  
is . . . a sine qua non for numerous human rights such as the right to health and the 
right to life itself.”). 
341 Nickel, supra note 321, at 286. 
342 U.N. Doc. A/HRC/40/55, supra note 322, ¶ 6. 
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governments or private agencies.” 343   The duty to protect more 
specifically calls on governments to prevent, investigate, and 
prosecute violations as well as to provide appropriate redress.344  The 
right to environmental protection also encompasses procedural 
duties, such as the duty to allow individuals to sue polluters, 
participate in the formation of environmental laws, and access 
information.345  In this scheme, international law does not directly 
enable victims to sue private enterprises; only states can be held 
accountable for failure to do so and for the resulting harm.346  So far, 
claims that the human right to a safe environment is threatened or 
violated have mostly been raised against oil and logging 
industries.347  
 
The consumption of meat and milk products has for years 
been marketed as beneficial to human health and even as an indicator 
 
343 Nickel, supra note 321, at 286. 
344 Shelton, supra note 322, at 130.  
345 Access to judicial and administrative proceedings, including redress and remedy, 
is guaranteed by: the Rio Declaration; the Aarhus Convention on Access to 
Information Public, Participation and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters; 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change; the UDHR; the 
ICCPR; the ECHR; the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man; the 
African Charter; and the Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights’ 
General Comment No. 14 to Article 12 of the Covenant.  U.N. Conference on 
Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I), princ. 10 (Aug. 12, 1992); Convention on 
Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to 
Justice in Environmental Matters, art. 9, June 25, 1998, 2161 U.N.T.S. 447; United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, art. 6, May 9, 1992, 1771 
U.N.T.S. 107; see UDHR, supra note 242, art. 8; International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, art. 2(3), Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; 
ECHR, supra note 329, art. 6; American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of 
Man, art. XVIII, May 2, 1948, O.A.S. Res. XXX; African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, supra note 325, arts. 7, 24; General Comment 14, supra note 327, 
art. 12, ¶¶ 11, 59. 
346 Shelton, supra note 322, at 130.   
347  Statements by United Nations Special Rapporteur John H. Knox provide an 
example of logging.  See Statement of United Nations Special Rapporteur John H. 
Knox on the Conclusion of His Mission to Madagascar, UNITED NATIONS HUMAN 
RIGHTS OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R (Oct. 31, 2016), https://www.ohchr.org/EN/N 
ewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=20791&LangID=E. In June 2017, 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court set a precedent by challenging fracking under the 
right to a safe environment, referencing the Declaration of Rights of Pennsylvania’s 
state constitution, which recognizes “environmental rights as commensurate with 
their most sacred political and individual rights.”  See Pa. Envtl. Def. Found. v. 
Commonwealth, 161 A.3d 911, 916 (Pa. 2017); see generally John C. Dernbach, 
Kenneth T. Kristl & James R. May, Recognition of Environmental Rights for 
Pennsylvania Citizens: Pennsylvania Environmental Defense Foundation v. 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 70 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 803 (providing a 
disscussion of the case). 
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of the prosperity of a civilized nation.348  This framing, pushed by 
corporate lobbying, 349  largely ignores the human health costs of 
animal agriculture.  As CAFOs become larger and more intensified, 
there is a rising awareness of the fact that emissions of excessive 
nitrates cause blue baby syndrome, affect the development of the 
central nervous system, and lead to miscarriages. 350   Hydrogen 
sulfide is associated with mild cerebral dysfunction and brain 
damage for people living close to CAFOs. 351   Asthma, chronic 
bronchitis, declining lung functions, cardiovascular irritation, 
headaches, and even brain damage and death have been observed due 
to the exposure of CAFO workers and their families to hydrogen 
sulfide, ammonia, and dust.352  People living near CAFOs have been 
reported to suffer from increased levels of depression, anxiety, and 
sleep disturbances.353  Surroundings of CAFOs are also increasingly 
exposed to pathogen outbreaks, including bacteria, fungi, viruses, 
helminths (parasitic worms), and protozoa.354  The high toxicity of 
CAFOs becomes evident with the example of Mexico:  due to animal 
waste and fertilizer runoff, there is a now a dead zone of 20,000 km2 
with no marine life in the Gulf of Mexico. 355   The multi-level 
contamination of water, air, and soil by CAFOs directly and 
fundamentally threatens people’s health and life.   
 
Because they continue to subsidize and even to immunize 
CAFOs from environmental responsibility, governments can and 
should be held accountable for violating their duty to refrain from 
 
348  After the postwar period, milk and other animal products were identified as 
products of wealth and economic growth. See ANNE MENDELSON, MILK: THE 
SURPRISING STORY OF MILK THROUGH THE AGES 45 (2008). 
349 See Melissa Mialon & Jonathan Mialon, Corporate Political Activity of the Dairy 
Industry in France: An Analysis of Publicly Available Information, 20 PUB. HEALTH 
NUTRITION 2432, 2435–36 (2017); see SHARON TREAT & SHEFALI SHARMA, SELLING 
OFF THE FARM: CORPORATE MEAT’S TAKEOVER THROUGH TTP 16, 45 (2016); see 
Julie C. Keller, Margaret Gray & Jill Lindsey Harrison, Milking Workers, Breaking 
Bodies: Health Inequality in the Dairy Industry, 26 NEW LAB. F. 36, 36–37 (2017). 
350 Wilson, supra note 32, at 445 & n. 45 (discussing ammonia emissions from 
animal agriculture and studies of the effects of such emissions in North Carolina and 
Iowa); Brehm, supra note 32, at 813–14; Marc B. Schenker et al., Respiratory Health 
Hazards in Agriculture, 158 AM. J. RESPIRATORY & CRITICAL CARE MED. S1, S2 
(1998). 
351 Brehm, supra note 32, at 814. 
352 Id.; Wilson, supra note 32, at 446.  
353  Kelley J. Donham et al., Community Health and Socioeconomic Issues 
Surrounding Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations, 115 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 
317, 318 (2007). 
354 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, RISK ASSESSMENT EVALUATION FOR CONCENTRATED 
ANIMAL FEEDING OPERATIONS 29 (2004). 
355  Janet Raloff, Dead Waters: Massive Oxygen-Starved Zones Are Developing 
Along the World’s Coasts, SCI. NEWS (May 30, 2004, 4:30 PM), https://www.science 
news.org/article/dead-waters.  
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damaging human life and health, as well as for their failure to fulfill 
their duty to protect people from harm to life and health caused by 
third parties (i.e., animal agribusinesses).  As Shelton argues, “there 
may be little difference between a state that arbitrarily executes 
persons and a state that knowingly allows drinking water to be 
poisoned by contaminants.”356 
 
D.  Right to Land 
 
The right to land, or land rights, can be defined as “rights to 
use, control, and transfer a parcel of land.”357  Some voices, including 
land rights movements within civil society,358 have called for the 
recognition of such a right in international human rights law.359  One 
such voice is that of Miloon Kothari, the former UN Special 
Rapporteur on adequate housing.360  Olivier de Schutter, the former 
Special Rapporteur on the right to food, even speaks of an “emerging 
human right to land.”361 
 
Together  with  food  sovereignty  claims,362  the  legal 
recognition of the right to land is one of the main concerns of the 
transnational movement La Via Campesina, composed of farmers 
and members of rural and indigenous populations.363  The movement 
emerged in response to the growing commodification of land and to 
the large-scale acquisitions of land by corporate actors over the past 
decades.364  Presently, the right to land is not explicitly recognized 
as a self-standing human right in international human rights law; land 
is only mentioned at the margins365 or via related concepts, such as 
property366 or housing.367 
 
356 Shelton, supra note 322, at 171.  
357 Jérémie Gilbert, Land Rights as Human Rights: The Case for a Specific Right to 
Land, 18 SUR INT’L J. ON HUM. RTS. 115, 115 (2013). 
358 Id. at 116; Priscilla Claeys, The Right to Land and Territory: New Human Right 
and Collective Action Frame, 75 REVUE INTERDISCIPLINAIRE D’ÉTUDES JURIDIQUES 
115, 117, 124 (2015). 
359 De Schutter, supra note 27, at 305; Gilbert, supra note 357, at 116; Jennifer C. 
Franco, Sofía Monsalve & Saturnino M. Borras, Democratic Land Control and 
Human Rights, 15 CURRENT OPINION IN ENVTL. SUSTAINABILITY 66, 66, 68 (2015). 
360 Miloon Kothari (Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing as a Component of the 
Right to an Adequate Standard of Living), Report of the Special Rapporteur on 
Adequate Housing as a Component of the Right to an Adequate Standard of Living, 
¶¶ 25–31, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/18 (Feb. 5, 2007). 
361 De Schutter, supra note 27, at 303. 
362 Saturnino M. Borras Jr., Jennifer C. Franco & Sofía Monsalve Suárez, Land and 
Food Sovereignty, 36 THIRD WORLD Q. 600, 603 (2015). 
363 Claeys, supra note 358, at 117. 
364 Id. at 116–17. 
365 E.g., CEDAW, supra note 246, art. 14. 
366 E.g., UDHR, supra note 242, art. 17. 
367 E.g., ICESCR, supra note 238, art. 11(1). 
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Why talk about land if no corresponding right exists in 
contemporary international law? Simply because it is widely 
accepted that access to land is key to the realization of other human 
rights.368  As a matter of fact, land rights are present in several ways 
in international human rights law.369  In a report published in 2014, 
the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights noted that land issues, 
including large-scale agriculture, affect a variety of human rights, 
namely the right to self-determination, non-discrimination and 
equality, the right to life, the right to an adequate standard of living 
(including food, housing, and water), freedom from hunger, the right 
to an effective judicial remedy, freedom of opinion, expression, 
assembly and association, and the right to take part in public 
affairs.370  Following a number of scholars,371 the Commissioner has 
advocated viewing land issues through a human rights lens.372  
 
Right-to-farm laws and exemptions for animal agricultural 
industries greatly threaten the (emerging) human right to land.  In 
2014, agriculture took up 36.99% of all available land.373  Meat-
 
368 E.g., Gilbert, supra note 357, at 115; see also Land and Human Rights, UNITED 
NATIONS HUM. RTS. OFF. OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Iss 
ues/LandAndHR/Pages/LandandHumanRightsIndex.aspx (last visited Oct. 14, 
2019) [hereinafter Land and Human Rights]. 
369  Gilbert, supra note 357, at 115 (mentioning property law, the protection of 
indigenous eoples,  the  right  to  food, and  housing);  see UDHR, supra  note  242,  
 arts. 15, 25; see International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, art. 5, Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195; see CEDAW, supra note 
246, arts. 14(2)(h), 16; see ICCPR, supra note 345, art. 27; see ICESCR, supra note 
238, art. 11; see CRC, supra note 245, art. 27(3); see also U.N. Comm. on Econ., 
Soc. and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 4: The Right to Adequate Housing, 
art. 11(1), U.N. Doc. E/1992/23 (Dec. 13, 1991); U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc. and 
Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 7: The Right to Adequate Housing: Forced 
Evictions, art. 11.1, U.N. Doc. E/1998/22 (May 20, 1997). 
370 Econ.nd  Soc.  Council,  Rep.  of  the  High  Commissioner  for  Human  Rights,  
¶¶ 15–34, U.N. Doc. E/2014/86 (July 11, 2014) [hereinafter U.N. Doc. E/2014/86]; 
see  also  Land  and  Human  Rights,  supra  note  368  (“[T]he  shift  to  large-scale  
farming has . . . led to forced evictions, displacements and local food insecurity, 
which in turn has contributed to an increase in rural to urban migration and 
consequently further  pressure  on  access  to  urban  land  and  housing.”);  see  
generally  Office  of   the   High   Comm’r   for   Human   Rights,   Land   and   
Human  Rights: Standards and Applications, at 10, U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/15/5/Add.1 
(2015),  http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/Land_HRStandardsApplica 
tions.pdf [hereinafter Standards and Applications] (providing a comprehensive 
overview of the human rights implications of land-related issues). 
371 E.g., Gilbert, supra note 357, at 115; De Schutter, supra note 27, at 303. 
372  U.N. Doc. E/2014/86, supra note 370, at ¶¶ 62–66; see also Standards and 
Applications, supra note 370, at 53–54. 
373 Land Use Statistical Data, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/# 
data (last visited Dec. 21, 2019) (follow “Land Use Indicators” hyperlink under 
“Agri-Environmental Indicators” heading; select “World + (Total)” under 
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based nutrition requires significantly more land than plant-based 
nutrition.374  According to the FAO, the livestock sector uses 78% of 
all agricultural land and 33% of all cropland.375  More specifically, a 
study conducted in the Netherlands for the year 1990 has shown that 
meat production required 57.9 m2 of land per kg (with beef meat 
requiring 20.9 m2/kg), while the total production of cereals, sugar, 
potatoes, vegetables, and fruit required only 3.8 m2 of land per kg 
(over fifteen times less).376  To satisfy the demand for meat, many 
minority world countries today need more land than the surface that 
is available domestically.  For instance, between 2008 and 2010, the 
EU used a surface of almost fifteen million hectares of land, thirteen 
of which were located in South America.377  
 
These developments do not necessarily lead to investment 
relationships from which all parties benefit.  As a matter of fact, these 
global “land grab policies” often lead to dire conflicts as arable land 
is taken away from populations in the Global South, who 
simultaneously bear the environmental and human rights 
externalities of meat production.378  In South America, for example, 
approximately four million hectares of forest are disappearing every 
year, mainly due to the spread of agricultural activity.379  CAFOs also 
threaten grasslands, which are frequently replaced by monoculture 
production.380  Given the continuous growth of the world population 
and the steady increase in meat consumption,381 these issues will 
only become more severe in the future. 
 
The use of land for the purpose of animal agriculture affects 
individuals and their environment in a myriad of ways: it accelerates 
climate change and it leads to the pollution of water and soil, land 
degradation, and water depletion.382  Intensive animal agriculture 
 
“Regions”; select “Agricultural Land” under “Items”; select “All” under 
“Elements”; select “2014” under “Years”;  and then select “Show Data”). 
374 FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., supra note 33, at 74. 
375 Id. 
376 See P. Winnie Gerbens-Leenes, Sanderine Nonhebel & Wilfried P.M.F. Ivens, A 
Method to Determine Land Requirements Relating to Food Consumption Patterns, 
90 AGRIC., ECOSYSTEMS AND ENV’T. 47 (2002) (discussing the amount of 
agricultural land required for plant-based versus meat-based food production); see 
also WITZKE, NOLEPPA & ZHIRKOVA, supra note 273; FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., supra 
note 33, at 23–74. 
377 WITZKE, NOLEPPA & ZHIRKOVA, supra note 273, at 6. 
378 Id. at 7. 
379 Id. at 17. 
380 FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., supra note 33, at 34–35. 
381  WITZKE, NOLEPPA & ZHIRKOVA, supra note 273, at 15–17 (discussing the 
increasing consumption of meat in Germany in recent years). 
382 In the US, for example, livestock is estimated to be responsible for 55% of soil 
erosion on agricultural land.  FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., supra note 33, at 73. 
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also catalyzes soil acidification, notably because of the fertilizers on 
which it relies.383  The appropriation of land to meet the demands of 
agriculture can threaten specific human rights, such as the right to 
housing when the demand for land triggers forced evictions and 
displacements.384  The environmental and human rights side effects 
of animal agriculture are particularly palpable for specially 
vulnerable groups, such as indigenous communities.385 
 
Land issues related to factory farming have major 
consequences for the right to food.  The UN Special Rapporteur has 
frequently stressed that access to land is a prerequisite for realizing 
the right to food.386  It emerges from de Schutter’s analysis that 
factory farming increases the poverty (and hence jeopardizes the 
right to food) of small-scale farmers, but also of agricultural workers 
on large farms. 387   Addressing these issues requires reforming 
agricultural policy to ensure an equal distribution of land and security 
of tenure.388  Moreover, given the high impact of animal agriculture 
on these rights, the relevant policies need to be designed based on a 
holistic approach so as to take into account the interlinkage between 
CAFO production, land use, and the enjoyment of human rights. 
 
 
 
383  See Fertilizers and Soil Acidity, CROPNUTRITION (Apr. 2013), 
http://www.cropnutrition.com/fertilizers-and-soil-acidity. 
384 See Miloon Kothari (Special Rapporteur), Basic Principles and Guidelines on 
Development-Based Evictions and Displacement, Annex 1 of the Rep. of the Special 
Rapporteur on Adequate Housing as a Component of the Right to an Adequate 
Standard of Living, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/18 (Feb. 5, 2007). 
385 E.g., G.A. Res. 61/295, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples (Sept. 13, 2007). 
386 See U.N. Doc. A/57/356, supra note 260; see also U.N. Doc. A/65/281, supra 
note 280, ¶ 27 (discussing access to land and the right to food); Oliver de Schutter 
(Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food), Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the 
Right to Food, Addendum on Large-Scale Acquisitions and Leases: A Set of 
Minimum Principles and Measures to Address the Human Rights Challenge, U.N. 
Doc. A/HRC/13/33/Add.2 (Dec. 28, 2009).  De Schutter argues that access to land 
is sometimes a self-standing right and sometimes instrumental to the right to food.  
See De Schutter, supra note 27. 
387 De Schutter, supra note 27.  
388 Id.; Olivier de Schutter, The Green Rush: The Global Race for Farmland and the 
Rights of Land Users, 52 HARV. INT’L L. J. 504 (2011); see also ICESCR, supra note 
238, art. 11(2)(a); U.N. Doc. A/57/356, supra note 260, ¶ 30 (“[A]ccess to land and 
agrarian reform must form a key part of the right to food.”) (cited by Elisabeth 
Wickeri & Anil Kalhan, Land Rights Issues in International Human Rights Law, 4 
MALAYSIAN J. ON HUM. RTS. 16 (2010)); U.N. Doc. A/70/287, supra note 262, ¶ 34.  
The importance of ensuring security of land tenure has, for example, been mentioned 
by the FAO.  See FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., VOLUNTARY GUIDELINES ON THE 
PROGRESSIVE REALIZATION OF THE RIGHT TO ADEQUATE FOOD IN THE CONTEXT OF 
NATIONAL FOOD SECURITY 17 (2005) (referring to Guideline 8B). 
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E.  Right to Animal Protection 
 
Today, many animal protection and animal welfare acts 
throughout the world recognize animals as sentient, living beings, 
whom we owe moral and legal duties.  These laws provide that 
animals ought not to be treated inhumanely or caused unnecessary 
suffering.  This “general principle of animal welfare” 389  is 
established law in, among others, the following countries and supra- 
or international organizations: the EU, the Council of Europe, 
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, 
Costa Rica, Croatia, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Germany, 
Gibraltar, Greece, Hong Kong, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Israel, 
Kenya, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Malaysia, Malta, Myanmar, 
the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Papua 
New Guinea, Paraguay, the Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Puerto 
Rico, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, South Korea, Sri 
Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Tanzania, Tonga, Turkey, 
Uganda, Ukraine, the UK, the US, Vanuatu, Venezuela, and 
Zambia.390  In addition, more and more states (such as Brazil, Egypt, 
Germany, India, Luxemburg, and Switzerland) have expressed their 
concern for animals at a constitutional level, including by setting up 
duties owed to animals. 391   These provisions make an important 
value   statement   about   the   claims   of   animals   against   us   and  
 
389 MICHAEL BOWMAN ET AL., LYSTER’S INTERNATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW 678 (2d ed. 
2010); Sabine Brels, Animal Welfare Protection: A Universal Concern to Properly 
Address in International Law, J. ANIMAL WELFARE L. 34, 37 (2012); Katie Sykes, 
Sealing Animal Welfare Into the GATT Exceptions: The International Dimension of 
Animal Welfare in WTO Disputes, 13 WORLD TRADE REV. 471 (2014); Neil Trent et 
al., International Animal Law, With a Concentration on Latin America, Asia, and 
Africa, in THE STATE OF THE ANIMALS III 65, 77 (Deborah J. Salem & Andrew N. 
Rowan eds., 2005); Steven White, Into the Void: International Law and the 
Protection of Animal Welfare, 4 GLOBAL POL’Y 391 (2013). 
390 Charlotte E. Blattner, An Assessment of Recent Trade Law Developments From 
an Animal Law Perspective: Trade Law as the Sheep in Wolf’s Clothing?, 22 
ANIMAL L. 277, 304–6 (2016). 
391 Article 225 paragraph 1 VII of the Brazilian Constitution states that it is “the 
responsibility of the Government to . . . prohibiting, as provided by law, all practices 
that . . . subject animals to cruelty.”  CONSTITUIÇÃO DA REPÚBLICA FEDERATIVA DO 
BRASIL [C.F.] [Constitution] Oct. 5, 1988, art. 225, para. 1(IV) (Braz.).  Article 45 
of the Egyptian Constitution commits the state to “the protection of plants, livestock 
and fisheries; the protection of endangered species; and the prevention of cruelty to 
animals.”  CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT [CONSTITUTION] Jan. 15, 
2014, art. 45 (Egypt); see also Egypt’s Constitution of 2014, INT’L IDEA, 
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Egypt_2014.pdf (last updated Dec. 4, 
2019) (providing a translated version of Egypt’s Constitution).  In Germany, article 
20a of the Basic Law identifies animal protection as a state objective.  See 
GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW] May 23, 1949, art. 20a (Ger.), https://www.btg-
bestellservice.de/pdf/80201000.pdf; ENTWURF EINES GESETZES ZUR ÄNDERUNG DES 
GRUNDGESETZES (STAATSZIEL TIERSCHUTZ) [LAW TO CHANGE THE BASIC LAW 
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“bring . . . [animals] into the very structure of the body politic.”392 
 
Also on the international level, we are observing a growing 
awareness of the importance of thinking about the impacts of human 
activity on animals, e.g., under the auspices of the World 
Organization for Animal Health (OIE),393 the UN,394 the Council of 
 
(STATE OBJECTIVE OF ANIMAL PROTECTION)] July 31, 2002, BGBl. I at 2862 (Ger.) 
(amendments introduced by the Gesetz zur Änderung des Grundgesetzes).  Article 
51 of the Indian Constitution, introduced in 1976, provides that “[i]t shall be the duty 
of every citizen of India . . . to protect and improve the natural environment including 
forests, lakes, rivers and wild life, and to have compassion for living creatures.”  THE 
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA Nov. 26, 1949, art. 51 A(g) (India).  Luxembourg’s 
constitution provides in article 11: “The State guarantees the protection of the human 
and cultural environment, and works for the establishment of a durable equilibrium 
between the conservation of nature, in particular its capacity for renewal, and the 
satisfaction of the needs of present and future generations. It promotes the protection 
and well-being of animals.”  CONSTITUTION OF THE GRAND DUCHY OF LUXEMBOURG 
Oct. 17, 1868, art. 11bis (Lux.).  The Swiss Constitution protects the dignity of 
animals.  See FEDERAL CONSTITUTION OF THE SWISS CONFEDERATION Apr. 18, 1999, 
art. 120, para. 2 (Switz.); see generally Jessica Eisen & Kristen Stilt, Protection and 
Status of Animals, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 55 (Rainer Grote, Frauke Lachenmann & Rüdiger Wolfrum 
online eds., 2017) (providing an in-depth discussion of the aforementioned 
provisions).  Some Constitutions also allocate competences among state institutions 
or regulatory levels over animal protection matters, e.g., in Austria and Slovenia. 
392 BRUCE A. WAGMAN & MATTHEW LIEBMAN, A WORLDVIEW OF ANIMAL LAW 260 
(2011). 
393 World Organization for Animal Health [OIE], Terrestrial Animal Health Code, 
s. 7 (2018); OIE, Aquatic Animal Health Code, s. 7 (2018); see also OIE, Third 
Strategic Plan 2001-2005, 69 GS/FR (2000); see also OIE, Sixth Strategic Plan 
2016-2020, at 3, 83 SG/17 (2015) (identifying animal welfare as a mandate of the 
organization); see also FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY 
OPTIONS FOR ANIMAL WELFARE 7 (2010). 
394 G.A. Res. 66/750, at 8, 15, 18 (Mar. 20, 2012); U.N. NGO Branch, Dep’t of Econ. & 
Soc. Affairs, 64th UN DPI/NGO Conference, Bonn Declaration on Rio+20 
Presented to the General Assembly (Apr. 26, 2011) (arguing that safeguarding animal 
welfare is a requirement for achieving the goals of sustainable development and 
eradication of poverty, that the Millennium Consumption Goals should respect animal 
welfare, and that global agricultural production should ensure both good animal health 
and welfare); see also Gateway to Farm Animal Welfare, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., 
http://www.fao.org/ag/againfo/themes/animal-welfare/aw-abthegat/aw-whaistgate/ 
en/ (last visited Dec. 18, 2019) (a multi-stakeholder platform to exchange national 
and international knowledge about farm animal welfare). 
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Europe,395 and the World Trade Organization (WTO).396  Viewed 
together, these developments suggest an emerging universal 
consensus about the relevance of animal issues and that human 
diligence must be exercised when interacting with animals. 
 
In parallel, more and more scholars argue that humans feel 
violated themselves—in their dignity, and even in their rights—when 
animal protection laws are not adhered to or when governments fail 
to enact such laws in the first place.  This claim rests on an argument 
that ethicists have been raising for centuries, namely that there is a 
direct link between treating animals unkindly and the degradation of 
man.  Immanuel Kant famously stated it as:  
 
If a man shoots his dog because the animal is no 
longer capable of service, he does not fail in his duty 
to the dog, for the dog cannot judge, but his act is 
inhuman and damages in himself that humanity 
which it is his duty to show towards mankind.  If he 
is not to stifle his human feelings, he must practice 
kindness towards animals, for he who is cruel to 
animals becomes hard also in his dealings with 
men.397 
 
Today, policy makers recognize the connection between 
preventing animal cruelty and curbing human crimes, on the one 
hand, and animal cruelty and the brutalization of society, on the 
other.  People who are cruel towards humans often have a history of 
animal cruelty; vice versa, animal abuse is regularly an indicator for 
abuse of other family members (in the literature, these correlations 
are known as “the link”).398  
 
395  Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Animals During 
International Transport, Dec. 13, 1968, C.E.T.S. No. 065; Council of Europe, 
Convention for the Protection of Animals During International Transport (revised), 
Nov. 6, 2003, C.E.T.S. No. 193; Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection 
of Animals Kept for Farming Purposes, Mar. 10, 1976, C.E.T.S. No. 087; Council of 
Europe, Convention for the Protection of Animals for Slaughter, May 10, 1979, 
C.E.T.S. No. 102; Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Vertebrate 
Animals Used for Experimental and Other Scientific Purposes, Mar. 18, 1986, 
C.E.T.S. No. 123; Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Pet Animals, 
Nov. 13, 1987, C.E.T.S. No. 125. 
396  See Appellate Body Report, EC–Measures Prohibiting the Importation and 
Marketing of Seal Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS400/AB/R, WT/DS401/AB/R (adopted 
June 18, 2014). 
397 IMMANUEL KANT, LECTURES ON ETHICS 212 (P. Heath & J.B. Schneewind trans., 
1997). 
398  This link is noticed and examined by Rebecca L. Bucchieri.  See Rebecca L. 
Bucchieri, Bridging the Gap: The Connection between Violence Against Animals and 
Violence Against Humans, 11 J. ANIMAL & NAT. RESOURCE L. 115 (2015); see also 
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Drawing on these insights, Konstantin Leondarakis argues 
for a human right to animal protection, providing the following: “It 
is a right of every person to reasonably safeguard the lives and 
integrity of animals, and ensure they are treated with dignity.”399  
Such a right is needed, he claims, because current violations of 
animal interests cannot be redressed by animals, and because humans 
have only a limited ability to contribute to the proper enforcement of 
these laws; indeed, humans themselves lack standing because they 
have not suffered an injury.400 Leondarakis argues that a discrete 
human right to animal protection should be established, but that it 
could also be drawn from existing human rights guarantees, like the 
human right to privacy and family life, 401  and the protection of 
human dignity.402  
 
In CAFOs, farmed animals suffer from numerous 
production-related cardiovascular, skeletal, and respiratory diseases 
as well as mutilation, mourning, aggression, frustration, and lethal 
stress syndromes.403  Against this background, exempting animal 
cruelty in agriculture from the purview of the law is problematic in 
two ways.  First, the general principle of animal welfare404 demands 
 
FRASCH ET AL., supra note 125, at 107; HUMANE SOC’Y OF THE U.S., FIRST STRIKE: THE 
VIOLENCE CONNECTION (2008), https://www.sheriffs.org/publications/first_strike.pdf; 
KONSTANTIN LEONDARAKIS, ETHIK IM RECHT: DIE VERLETZUNG VON 
MENSCHENRECHTEN DURCH DIE VERLETZUNG VON BELANGEN AN TIEREN 34 (2001); 
ANDREW LINZEY, THE LINK BETWEEN ANIMAL ABUSE AND HUMAN VIOLENCE (2009); 
SCHAFFNER, supra note 126, at 28; WAGMAN & LIEBMAN, supra note 392, at 145. 
399 KONSTANTIN LEONDARAKIS, MENSCHENRECHT “TIERSCHUTZ”: DIE VERLETZUNG 
VON MENSCHENRECHTEN DURCH DIE VERLETZUNG VON BELANGEN VON TIEREN 54 
(2006) (authors’ translation). 
400 Id. at 30. 
401 Id. at 41.  Article 8 ECHR protects relationships to other beings, namely animals.  
See ECHR, supra note 329, art. 8 (providing that “[e]veryone has the right to respect 
for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.”). 
402  Not only does a violation of animal protection violate a person’s subjective 
dignity; it also infringes the objective worth of dignity.  LEONDARAKIS, supra note 
398, at 42. 
403 The animal industry has changed the morphology and physiology of animals, 
which impairs their ability to adapt.  Today, chickens reach the weight of two 
kilograms twice as fast as they did fifty years ago.  Dairy cows were intensively bred 
for more productive mammary glands.  Cows used for meat production now have 
enormous muscle mass, which strains their internal organs.  Joy M. Verrinder, Nicki 
McGrath & Clive J.C. Phillips, Science, Animal Ethics and the Law, in ANIMAL LAW 
AND WELFARE: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 63, 63–64 (Deborah Cao & Steven 
White eds., 2016).  In CAFOs, animals are mutilated to prevent injuries that arise at 
high stocking densities: tails are docked; beaks, teeth, and toes are clipped; ears are 
notched; horns are removed; and castration is undertaken without anesthetics.  See 
David N. Cassuto, Bred Meat: The Cultural Foundation of Factory Farm, 70 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 59, 64 (2007); Matheny & Leahy, supra note 122, at 328; PEW 
COMM’N, supra note 29, at 35. 
404 See supra text accompanying note 389. 
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that animals be treated humanely and that they be spared from 
suffering.  Because agricultural production affects the highest 
number of domesticated animals, it is, from a teleological 
perspective, unjustifiable not to apply this principle to the 
agricultural sector.  This prompts us to address and question the 
blanket authorizations given to CAFO industries to inflict systematic 
cruelty on animals through broad right-to-farm laws and far-reaching 
immunities from the law.  Second, should the human right to animal 
protection be established as a stand-alone right or as an integral part 
of the human right to privacy and family life, then states would 
violate their legal duties to protect and respect this right by not 
establishing the necessary legal framework to review practices that 
threaten and likely violate it.  In other words, the human right to 
animal protection would apply regardless of sweeping farmers’ 
rights.  Together, these developments make clear that the interests of 
animals and humans are often intertwined and that there are 
numerous entry-points that could be used more systematically in the 
future for litigation and advocacy purposes. 
 
V.  Conclusion 
 
Across the world, most people cling onto a “happy farm” 
image, be it the red barn in the US or cows roaming on green pastures 
in Europe.  This image has been produced and sustained through 
heavy marketing campaigns. 405  The reality is markedly different.  
Laws originally designed to govern small family farms now protect 
corporate giants, many of which are multinationals.  By benefitting 
from farmers’ rights (i.e., right-to-farm laws and exemptions from 
environmental and animal laws), agribusinesses are, in many cases, 
shielded from regulation.  In fact, as we argued, the combination of 
rampant corporate activity and de facto immunity from the law acts 
as a toxic agent that threatens the environment and our livelihoods. 
 
The host of negative effects of animal agriculture on the 
immediate environment, workers, and the local community are well-
documented. However, little is done academically to explore their 
global repercussions, particularly on human rights guarantees.  
Human rights litigation, advocacy, and research have yet to 
recognize and address this angle.  With this contribution, we have 
attempted to fill this soaring gap.  We have shown how intensified 
animal agriculture threatens and violates the human rights to food, 
water, a safe environment, land, and animal protection, and we have 
made apparent the urgency to address these issues.  Under 
international law, states are obligated to respect, protect, and fulfill 
 
405 Wilson, supra note 32, at 451. 
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human rights—duties which they violate when they exempt from the 
law the many activities of animal agriculture that directly cause 
human suffering and violate or threaten well-established basic rights.  
While in domestic law, states are prima facie at liberty to establish 
insulations for agriculture, international law (particularly the human 
rights regime) binds all states and puts a halt to the most sweeping 
forms of agricultural exceptionalism.  This knowledge can and 
should be used as a strategy for litigation and advocacy to hold states 
accountable, and further prompt us as a society to seriously question 
the rationale underlying the many right-to-farm laws and exemptions 
enjoyed by this type of agriculture.406   
 
Through our contribution, we hope to forge a pathway for 
the many more analyses that are needed at this juncture.  In particular, 
more research is necessary to determine which other human rights 
are violated or threatened by animal agriculture, such as the right to 
life, housing, privacy, and family life.  Future research should 
notably also explore the responsibility of agricultural businesses to 
protect these human rights and how such actors can be held 
accountable for violations.407 
 
As time passes, finding alternatives to CAFOs will become 
a matter of practical necessity due to the biophysical limits of land, 
water, and biomass.  In the meantime, for the sake of human health 
and life, animals, and a safe environment, appropriate regulation—
including and perhaps especially on the international plane—is 
essential to anticipate, address, and remedy these violations.  
International human rights lawyers are uniquely equipped to address 
these issues and contribute to the further development and 
reconceptualization of this nexus, acting as catalysts for much-
needed change. 
 
406 Ruhl, supra note 111, at 263; see also Alford & Berger Richardson, supra note 
44, at 136 (“RTFs [right-to-farm laws] have failed to adapt to changing industry 
standards in agricultural production and to incorporate the level of public 
accountability required to ensure the continued sustainability of the industries and 
lands they exist to protect.”). 
407 See supra text accompanying note 24. 
